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Glossary of Key Terms 
 
5x5x5 
A 5x5x5 intelligence report is an applied methodology for the evaluation and 
dissemination of incoming and outgoing intelligence.  The numbers reference a 
tripartite system to evaluate data and control dissemination, using a five-point scale 
to grade the trustworthiness of the source, the reliability of the information or 
intelligence described on the report and to assign a handling code to indicate how 
widely the intelligence may be disseminated.  The model has recently been 
superseded by an alternative system, the 3x5x2 which was designed to be more 
straightforward, especially with respect to dissemination. 
 
Chatham House Rule 
The Chatham House Rule is a widely recognised and observed protocol that is used 
to enable the presentation or discussion of potentially sensitive information in a forum 
that may comprise representatives of many and diverse organisations.  The 
convention stipulates that while participants may subsequently use or refer to the 
information disclosed during the meeting, they may not reveal the identity of the 
speaker or other participants.  The Rule was devised in 1927 by The Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, and was most recently refined in 2002.  While it can be 
common for meetings using the convention to refer to Chatham House Rules, there 
is only one such Rule in place.  The formal wording of the Rule is: 
 
“When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, 
participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity 
nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be 
revealed.” (Chatham House, 2017). 
 
Government Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN) 
GAIN networks are multi-organisational, cross-sector information and intelligence 
sharing networks that operate across the UK, organised primarily on a regional basis 
although with some local GAINs operating at more localised (e.g. city) levels.  GAINs 
are based within police Regional Organised Crime Units [ROCUs].  The networks are 
organised around a central GAIN Coordinator who acts as the central conduit for 
intelligence sharing, managing requests and referrals from partner agencies in a hub-
and-spoke model.  The networks allow both the coordination of action amongst 
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partner agencies against criminal targets and as a means of allowing organisations 
to request intelligence searches of other members’ intelligence databases.  GAINs 
can include amongst their membership organisations that operate across all sectors. 
 
Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) 
Intelligence-Led Policing is a model of policing that focuses on the use of intelligence 
to determine the priorities for allocation of policing resource according to risk.  It was 
developed as a proactive approach to policing targeting patterns of problem areas 
and prolific offenders, rather than the reactive models that preceded it which focussed 
on the response to individual incidents. 
 
Management of Police Information (MOPI) 
MOPI is a framework for the collection, handling, storage, retention, review, 
destruction and sharing of information collected by police forces in England and 
Wales.  The principles and responsibilities for MOPI are set out in a Code of Practice 
issued in 1995 by the Home Office, under the Police Act 1996 and the Police Act 
1997.  The code sets out principles of practice for the handling of data – including 
personal data, information and intelligence – collected for policing purposes, and the 
responsibilities incumbent upon Chief Constables to put into place systems and 
procedures to ensure compliance with the code. 
 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
A Memorandum of Understanding, or an Information Sharing Agreement, is a formal 
written agreement between two parties that can be used to establish the basis on 
which an information-sharing relationship is based.  These take many different forms, 
but can include details such as the purpose of the agreement, the circumstances for 
sharing, the legal basis under which information sharing will take place, key parties 
and points of contact, and the process by which information sharing will take place.  
It may also formalise the rights and obligations of the parties, and any mechanisms 
to check and review that the processes, and agreement, are functioning as intended. 
 
National Fraud Initiative (NFI) 
The National Fraud Initiative, initially set up in 1996, is a multi-agency and cross 
sector data matching project run by the Cabinet Office (and previously by the Audit 
Commission).  The project operates on a biennial cycle, collecting payroll and creditor 
data from participating organisations from the public, private and not-for-profit 
sectors.  This data is matched across all participating agencies and relevant matches 
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that may indicate potential fraud is returned to each organisation for review and, 
where appropriate, investigation.  The NFI is credited with helping participating 
organisations identify £1.39 billion of fraud and overpayments since its inception. 
 
National Intelligence Model (NIM) 
The National Intelligence Model is a business model designed for law enforcement 
around the concept of Intelligence-Led Policing.  The model was developed by the 
UK’s National Criminal Intelligence Service and implemented across UK police forces 
in the early 2000s.  It defines a process for intelligence-led policing decisions 
operating at three levels: local, cross-border and organised crime.  The model 
outlines central processes including Tasking and Coordination Groups which meet to 
determine policing priorities and allocate resources based on a defined set of 
products that assist in this decision making.  These products are split into four 
categories: analytical products, intelligence products, knowledge products and 
system products. 
 
Specified Anti-Fraud Organisation (SAFO) 
Sections 68-72 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 provides a legal gateway for public 
sector authorities to share sensitive information and intelligence with organisations 
designated under the legislation as Specified Anti-Fraud Organisations for the 
purposes of the prevention, detection and investigation of fraud.  This gateway may 
be used so long as the disclosure does not breach the Data Protection Act 1998 or 
any obligation of confidence that the authority has, and that the disclosure is not 
prohibited by Part 1 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 [RIPA].  This 
gateway was designed to facilitate appropriate cross-sector sharing from the public 
sector to private and not-for-profit sector organisations.  The Serious Crime Act 2007 
required the government to produce a code of practice for sharing under the provision.  
SAFO status is conferred upon organisations whose purpose and procedures have 
been vetted and approved as being competent in handling and processing such data 
for the purposes of combating fraud. 
 
Single Point of Contact (SPOC) 
A Single Point of Contact is a party within an organisation designated as the formal 
contact or gatekeeper within an information sharing relationship, and the point 
through which requests for information or intelligence would normally be channelled.  
They will commonly also be the point from which information and intelligence will be 
disseminated under the same relationship.  In many cases, the SPOC will be 
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identified for each party within a formal MOU document.  While often the SPOC will 
be a single person or contact point within an organisation or department, given the 
size of many organisations (such as multinational corporations) there may be more 
than one designated SPOC.  SPOCs will often also act both as gatekeeper and as 
arbiters or guarantors of the quality and reliability of shared information and of the 
rules under which it is disseminated. 
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Abstract 
Information and intelligence sharing has long been recognised to be a practice that 
could have significant bearing on organisations’ ability to prevent, detect, investigate 
and take action against economic crime.  Despite this recognition, many businesses 
struggle to build and maintain effective information sharing relationships.  This 
research aims to close the gap caused by limited academic attention paid to economic 
crime information sharing, examining the contemporary nature of the challenges, the 
models and strategies that can be used to overcome these and how professional 
practice can be improved to increase information and intelligence sharing in this area. 
 
Data was collected in two phases in order to examine how those organisations that 
manage to successfully share information and intelligence overcome the challenges 
to collaboration.  The first phase involved a case study into how the Federation 
Against Copyright Theft handles and shares intelligence with partners.  This involved 
twenty-four interviews with officers and staff and examining documents relating to its 
operational activity and on-site observations.  The second phase of the research 
involved conducting twenty-two interviews with participants from other organisations 
in respect of their approaches to information and intelligence sharing.  Most of these 
participants were anti-fraud, IP crime or criminal intelligence sharing practitioners, 
although a couple represented relevant stakeholders at regulatory and government 
policy levels. 
 
The study found that the foundation of effective intelligence sharing relationships is a 
combination of trust, competence in intelligence handling and mutual understanding 
between organisations.  In order to overcome an array of challenges to collaboration, 
including a complex and commonly misunderstood legal framework, cultural 
resistance to sharing information and the lack of a comprehensive national strategy 
and standards for anti-crime intelligence handling and sharing, organisations employ 
a range of strategies.  These include aligning their working practices to the National 
Intelligence Model as a default standard, formalising relationships through 
intelligence sharing agreements and committing resources to training both their own 
employees and staff in partner organisations to ensure that practitioners on both sides 
have the requisite skills and knowledge to share information in a competent and legal 
manner.  There are significant risks remaining, however, in the interpretation and 
implementation of a default standard that was designed for law enforcement and in 
the context of forthcoming legislative change in data protection law. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
Background 
 
Fraud and Intellectual Property Crime 
Fraud affects all aspects of society, causing significant harm to its direct victims, to 
the wider economy and to society as a whole.  The true cost of fraud is difficult to 
determine with accuracy for many reasons, not least of which are that it is, by its very 
nature, a hidden crime.  Much fraud will remain undiscovered, and a significant 
amount of fraud that is discovered is not formally reported (NERA, 2000, pp.2-3), 
while methodologies for accurate measurement of it are still being formulated and 
refined (National Audit Office [NAO], 2016, p.20).  Furthermore, a substantial amount 
of fraud is identified only by accident (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
[ACFE], 2016, p.21).  In some areas, it has been difficult to distinguish between the 
crime of fraud and non-criminal activity: statistics and reports of tax and benefit fraud 
are still routinely conflated with those for errors (NAO, 2015, p.11), while many 
organisations and individuals also attribute losses to error or misfortune rather than 
crime (Levi, 1987, p.27).  There are numerous different routes and sources for 
collecting and recording fraud data, all using different approaches and definitions, and 
many gaps where little or no data is collected at all.  The differences in methodology 
can impact on the quality and reliability of some of this data (Levi, Burrows, Fleming 
& Hopkins, 2007, p.15).  Even within government departments' central reporting of 
data, fraud is underestimated and inconsistently reported, with the NAO (2016, p.5) 
observing that some departments reported no fraud losses to the Cabinet Office for 
the data that it had started to collect, despite reporting it elsewhere for the same 
period. 
 
Despite these problems, there are resources and research that we can use to get an 
overall understanding of the scale of the issue, at both national and international 
levels.  In the UK, the national crime statistics in England and Wales show that 
621,000 fraud offences were recorded by law enforcement agencies (Office for 
National Statistics [ONS], 2016, p.22) and provides an official estimate that 5.8 million 
offences of fraud and computer misuse occurred in the year to March 2016 (pp.38-
39).  The most recent attempt at a comprehensive national estimate of the cost of 
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fraud assessed the annual cost to the UK economy of £193 billion, with the private 
sector losing £144 billion, the public sector £37.5 billion and the remainder split 
between individuals and the charity sector (UK Fraud Costs Measurement 
Committee, 2016, p.11).  That study revived the approach taken by the former 
National Fraud Authority [NFA] for which the most recent official estimates of the 
annual cost of fraud had been £52 billion (2013, p.2) and £73 billion (2012, p.7) 
respectively.  Even these estimations do not cover all types of fraud, or all industries. 
 
At the international level the challenges to measurement are greater still, although 
there are still estimations to which we can refer.  One regular assessment is the 
biennial study conducted by the ACFE which surveys the cost of occupational fraud.  
The 2016 report estimated that the average organisation loses 5% of its turnover to 
fraud and posits that, extrapolated to global Gross Domestic Product [GDP], the 
annual cost to the world economy equates to $3.7 trillion (ACFE, 2016, p.8).  Although 
there are methodological issues with the survey, the 5% figure remains consistent 
both with previous editions (ACFE, 2014; ACFE, 2012; ACFE, 2010) and with 
estimates by other researchers using alternative approaches (Button & Gee, 2013, 
pp.16-17). 
 
Cybercrime, which can involve both fraud and intellectual property crime, is also a 
significant problem, with a recent international survey of over 6,000 organisations 
reporting that 32% had been victimised in the last year (PwC, 2016, p.9).  Other 
research suggests the global average cost of a cyber-attack on an organisation to be 
as high as $6 million (Juniper Research, 2015, p.2), and that the global cost of data 
breaches will exceed $2 trillion by 2019.  It has been reported that 34% of cybercrime 
targeting UK companies is related to intellectual property crime (Centre for 
Economics and Business Research, 2015, p.7).  Intellectual property crime itself is 
difficult to put a cost to, as it covers a diverse array of criminality from corporate 
espionage and information theft to the trade in counterfeit goods including, most 
prominently in the UK, tobacco, alcohol, clothing, shoes and DVDs [Digital Versatile 
Discs] (IP Crime Group, 2015, p.6).  Nationally and internationally the trade involves 
a more extensive range of goods including food, consumer electronics and 
pharmaceuticals, and there are documented links between intellectual property crime 
and organised crime syndicates (IP Crime Group, 2014, pp.24-25).  Consumer 
entertainment-focused intellectual property crime increasingly involves the delivery 
and consumption of copyrighted entertainment material, including music, film and 
television content, through online streaming and away from the distribution of physical 
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media (Federation Against Copyright Theft [FACT], 2012b, p.5).  Although there are 
no readily available comprehensive data on the losses to the UK economy, the costs 
have been estimated at £1.3 billion per year in respect of counterfeit goods alone 
(National Crime Agency [NCA], 2015, p.26). 
 
More comprehensive estimates are available beyond the UK, perhaps most notably 
that intellectual property crime costs the US economy approximately $300 billion per 
year (IP Commission, 2013, p.2).  The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development [OECD] (2008, p.114) estimated the value of the global trade in 
counterfeit and pirated goods to be $200 billion in 2005.  A study commissioned by 
the International Chambers of Commerce built on the OECD methodology and 
extended it to domestic and internet-based counterfeiting and piracy.  This produced 
an estimate of the cost of these crimes falling between $455 billion and $650 billion 
in 2008, with wider economic damage for the G20 economies in excess of $125 billion 
per year and 2.5 million jobs lost (Frontier Economics, 2011, pp.46-48).  Furthermore, 
it projected that the cost of counterfeiting and piracy could increase to as much as 
$1.7 trillion by 2015. 
 
These figures, which generally exclude wider associated costs, demonstrate the 
devastating damage that these crimes cause to the national and global economies.  
As such, they exemplify the need for effective action across all sectors to combat 
these crimes, of which information sharing is an essential component. 
 
The Fraud Review and the Subsequent Environment for Combating Fraud 
The sharing of information and intelligence has long been recognised as being of 
pivotal importance in combating fraud and similar crimes.  Indeed, they are strategies 
of great value in combating many types of crime.  However, where fraud and 
intellectual property crime are so widespread, affecting all aspects of society and 
impacting on organisations across all sectors and industries, it takes on particular 
significance.  The UK’s Fraud Review (Fraud Review Team, 2006b) placed significant 
emphasis on the need to improve cross-sector information sharing and devoted 
substantial coverage to issues of information, intelligence and data sharing.  Since 
the Fraud Review was published the need for, and commitment to, improved 
collaboration and exchange of information and intelligence between organisations 
and agencies has been repeatedly restated as a central tenet in numerous official 
strategies for combating fraud and intellectual property crime (National Fraud 
Strategic Authority, 2009, pp.34-39; NFA, 2011b, pp.19-20; Cabinet Office, 2011a, 
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pp.12-13; Cabinet Office, 2011b, pp. 37-38; Fighting Fraud Locally Oversight Board, 
2011; p.14; Home Office, 2011, p.21; Home Office, 2013, p.10; CIPFA, 2016, p.8). 
 
The Fraud Review (2006, pp.76-77) observed that, while information about fraud is 
gathered by organisations other than law enforcement agencies, there are 
inadequate mechanisms or strategies in place to allow effective intelligence sharing 
between police forces, let alone between private sector organisations and the police.  
Despite this long-standing recognition that information sharing is an essential strategy 
for preventing and investigating economic crime, and the repeated inclusion of it 
within anti-crime strategies in the years since the Fraud Review, it is not clear that the 
situation has significantly improved. 
 
The Fraud Review was the most comprehensive review of the fraud problem, and the 
infrastructure and environment for combating it, in recent years.  It made a total of 
sixty-two recommendations with respect to improving the national response to fraud, 
including in the following key areas: 
 
 creation of a National Fraud Strategic Authority [NFSA] to provide a strategic 
lead on the response to fraud and to measure the extent of the problem 
 creation of a national fraud reporting centre to receive reports of fraud and to 
create and disseminate warnings, statistics and intelligence packages 
 for the government and the NFSA, in consultation with the Information 
Commissioner’s Office [ICO], to produce guidance on data sharing for public 
authorities 
 for public authorities to give primacy to the common law position on data 
sharing 
 establishing a National Lead [police] Force for fraud to act as a centre of 
excellence 
 additional recommendations, and a recurring emphasis, on measures to 
enable and encourage greater information sharing (Fraud Review Team, 
2006b). 
 
Following publication of the Fraud Review, a number of actions were taken by the 
government which did significantly impact the response to fraud.  Not least of these 
was the passing of the Fraud Act 2006, which significantly simplified the law with 
respect to fraud, introducing clearer offences.  The Act was not a consequence of the 
Fraud Review, but rather the result of a Bill that was concurrent to it which arose from 
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a prior recommendation from the Law Commission (Farrell, Yeo & Ladenburg, 2007, 
p.2; Law Commission, 2002, pp.2-4).  Additional legislative changes introduced after 
the Fraud Review included the introduction of the Bribery Act 2010 and, significantly, 
provision within the Serious Crime Act 2007 [SCA] for public authorities to share 
information with private sector organisations designated as Specified Anti-Fraud 
Organisations [SAFOs] (Home Office, 2015, p.7).  The government also implemented 
several key Fraud Review recommendations, including establishing the NFSA (which 
later became the NFA), nominating the City of London Police [COLP] as the National 
Lead Force for fraud and establishing the National Fraud Reporting Centre (later 
renamed Action Fraud) and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau [NFIB] within the 
COLP (HM Treasury & NAO, 2008, p.7).  In addition, the Serious Organised Crime 
Agency [SOCA] was replaced by the NCA in 2013, with the new agency having an 
Economic Crime Command and a National Cyber Crime Unit within its operational 
structure (NCA, 2016, p.7). 
 
However, not all developments were positive or permanent, with actions in a number 
of areas never fully implemented or subsequently rescinded.  Most notable was the 
government’s decision to abolish the NFA in 2014, resulting in the cessation of the 
publication of annual official measurements and estimates of the cost of fraud to the 
economy (Fraud Advisory Panel [FAP], 2016, p.6).  Furthermore, following abolition 
of the NFA, there appears to be no overall coordination or strategic direction 
underlying ongoing collaborative initiatives between the government and private 
sector (FAP, 2016, p.8).  There has also been limited engagement between public 
authorities and the private sector through the legal gateway established under the 
SCA.  Only six bodies were designated as SAFOs when the gateway was established 
and the NFA reported in 2010 that there was limited use of this, with some major 
authorities – notably HM Revenue & Customs [HMRC] and the Department for Work 
and Pensions [DWP] – hesitating to share information with SAFOs despite the clear 
gateway being in place (NFA, 2010a, pp.14-17).  A subsequent review of the use of 
the gateway indicated that neither HMRC nor the DWP were sharing information with 
SAFOs five years later, a full eight years after establishment of the channel (ICO, 
2015a, p.15).  The review also reported a disparity between the level of sharing 
reported by public authorities and that which the SAFOs themselves reported as 
taking place, concluding that this discrepancy was due to lack of understanding of the 
legal channel by public bodies (ICO, 2015a, p.5). 
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Legal Channels for Information Sharing 
The legislative infrastructure surrounding the sharing of personal data in the UK is 
complex, convoluted, opaque and not widely understood.  This greatly complicates 
the prospects for, and process of, greater collaboration for combating economic 
crime. 
 
Public sector organisations are restricted to sharing within the extent of their legal 
powers (Law Commission, 2014, p.7).  These powers are generally derived from 
statute, although in many cases these do not expressly cover data sharing (ICO, 
2011, p.11).  Public bodies' legal powers to share information may derive from: 
 
 an express obligation to share 
 an express power to share through a legal gateway defined by statute 
 implied powers to share (ICO, 2011, pp.11-12) 
 non-statutory powers (such as common law) (Law Commission, 2013, p.48). 
 
Legal gateways are statutorily provided channels to enable public bodies to share 
data within specific circumstances or conditions (Fraud Review Team 2006a, p.125; 
Kennedy, 2007, p.383).  These add significant complexity to the issue of data sharing 
as there are manifold gateways in place.  The Law Commission found there to be in 
excess of sixty gateways for the DWP spread across more than twenty pieces of 
legislation (2014, p.26) and over two hundred and sixty for HMRC (2014, p.130).  
Furthermore, these are discretionary and there is no obligation for public bodies to 
share even if a gateway, specific or general, is in place (Department for Constitutional 
Affairs, 2011, p.21).  The picture is complicated further as it is not always clear which 
law takes precedence in many circumstances, which can be problematic if 
determining which legal gateways exist, or whether these override obligations to keep 
data confidential.  A more general gateway exists for public sector bodies under s.17 
and s.115 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, allowing agencies to share information 
to enable them to prevent crime within their respective areas of responsibility (Brooks, 
Moss and Pease, 2003, p.8; Wenjing, 2011, p.365).  Another broad gateway that was 
developed to allow public bodies to share information with the private sector for the 
prevention of fraud was under s.68 of the SCA, which allows sharing with private 
sector entities designated as SAFOs.  However, as noted above, only six 
organisations were recognised as SAFOs when the legislation was introduced.  
Although the list has since been extended, only eleven SAFOs are currently 
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recognised (Home Office, 2015, p.20) and the gateway is still under-used by public 
authorities with respect to these as outlined above.  Finally, there are common law 
powers that enable public bodies to share data.  However, there is both considerable 
uncertainty as to their extent and application, and the Law Commission's (2014, p.86) 
consultation on information sharing found that the plethora of statutory gateways had 
resulted in the perception that there was no power to share information where no 
specific gateway was in place. 
 
From a legal perspective, the situation is more straightforward for private sector 
organisations in that they have a general ability to share information so long as this 
is done within the constraints of the law (ICO, 2011, p.12).  For both public and private 
sectors, the main legal parameters within which any otherwise legally permitted 
sharing may take place are the constraints of the Data Protection Act 1998 [DPA] and 
the law on confidence as derived from Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, although some entities may be subject to additional constraints such 
as that of legal privilege (Law Commission, 2013, p.25). 
 
While the DPA is a constraint on sharing, it does contain an important exemption from 
the rules on how personal data may be processed and disclosed under s.29 of the 
Act, which include exemptions for the prevention and detection of crime and for the 
apprehension or prosecution of offenders (ICO, 2001, pp.42-43).  This provides a 
valuable channel to facilitate qualifying disclosures, although it is not a gateway that 
allows sharing in its own right (Law Commission, 2014, p.14). 
 
There is considerable complexity within the law on data sharing, especially where this 
involves public authorities.  This can impact on their ability and willingness to 
collaborate with other organisations, in both public and private sectors, for the 
prevention or investigation of economic crime.  The law continues to develop in this 
area, with another legal gateway having recently been introduced through 
parliamentary legislation.  Part Five of the Digital Economy Act 2017 contains a 
provision for an information sharing gateway between public bodies for the 
prevention, detection and investigation of fraud against a public authority, or the 
pursuit of sanctions.  The sharing of information using this gateway, will be restricted 
to 'specified persons' to be defined under subsequent regulations, and a further code 
of practice will be issued setting out rules for use of the gateway (HM Government, 
2016, pp.31-32).  Such a structure for the proposed gateway does not suggest that 
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the government is moving in the direction of enabling more general gateways to assist 
in the fight against economic crime, or towards simplification of statutory provisions. 
 
It should also be noted that not all information sharing need necessarily rely on 
legislative gateways.  An often overlooked issue within the debate is that a 
considerable amount can be achieved through the sharing of non-classified data 
(Hardouin, 2009, p.209), although this thesis is primarily concerned with how to share 
data that might have some restrictions upon its exchange. 
 
Intelligence Sharing Failure 
It is important also to acknowledge that information and intelligence sharing do not 
just present opportunities for improving the fight against crime, but that there have 
been, and will continue to be, serious consequences for organisations' failure to do 
so.  We have unfortunately been witness to numerous examples of intelligence 
sharing failure that have had serious, and sometimes tragic, ramifications in recent 
years, in both the crime and security arenas. 
 
Failures in intelligence sharing have been highlighted in recent terrorist attacks, such 
as those in Paris in 2015 (Corera, 2016, para.12; Camilli, 2015, paras.3-9) and, more 
recently, in Brussels in 2016 (Karagiannis, 2017).  Intelligence sharing failures have 
also been highlighted in many serious criminal matters in the UK in recent decades; 
the recent inquiries into the Jimmy Saville scandal found that intelligence reports had 
not been made available to several police forces; doing so could potentially have 
prevented serious abuses or led to earlier identification of his crimes (Oswald, 2013, 
p.7).  Some of the most significant recent fraud cases could also have been averted 
with better sharing of intelligence.  The fraud resulting in the collapse of Enron, which 
had previously been one of the ten largest US companies with assets valued at $62 
billion in September 2001 (Oppel Jr. & Sorkin, 2001, paras.1-2), in November 2001 
could have been identified sooner with better information sharing and scrutiny; the 
information in Enron's tax filings indicated that it paid no tax as a non-profitable 
company, in contrast to the information published in its financial statements (Gladwell, 
2007, paras.57-58). 
 
The Madoff Ponzi scheme, the largest fraud in history with losses of $65 billion 
(Bandler & Varchaver, 2009, para.3), could also have been identified much earlier 
with adequate intelligence handling and sharing.  The U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission [SEC] missed several opportunities to investigate following direct 
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allegations and referrals made to it by a whistle-blower in 2000 and 2001, with the 
Boston office failing to send details to its New York counterpart (Markopolos, 2010, 
p.65) and through ignoring articles in the financial press questioning the integrity of 
the hedge fund (SEC, 2009, pp.74-77).  These, and other, failings have had 
considerable ramifications, and serve as stark reminders as to the critical importance 
of intelligence and information sharing in combating fraud and other forms of crime. 
 
Aims of the Research 
This research concerns information and intelligence sharing for the purposes of 
fighting fraud and intellectual property crime, and how this may be encouraged, 
enabled and facilitated with a view to widening participation in anti-fraud information 
exchange.  The importance and value of information and intelligence sharing for 
combating fraud is widely recognised.  With the exception of a few sectors in the UK, 
however, it remains an under-employed and poorly understood strategy and whilst 
this remains the case the only winners are those who perpetrate these crimes. 
 
This study will examine how information and intelligence sharing can be achieved 
successfully, with a view to promoting wider collaboration within the UK and beyond.  
Despite the recognition of the need for effective and widespread information and 
intelligence sharing between organisations and sectors to better combat issues of 
economic crime, and the significant economic and social incentives to do so given 
the scale of the problem, there remain considerable challenges that prevent many 
organisations from collaborating successfully.  This notwithstanding, there are some 
organisations and anti-fraud information sharing schemes that do collaborate 
effectively.  This research will examine the contemporary nature of these problems 
and consider how they may be overcome by examining models and strategies 
employed by those organisations that do have productive information sharing 
relationships in order that these may be adopted and modified by others to enable 
more widespread collaboration. 
 
The research has been framed within the context of inter-organisational and cross-
sector information sharing.  The primary focus and purpose has been to understand 
the strategies and mechanisms that enable organisations to share information more 
effectively.  Furthermore, the emphasis has been placed on seeking to understand 
how organisations that are not formally charged with law enforcement responsibilities 
may effectively collaborate with others on anti-crime issues.  While information 
sharing is of significant importance within the law enforcement context, the aim has 
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been to examine strategies that may be employed by organisations that do not enjoy 
specific legal powers to enable them to share information for anti-crime purposes.  
Because of the lack of legislative provision for these entities, there remains 
considerable uncertainty about how they can collaborate effectively and legally.  
However, while this perspective has been taken, the law enforcement arena has not 
been disregarded within the research.  Non-law enforcement organisations can learn 
a lot from the intelligence handling and sharing arrangements of the police and similar 
agencies, and vice versa.  Of equal importance, for many organisations across all 
industries and sectors, anti-crime information sharing may necessarily involve 
collaboration with law enforcement agencies.  Finally, the focus has been on 
information sharing within the UK, although cross-jurisdictional issues have inevitably 
arisen.  This has primarily been for pragmatic reasons.  Information sharing is a 
complex subject, with many challenges within the UK alone, and many of the issues 
become significantly more complicated when multiple jurisdictions are taken into 
account.  It would not have been feasible to seek to address these issues on both 
national and international scales within a project of this size.  Many of the issues and 
findings will, however, have relevance beyond the UK. 
 
The research sought to address the following questions: 
 
1. What is the contemporary nature of the barriers, both real and perceived, that 
impede effective anti-economic crime information and intelligence sharing 
between organisations, industries and sectors in the UK? 
 
2. What potential strategies and solutions may be effective in helping to 
overcome these barriers, and what approaches have been effective to 
promote anti-crime collaboration? 
 
a. What types of strategy and solution could be employed to overcome 
the barriers to effective information and intelligence sharing? 
 
b. What can be learned from the models of successful existing 
information sharing partnerships, and can their approaches be 
translated into wider use in other industries and sectors? 
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3. How can professional practice be improved at the strategic and policy levels 
to help overcome the present impediments to wider information and 
intelligence exchange? 
 
A significant amount of work has been conducted, and remains ongoing, into 
promoting greater information sharing between public authorities in the UK.  
Therefore, the emphasis for the research will be on promoting collaboration involving 
private sector organisations (and not-for-profit organisations by extension).  However, 
the research has aimed to take relevant learning from public sector schemes into 
account where relevant, and does specifically include collaboration between public 
and private sector entities. 
 
Key Definitions 
In order to examine the sharing of data, information and intelligence, it is useful first 
to consider what they are.  The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines data as 
‘facts and statistics used for reference or analysis’ (Soanes & Stevenson, 2006, 
p.364), a simple definition that infers the raw nature of data.  Jennex (2009, p.6) 
defines it as ‘basic, discrete, objective facts such as who, what, when, where, about 
something’.  Rowley (2007, pp.171-172) observes that data in itself is void of 
meaning, that it is not processed or organised, whereas information is structured and 
has been processed in order to give it contextual meaning, relevance and value; it is 
the relational connection between data from this processing that endows this meaning 
(Bellinger, Castro & Mills, 2004, p.2). 
 
Intelligence is perhaps a more complex concept to define.  Historically, intelligence 
has been closely associated with the military setting, with references to, and guidance 
on, intelligence collection stretching back to antiquity.  The final chapter of Sun Tzu's 
(n.d./1971, pp.144-149) famous treatise The Art of War concerned espionage, and 
the use of intelligence in military matters is documented back to 19th century BC in 
Chinese military history (Sawyer, 1998, p.7). 
 
Despite such a long history, the definition of what constitutes intelligence is not 
settled, whether in the military, criminal or other contexts.  Some definitions err toward 
the outcome, in that intelligence informs action, whereas others lean towards 
processing and intelligence products, averring intelligence to be information that has 
been processed and analysed (Warner, 2002, p.16).  Wheaton and Beerbower (2006, 
p.329) argue in favour of a definition that focuses on the purpose of intelligence being 
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to reduce uncertainty, while Brown (2007, p.340) suggests that intelligence is 
information imbued with the quality of significance.  Johnson (2006, p.120) holds that 
intelligence must be capable of being turned into useable information.  For Warner 
(2002, p.20), another key element of intelligence is secrecy.  This has some merit, 
although it does ignore that much information that comprises intelligence is gathered 
from publicly available sources; the concept of open-source intelligence is widely 
used and accepted in the criminal intelligence field, amongst others.  However, these 
concepts of significance, secrecy and its utility to inform decision making or action 
are central to most definitions of intelligence.  Corporate intelligence is geared 
towards two prime purposes: helping organisations manage risk, which would include 
crime risk, and to assist in exploiting opportunities (Strachan-Morris, 2013, p.120).  
Most definitions of intelligence, by nature, work on the inference that the intelligence 
is correct, whereas it has long been recognised that much intelligence can be false, 
contradictory or subject to uncertainty (Clausewitz, 1832/1989, p.117); a 
consideration relevant to both military and criminal intelligence and a reason for 
applying both caution and controls. 
 
The fight against economic crime can involve, and benefit from, the prudent and legal 
exchange of data, information or intelligence.  There can be different approaches, 
processes and channels that apply to the exchange of these, although in many 
situations the exact distinction between data and information, or information and 
intelligence, may not be clear or consistent, and this is regularly featured in discourse 
on the subject.  At certain levels, the distinctions are of practical importance, such as 
in considerations of bulk sharing and anonymisation which may be feasible for data 
sharing, but usually less suitable for intelligence.  At a more theoretical level, the 
distinction may be less significant, in that the delineation between the concepts of 
intelligence and information may be indistinct or even interchangeable.  This thesis 
follows this trend in that the terms may sometimes be interchanged when sharing is 
being discussed at a more general or theoretical level and the distinction is less 
important, but with more discriminate application when the technical or practical 
differences make it appropriate to do so.  This notwithstanding, for the purpose of this 
thesis, the term data refers to raw facts, information to data which have been 
processed and given contextual meaning and value, and intelligence as data or 
information that have been analysed and processed and are considered relevant and 
useable to inform decision making or action in the management and response to 
economic crime incidences or risks. 
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As this thesis is concerned with both fraud and intellectual property crime [IP crime], 
the term economic crime has been used to refer to both collectively. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis has been structured into chapters as follows. 
 
Chapter Two presents a literature review examining issues of information and 
intelligence sharing from a number of perspectives including knowledge 
management, e-government collaboration and information sharing projects within the 
criminal justice and other fields.  It considers barriers to, and enablers of, information 
sharing identified in past studies before taking a concise look at aspects of intelligence 
handling theory and practice. 
 
Chapter Three sets out the methodology followed in this study, which was conducted 
in two phases.  The first was a case study of FACT and the second a series of semi-
structured interviews with representatives of other organisations as active participants 
in the practice or process of information and intelligence sharing for anti-crime 
purposes. 
 
Chapter Four is the first of four chapters setting out the findings of the research.  This 
chapter discusses the key findings relating to challenges and barriers to information 
sharing with respect to economic crime.  It also sets out findings relating to the 
legislative framework for information sharing and the problems within this. 
 
Chapter Five outlines FACT as an organisation and provides an overview of its 
mission and structure.  It examines some of the key functions and processes of the 
organisation and how these pertain to its approach to successful information sharing 
relationships with other agencies and sectors. 
 
Chapter Six details key findings from both phases of data collection in respect to the 
strategies and methods used by organisations to build and maintain effective 
information and intelligence sharing relationships with others and to overcome the 
challenges and barriers to collaboration. 
 
Chapter Seven discusses findings from the data relating to issues of competence in 
intelligence handling, education and training.  These issues are all central to effective 
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intelligence sharing relationships.  The chapter also looks at the early indications of 
the embryonic professionalisation process emerging in the field. 
 
Chapter Eight presents a high level discussion of the findings, examining the key 
issues arising in five overarching themes: the barriers to information and intelligence 
sharing; the legislative framework; standards; relationship management; and the 
subject of professionalisation.  It also illustrates the structures of several models of 
information sharing that arose from the data; models that can facilitate inter-
organisational intelligence sharing between two, or between many, different parties. 
 
Chapter Nine presents the overall conclusions of the study, assessing at a high level 
how the findings respond to the original research questions.  It also identifies how the 
research has made a contribution to knowledge in the area of anti-economic crime 
information and intelligence sharing. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The Practice of Information Sharing and Intelligence 
Handling 
 
Introduction 
Information and intelligence sharing has long been identified, within both the literature 
and within public policy and debate, as an essential component in the fight against 
fraud.  There are parallels with similar debates and initiatives to promote information 
sharing within the context of many other types of crime, from murder investigations 
to counter terrorism, and with other forms of governmental collaboration concerned 
with non-law enforcement issues. 
 
Numerous factors have contributed to information sharing being highlighted as a 
necessity within law enforcement, leading to a greater political impetus to promote 
and implement information and intelligence sharing initiatives.  From the role that data 
sharing can play in risk assessment and the focus on harm prevention within social 
policy (Bellamy, 6 & Raab, 2005, p.396) to widespread criticism levelled at the 
government and law enforcement bodies for failing to share relevant information that 
could have prevented tragedies, such as in the case of the Soham murders (Bichard, 
2004), these arguments have become prominent and regular.  Many other high profile 
cases, including murder, fraud, child abuse and more, have pushed information 
sharing higher up the political agenda (6, Bellamy, Raab, Warren & Heeney, 2006, 
p.406; Bellamy, Raab & 6, 2005, p.57).  The need for, and activity towards, the 
sharing of intelligence between agencies at national and international levels were 
highlighted in the wake of the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Centre in 
New York (Gottschalk, 2005, p.617; Kim & Lee, 2006, p.370), which raised the 
political stakes even further.  It has been argued that the political drive to increase 
information sharing and collaboration stems from widely-held perceptions that such 
high profile failings have resulted from excessive emphasis being placed upon privacy 
and confidentiality (6 et al, 2006, p.406).  This has a ring of truth to it, and may help 
to explain why collaboration has not occurred even where channels have existed to 
allow for information sharing; Grabiner (2000, pp.20-21) commented on the disjointed 
exchange of information between public sector agencies despite the existence of 
legal gateways to enable it. 
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A literature review was conducted in order to examine the understanding of 
information sharing issues within both the anti-fraud and wider contexts.  There has 
been relatively little published within the academic literature concerning anti-fraud 
information sharing issues, although there is a small, but growing, body of knowledge 
in the grey literature.  However, information sharing has been discussed, debated and 
trialled in many fields and sectors, and there are relevant lessons that can be drawn 
from these and applied to the promotion of anti-fraud collaboration. 
 
This chapter sets out the findings of the literature review with four main focal points.  
The first examines literature concerning information sharing within the contexts of 
organisational knowledge management and transfer, and the burgeoning field of e-
government collaboration.  It then proceeds to examine some key learning points from 
a number of information sharing projects from around the world, in both law 
enforcement and non-law enforcement environments, identifying the challenges that 
they faced and factors that contributed to their success.  This is followed by a review 
of the current state of anti-fraud information sharing in the UK, reviewing the primary 
challenges faced in sharing information between organisations and sectors for the 
prevention, detection and investigation of fraud.  Finally, a brief review is conducted 
of two models within the theory and practice of intelligence handling: the intelligence 
cycle and the National Intelligence Model [NIM]. 
 
Knowledge Management, Sharing and Transfer 
The first area examined was knowledge management, sharing and transfer.  
Knowledge management is the processes of creating, using, storing, distributing, 
sharing and understanding knowledge (Bock, Zmud, Kim & Lee, 2005, p.88; 
Gottschalk, 2006, p.381).  In planning for the effective management of organisational 
knowledge, Cabrera and Cabrera (2002, p.691) suggest that managers should 
explicitly consider the motivations and barriers to information sharing, and how these 
can be overcome, before investing in knowledge management systems.  By 
implication, information sharing should be a prime consideration in organisations’ 
management of information. 
 
The concept of organisational ownership of information is central to both knowledge 
management and information sharing.  Information has variously been described as 
being owned by organisations in terms of information products created by employees 
that should be used for the good of the organisation (Constant, Kiesler & Sproull, 
1994, p.418), as a key strategic asset that is difficult for others to reproduce (Cabrera 
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& Cabrera, 2002, p.688) and as a source of organisational power (Cress, Kimmerle 
& Hesse, 2006, p.372).  In the law enforcement context – which can be extended to 
a wider economic crime context – Gottschalk (2006, p.381) argues that knowledge is 
the most important resource in investigations, and that successful outcomes are 
highly dependent upon the availability of information.  Jarvenpaa and Staples (2000, 
p.134) suggest that the concept of organisational ownership of information is not a 
social norm, but rather an organisational norm.  Kolekofski Jr. and Heminger (2003, 
p.523) suggest that organisational norms will influence information sharing to the 
extent that sharing may occur regardless of potential barriers, such as lack of 
reciprocity, if the sharing organisation believes the process to be of benefit to it.  A 
study by Bock et al (2005, pp.100-101) demonstrates that the greater the subjective 
norm to share information, employees will be more willing to do so, although it also 
found that employee attitudes would be positively affected by perceived reciprocity in 
the relationship.  This could potentially be significant in respect of anti-fraud 
information sharing, suggesting that some of the cultural barriers that exist may be 
within organisations’ power to overcome; it is more feasible for organisations to 
change their own norms than societal values. 
 
It is important to recognise, of course, that there are different types of knowledge.  A 
commonly used distinction is that of tacit knowledge, described as those types of 
knowledge that are harder to communicate and transfer, including skills and practical 
knowledge (Cabrera & Cabrera, 2002, p.690), and explicit knowledge, such as facts 
and records, that is more readily transferrable (Pardo, Cresswell, Thompson & Zhang, 
2006, p.295).  The majority of information sharing needs that prove challenging in the 
economic crime context would likely be in the form of factual data and records.  As 
this is explicit knowledge, this should be more readily transferrable than other types 
of information.  However, Ipe (2003, p.344) cautions that just because explicit 
knowledge can be more readily transferred does not necessarily mean that it will be 
shared.  Furthermore, as many organisations are targeting resources towards sharing 
of tacit knowledge internally (Syed-Ikhsan & Rowland, 2004, p.95) this focus does not 
advance the prospects of inter-organisational exchange of explicit knowledge that 
would be of most benefit in combating economic crime. 
 
Organisational knowledge transfer has been defined as “the process through which 
organizational actors – teams, units or organizations – exchange, receive and are 
influenced by the experience and knowledge of others” (van Wijk, Jansen & Lyles, 
2008, p.832).  It is the emphasis on the change and impact caused on the recipient 
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(Argote & Ingram, 2000, p.151; Argote, Ingram, Levine & Moreland, 2000, p.3) that 
suggests that knowledge transfer is more concerned with the exchange of tacit rather 
than explicit knowledge, and thus differentiates it from the end goals of information 
sharing, but there are still relevant lessons that can be drawn from these processes, 
especially with respect to the transmission of skills to enable information sharing.  Kim 
and Lee (2006, p.370) suggest that knowledge sharing “requires the dissemination of 
individual employees’ work-related experiences and collaboration between and 
among individuals, subsystems, and organizations; collaboration with other agencies 
and stakeholders”.  This incorporates the important element of collaboration into the 
equation.  In line with the issues surrounding anti-crime information exchange, it has 
long been recognised that knowledge sharing is highly beneficial for organisations, 
which are more likely to succeed if they can transfer knowledge effectively (Argote et 
al, 2000, p.2), while van Wijk et al (2008, p.832) cite research indicating that 
knowledge transfer is more difficult between multiple organisations than internally. 
 
Kim and Lee (2006, p.373) identify three cultural enablers that help facilitate 
knowledge sharing, these being trust, a clear organisational vision, and social 
networks.  Van Wijk et al’s (2008, p. 845) study demonstrated clear links between 
trust and the existence of strong relationships [between participants] and effective 
knowledge transfer, suggesting that this relational capital is the most significant factor 
enabling intra- and inter-organisational transfer.  It has been recognised that 
participation in information sharing is strongly influenced by the levels of trust 
between parties (Canestraro, Pardo, Raup-Kounovsky & Taratus, 2009, pp.115-116).  
An important element of trust is the reliability of the source (Argote & Ingram, 2000, 
p.161).  In a study of drivers and impediments to knowledge sharing in virtual 
communities of practice, Ardichvili, Page and Wentling (2003, pp.73-74) found that 
central to the creation of knowledge sharing networks was the establishment of 
institution-based trust establishing the principles and structures for sharing, and also 
the communication of the rules and standards by which participants should abide. 
 
The establishment of a knowledge-sharing culture is also a noted requirement 
towards the success of sharing schemes.  A study of public sector organisations in 
Malaysia reported a positive correlation between a knowledge sharing culture and the 
performance of knowledge transfer (Syed-Ikhsan & Rowland, 2004, p.107), while 
Gottschalk (2005, p.618) observes that, within the law enforcement context, there is 
a need for a culture that embraces collaboration.  Fifteen years ago, Cabrera and 
Cabrera (2002, p.704) suggested that an environment that encouraged information 
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sharing was of greater significance to success than technology solutions that facilitate 
it.  Unfortunately, it is also recognised that some organisations intentionally stifle 
opportunities for sharing information and knowledge for a range of reasons, from 
perceived threats to resourcing issues (Constant et al, 1994, p.401; Hatala & Lutta, 
2009, p.12). 
 
One further way of examining the issue is through the lens of information sharing as 
a social dilemma.  Social dilemmas have two primary properties: there is a higher 
potential payoff for individual parties if they make selfish choices at odds with the 
greater good, but all parties are better off if every party cooperates rather than acting 
selfishly (Dawes, 1980, p.169).  Government agencies share information for the 
generation of public goods (Lee & Rao, 2007, p.155), such as protection from crime.  
Private sector organisations share information in line with the underlying profit motive; 
minimising losses to economic crime can contribute to that goal.  Social dilemmas 
apply to both of these contexts, and have been linked to the problems impeding these 
goals (Kalman, Monge, Fulk & Heino, 2002, p.127).  Where information sharing is for 
the public good - such as reducing economic crime in both public and private sectors 
- there is the potential for every member of the group to benefit from the activity, 
regardless of their level of contribution. This is known as the public-good dilemma 
(Cabrera & Cabrera, 2002, p.693).  In this situation, as not all members are required 
to collaborate in order to share the good, this increases the chance of members acting 
selfishly, rather than for the common good, which Cabrera and Cabrera (2002, p.693) 
refer to as the deficient equilibrium.  A suggested means of overcoming this problem 
is to establish rewards and incentives for individual members in order to align the 
individual’s interest with the greater good to ensure that collaboration becomes the 
optimum strategy for members (Cabrera & Cabrera, 2002, p.696; Cabrera, Collins & 
Salgado, 2006, pp.250-251). 
 
Information Sharing in E-Government Collaboration 
Information sharing is also a significant and highly relevant topic within the field of e-
government collaboration, in which inter-departmental information sharing is 
essential.  Cross-departmental anti-fraud information sharing in the UK remains a 
challenge, but there is a wider literature that discusses some of the challenges and 
enablers in government collaboration, some of which are relevant to the economic 
crime arena. 
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E-government collaboration and inter-agency working are increasingly common 
themes in modern government, with an extensive range of projects being undertaken 
to solve a range of complex and far-reaching issues, such as emergency response, 
online provision of public services, multi-partner environmental data exchange and 
cross-jurisdictional identity authentication (Chun, Luna-Reyes & Sandoval-Almazán, 
2012, pp.7-9).  In order to meet contemporary challenges, it is essential for 
government agencies and departments to collaborate (Degwekar, DePree, Beck, 
Thomas & Su, 2007, p.102; Zheng, Dawes & Pardo, 2009, p.43).  Where these 
challenges involve multiple agencies, inter-organisational information sharing is 
required (Gil-Garcia et al, 2009, p.3) although there are many obstacles to such 
cooperation, ranging from legal restrictions to IT challenges.  Despite numerous 
government initiatives over many years to promote interagency collaboration, the 
sharing of information between agencies has remained inconsistent (6 et al, 2006, 
p.407), indicating that there remains considerable work to do.  Given recognition that 
achieving these aims will require a considerable overhaul of processes and the 
introduction of a comprehensive infrastructure to support information sharing 
(Landsbergen & Wolken, 2001, p.212; Pardo, Gil-Garcia & Burke, 2006, p.1), the 
limited progress is perhaps unsurprising. 
 
The literature on e-government collaboration and government information integration 
examines the nature of the barriers that impede information sharing and collaborative 
projects, and provide useful classifications and perspectives that can be applied to 
economic crime collaboration.  Dawes (1996, p.378) classified issues into three 
discrete categories: technical, organisational and political barriers.  Some have added 
the additional distinction of legal barriers (Gil-Garcia, Chengalur-Smith & Duchessi, 
2007, p.122; Gil-Garcia et al, 2009, p.3), differentiating elements that would have 
fallen under the political classification in the former analysis.  Other analyses place 
emphasis on different elements again, such as the five-category analysis of Zhang 
and Dawes (2006, p.437) of technological, organisational, legal, policy and financial 
barriers.  The explicit recognition of financial issues as a major challenge is important, 
and this is recognised by other commentators as being a significant impediment to 
governmental information sharing (Lam, 2005, p.519; Landsbergen & Wolken, 2001, 
p.209).  Lam (2005, p.518) proposes a four-part classification of barriers to e-
government integration, of strategic, technological, policy and organisational barriers.  
The inclusion of strategic barriers, including such factors as lack of ownership and 
governance, financial constraints and the lack of common objectives between 
collaborators (Lam, 205, pp.518-519) is an interesting proposition.  However, while it 
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is clear that the wide range of barriers can be analysed in different ways (Figure 2.1), 
the actual barriers that are generally identified within these analyses do not differ 
greatly; they are merely attributed to different categories.  Perhaps one overarching 
obstacle that is not commonly discussed elsewhere does emerge from the e-
government literature, however: that inter-organisational information sharing and 
collaboration itself is an ambitious goal.  It has been argued that this ambition, or 
perhaps over-ambition, is itself an obstacle to success (Lam, 2005, p.518; Zhang, 
Dawes & Sarkis, 2005, p.561).  This may be a justified view, but the implications 
would be concerning with respect to improving multi-agency sharing to combat 
economic crime, although this can be managed to an extent through the setting of 
realistic interim objectives (Zhang et al, 2005, p.561). 
 
Figure 2.1: Variant classifications of barriers to information sharing 
 
 
While technology-related issues, such as incompatible legacy systems (Gil-Garcia & 
Pardo, 2005, p.192), are recognised as barriers to information sharing, it has also 
been argued that these types of barrier are of lesser magnitude than other challenges 
faced (Landsbergen & Wolken, 1998, p.5).  This notwithstanding, other technical 
issues do provide lasting challenges to public sector information sharing, not least of 
which are data quality problems.  These can include basic, but significant, 
complications like errors, incomplete and inconsistent data (Gil-Garcia & Pardo, 2005, 
p.190) and data accessibility issues, as well as more subtle and complex issues of 
contextual significance which can arise from different stakeholders’ perspectives 
(Dawes et al, 2009, pp.394-395; Klischewski & Scholl, 2006, p.7).  As such, it is 
argued that participants need to reach agreement on data quality matters within 
information sharing initiatives (Dawes et al, 2009, p.395; Klischewski & Scholl, 2006, 
p.2). 
 
   
 
37 
 
Some of the legal issues that surround anti-fraud information exchange were 
introduced in Chapter One.  Many of these issues apply within the wider e-
government collaboration context, not least of which is that of data protection 
legislation, of which the UK’s is currently subordinate to the EU Directive on data 
protection (Otjacques, Hitzelberger & Feltz, 2007, p.34).  However, such restrictions 
may not be the only relevant factor.  Dawes et al (2009, p.398) argue that lack of 
legislative (and financial) support for public sector knowledge sharing initiatives is 
more challenging than legal restrictions, while Wenjing (2011, p.369) points out that 
some legal restrictions on public sector information sharing are necessary and 
desirable to mitigate risks inherent within it. 
 
Cultural barriers are another prominent theme within the e-government collaboration 
literature, and it is clear that these are key issues that any information sharing 
initiative, in any sector, will need to tackle.  Where governmental information sharing 
requires infrastructure to enable it, there are also concerns that there will inevitably 
be some resistance to any perceived centralisation that this entails (Lazer & Binz-
Scharf, 2004, p.18).  Furthermore, Pardo et al (2006, p.295) observe that the 
knowledge that would be shared through a collaborative arrangement is embedded 
within the culture of the sharing organisation, and that an effective information sharing 
initiative must find pathways through the different cultures and processes of the 
participating entities.  Not only can different working cultures within public sector 
organisations impede sharing, but subcultures can too.  Drake, Steckler and Koch 
(2004, pp.67-69) point out that different subcultures hold different norms and values 
and that these too can impede information sharing and undermine trust, furnishing an 
example of bureaucrats withholding information from politicians.  This may help to 
explain why at least some anti-fraud information sharing drives in the public sector 
have failed, despite enjoying political support. 
 
The literature also identifies some of the lessons learnt from public sector initiatives, 
and ways to overcome the challenges.  Managers can overcome problems arising 
from participating organisations having different expectations and objectives by 
recognising at the outset that the parties will have different perspectives (Gil-Garcia 
et al, 2007, p.131); this links to the identified need for stakeholders to understand 
each other’s needs and align goals.  Creating an effective initiative requires the 
development and maintenance of relationships between participants (Pardo, 
Cresswell, Dawes & Burke, 2004, p.3; Pardo & Tayi, 2007, p.700), which can help 
maintain trust.  This is essential in all cases, but especially where participants, and 
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therefore the network, may be distributed over a large geographic distance, which 
can itself be a barrier (Dawes et al, 2009, p.396), and where face-to-face contact in 
the early stages can help build lasting relationships.  Building trust through such 
relationships is essential to make information sharing initiatives work, so much so that 
it has been proposed that at the planning stages of new collaborations, resources 
should be specifically allocated for building trust (Pardo et al, 2006, p.7).  While this 
might prove a difficult concept to promote within the public sector, and perhaps within 
some private sector initiatives, it could prove to be resources well directed; Willem 
and Buelens (2007, p.597) found that a trusting environment would result in the 
sharing of more knowledge by participants, and also make the knowledge sharing 
more effective. 
 
Information Sharing Schemes 
Information sharing and collaboration schemes have been attempted, and studied, in 
a wide variety of contexts around the world.  It is useful to examine the literature 
relating to some of these to examine the challenges - and solutions - encountered by 
such projects, as these may be pertinent to the economic crime arena.  Some have 
encountered issues that were not anticipated at the outset.  For example, Dawes, 
Cresswell and Pardo (2009, p.396) comment on a collaborative project involving 
government agencies and organisations providing facilities for the homeless in the 
US, whereby an agreement to share policies and practices was finally reached based 
on a common understanding on the protection of service users' identities.  
Unforeseen issues arose when a domestic violence shelter joined the scheme and 
pointed out that, from its perspective, the key issue was the protection of the facility's 
location rather than the identity of residents. 
 
Significant multi-organisation information sharing projects have been conducted in 
such varied fields as emergency first responders (Fedorowicz, Gogan & Williams, 
2007);  disaster management (Bharosa, Lee & Janssen, 2010); communicable 
diseases (Chen, Wang & Zeng, 2004); telecommunications (Canestraro et al, 2009); 
e-government services (Luna-Reyes et al, 2007; Yang, Zheng & Pardo, 2012); food 
safety and product quality (Zheng, Jiang, Yang & Pardo, 2008); supply chain 
management (Li & Lin, 2006); and emergency medical services (Schooley & Horan, 
2007).  These projects were set within a range of different environments and 
circumstances, each of which presented different challenges.  These included issues 
relating to the sharing of information between organisations across different sectors, 
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countries and jurisdictions, covering large territories and distances, and, in some 
cases, between large numbers of organisations. 
 
There are also examples within the literature of information sharing schemes within 
the law-enforcement context, predominantly within the US.  As with the arguments for 
information sharing to combat economic crime, there is recognition within the law 
enforcement arena that information sharing between agencies could improve their 
ability to fulfil their respective missions (Bajaj & Ram, 2003, pp.59-60; Bajaj & Ram, 
2007, pp.29-30).  However, there is also a potential tension between the traditional 
focus on the secrecy of intelligence and more recent emphasis on using intelligence 
more effectively – including information sharing – that came with the concept of 
intelligence-led policing (6, Bellamy, Raab, Warren & Heeney, 2006, p.423; Tilley, 
2003, p.323).  Experiences and lessons from these schemes can provide valuable 
insight into the challenges and facilitators of inter-organisational information sharing.  
Initiatives such as COPLINK (Chau, Atabakhsh, Zeng & Chen, 2001; Chen et al, 
2002; Gottschalk, 2005, p.619; Zeng et al, 2003; Zhao et al, 2004, pp.625-631); 
California's COMPASS initiative (Boba et al, 2009); the Colorado Integrated Criminal 
Justice Information System (CICJIS) and the Delaware Justice Information System 
(DELJIS) (Gil-Garcia et al, 2005) and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Justice 
Network (JNET) (Cresswell, Pardo & Hassan, 2007; Gil-Garcia et al, 2005) 
demonstrate some of the issues faced by large scale information sharing schemes in 
the criminal justice arena. 
 
The literature outlining these schemes highlights some common themes amongst 
many projects, alongside other points of consideration in light of their potential to 
impact information sharing within the anti-fraud arena.  A wide range of barriers and 
challenges to successful sharing were faced by these collaborations, including those 
summarised in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2: Summary of barriers identified in information sharing schemes 
 
 
Issues around computer systems and compatibility problems arising from partners 
using different systems, software and data formats arose in several cases.  General 
system incompatibility issues, and problems relating to legacy systems, were 
identified as clear challenges to successful collaboration (Boba et al, 2009, p.35; 
Chen et al, 2004, p.336; Zheng et al, 2008, pp.93-94), in line with findings from the e-
government collaboration literature.  There were other barriers described with respect 
to the technology for information sharing too.  These ranged from the lack of systems 
available – with inevitable implications for the effectiveness of information sharing – 
for alerting and reporting between organisations in respect of outbreaks of West Nile 
Virus and Botulism (Chen et al, 2004, p.336) to problems where the systems that 
were in place were over-complex and not user-friendly (Bharosa et al, 2010, pp.62-
63). 
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Concerns over the quality of information shared, and shareable, by partners was also 
a prominent challenge for many projects.  General concerns about poor quality data 
were an issue in the DELJIS project (Gil-Garcia et al, 2005, p.7), and these have been 
echoed more recently as a major challenge in the anti-fraud field by the UK’s 
Insurance Fraud Bureau [IFB] (Barker, 2012, p.20).  Such issues are compounded 
by, and contribute to, lack of trust in the quality of information supplied by partners 
during information sharing as well as to fear both of information overload and of being 
swamped by irrelevant data (Bharosa et al, 2010, pp.56-57).  Parallel to the issue of 
system incompatibility, these problems are not helped where partners within a 
scheme store data in a wide variety of formats, some of which may be uncommonly 
used.  In the COMPASS information sharing project in California, this very issue 
complicated and confounded initial attempts to identify the nature and formats of data 
collected and stored by participants in the scheme due to the sheer quantity of formats 
employed (Boba et al, 2009, p.29). 
 
Another data-related problem experienced within the emergency medical services 
field was the sheer volume of information recorded and transmitted in non-digital 
form, including hand-written and spoken information (Schooley & Horan, 2007, 
p.771).  Due to the nature of these communication media, they are not readily 
transmissible or shareable at a large scale, although may well contain important 
information that partner agencies might benefit from. 
 
Data privacy issues were highlighted in several projects, with the handling of sensitive 
data and confidentiality prime concerns (Boba et al, 2009, p.29; Chen et al, 2004, 
p.336).  Fear of potential legal or political action arising over data privacy matters was 
an issue for the collaboration in an emergency medical services project (Schooley & 
Horan, 2007, p.778). 
 
A number of other technical obstacles were identified across the projects, not least of 
which, for some of the larger schemes, were complexities arising from involving large 
numbers of participants (Cresswell et al, 2007, pp.122-123; Gil-Garcia et al, 2005, 
p.7), many of whom would be using data in different ways to their partners (Chen et 
al, 2002, p.274).  Other notable problems included lack of training for staff in how to 
use information sharing systems and, in time-critical situations such as those 
experienced in disaster management, the lack of time available for people to absorb 
information shared by partners (Bharosa et al, 2010, p.57). 
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The literature also reflected a variety of organisational and cultural barriers that the 
schemes came up against.  Fundamentally, lack of trust amongst partners was an 
issue reported in several cases (Canestraro et al, 2009, p.116; Chau et al, 2001, p.3; 
Luna-Reyes et al, 2007, p.813; Schooley & Horan, 2007, p.775).   Similarly, another 
challenge was that of competing interests for private sector participants which could 
interfere with their willingness to share information (Canestraro et al, 2009, p.116; 
Zheng et al, 2008, p.95).  This factor had been experienced by the UK’s IFB, where 
insurers perceived their own fraud management capabilities as a competitive 
advantage, disregarding the bigger picture (Barker, 2012, p.21).  Some projects 
experienced a general unwillingness of some partners to participate and share 
information (Boba et al, 2009, pp.29-30; Chau et al, 2001, p.3; Gil-Garcia et al, 2005; 
p.7), and Li and Lin (2006, p.1643) reported perceptions held by some organisations 
that disclosing information to others represented a loss of power.  Related issues 
were problems of information asymmetry between participants that were information 
rich and poor (Yang et al, 2012, p.S54), and concerns that in some cases the 
information flow was in one direction only (Zheng et al, 2008, p.95). In one case, staff 
unwillingness to share was identified as being attributable to internal communications 
failures within organisations, whereby senior officers supported the collaboration but 
failed to communicate the authorisation to share data to their subordinates (Boba et 
al, 2009, p.31).  Lack of incentives for organisations to share was cited as a challenge 
to participation in one scheme (Zheng et al, 2008, p.95), while another reported that 
sharing suffered due to lack of feedback from recipients and failure to acknowledge 
the contribution that information received had made to successful outcomes (Bharosa 
et al, 2010, p.58). 
 
The Californian COMPASS project found that the organisations involved 
underestimated the extent of the challenges at the commencement of the project 
(Boba et al, 2009, p.30).  A disaster management project reported problems arising 
from collaborating agencies' lack of understanding of the other participants' needs, 
and were unsure what information would be useful to share and what would be 
unhelpful and distracting (Bharosa et al, 2010, pp.56-59).  Issues of ownership of 
shared data were also reported (Chen et al, 2004, p.336), as was the problem of staff 
resistance to change resulting in information sharing tools and equipment being 
unused or underused (Schooley & Horan, 2007, p.774; Zheng et al, 2008, p.94). 
 
A major issue identified in several projects related to the governance structure.  
Challenges ranged from lack of an overall decision making body in the JNET scheme 
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to problems of composition of the board; the DELJIS board included technical staff 
that were unable to make decisions on behalf of their own organisations (Gil-Garcia 
et al, 2005, p.7).  Creation of an appropriate governance structure was identified in 
one instance as the single greatest challenge faced (Canestraro et al, 2009, p.122). 
 
Straddling the divide between organisational and political barriers – depending upon 
the context within which the projects were situated – was the issue of excessive 
bureaucracy.  This ranged from problems caused by the wider regulatory environment 
(Luna-Reyes et al, 2007, p.819) to internal organisational rules requiring formal 
assessment of each instance of sharing, even where the sharing was between 
different parts of the same department (Yang et al, 2012, p.S55). 
 
Finance was also a major challenge (Fedorowicz et al, 2007, p.796; Gil-Garcia et al, 
2005, p.7).  Funding challenges were not restricted to initial financing, but extended 
to the costs of maintaining the project and its sustainability (Boba et al, 2009, p.31; 
Gil-Garcia et al, 2005, p7).  Lack of funding for future development was an issue for 
the CICJIS project (Gil-Garcia et al, 2005, p.7) and problems of different agencies 
vying for control of funding arose elsewhere (Fedorowicz et al, 2007, p.797).  Funding 
issues, even when they are indirect, can also have unexpected implications for 
schemes; the IFB cites as a major barrier to its success the cuts to police budgets for 
tackling fraud (Barker, 2012, p.20). 
 
A small number of political problems were highlighted by some projects, but these 
issues can present potentially significant obstacles to success.  These generally 
related to issues arising from operating across multiple jurisdictions.  The US-based 
CapWIN project for emergency first responders suffered political obstacles relating to 
funding and other issues, involving numerous government bodies at state and local 
levels, delaying the scheme for many months, and political factors had to be 
incorporated into the project's design and governance (Fedorowicz et al, 2007, 
p.796).  Cross-jurisdictional issues add another layer of complexity to many 
information sharing projects, be this across regional, national or international 
boundaries (Chen et al, 2004, p.336).  The lack of international laws unifying 
standards across nations was cited as perhaps the most significant challenge facing 
efforts to encourage data sharing at a global level (Zheng et al, 2008, p.95).  At a 
more localised level, political concerns over potential implications and criticism over 
sharing and publicising crime data were noted as a challenge within the COMPASS 
project (Boba et al, 2009, p.31). 
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In addition to the challenges, there were also a range of factors that were found to 
enable information sharing within the literature (Figure 2.3).  A number of these were 
cited by several collaborative ventures to be critical to their establishment or 
continuity, whilst others may be relevant for consideration in the economic crime 
capacity. 
 
Figure 2.3: Summary of key enablers identified in information sharing schemes 
 
 
An important element of any collaborative scheme, and one closely linked to the 
success or failure of a project, is that of its governance structure.  Just as this was 
identified as one of the challenges faced by DELJIS, a functioning governance 
structure is critical to success (Canestraro et al, 2009, p.125).  The governing board 
should be inclusive and representative of participating parties (Fedorowicz et al, 
2007, p.804; Gil-Garcia et al, 2005, p.7) and there should be clear lines of authority 
and accountability in place (Schooley & Horan, 2007, p.780).  It is also widely 
recognised that participants should have belief in the project, and have a shared 
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vision and collective appreciation of the purpose and value of information sharing 
(Bharosa et al, 2010, p.58; Barker, 2012, p.21; Canestraro et al, 2009; p.122; Li & 
Lin, 2006, p.1653).  To this end, it is important for participants to harmonise their 
organisational goals with the purpose of the collaboration (Fedorowicz et al, 2007, 
p.803; Schooley & Horan, 2007, p.780; Zheng et al, 2008, p.96).  Promoting greater 
mutual understanding of each other’s operations and information needs can enable 
more effective information sharing (Bharosa et al, 2010, p.59), whilst fostering trust is 
also essential if the collaboration is to work (Canestraro et al, 2009, p.125; Li & Lin, 
2006, p.1650; Luna-Reyes et al, 2007, p.813).  Many of the projects found that 
establishing data sharing agreements was an important early activity, albeit a time-
consuming one (Chen et al, 2004, p.339; Fedorowicz et al, 2007, p.803; Schooley & 
Horan, 2007, p.773).  Depending upon the context, agreements may cover such 
issues as protocols for secure exchange of information (Chen et al, 2004, p.337) as 
well as agreements over costs and over the ownership of shared information 
(Fedorowicz et al, 2007, p.803; Gil-Garcia et al, 2005, p.7) amongst other matters.  
Where contextually possible to do so, harmonising processes across agencies was 
found to be beneficial toward effective collaboration (Zheng et al, 2008, p.96), as was 
promoting shared norms, standards and values within participant agencies to foster 
a culture that embraced the sharing of information (Bharosa et al, 2010, p.60).  
Cultivating norms for information sharing will influence the attitudes of employees, 
and widely shared attitudes can influence and change group culture (Clements & 
Jones, 2008, p.71). 
 
Strong leadership and senior level support was also integral to the success of many 
of the programmes (Canestraro et al, 2009, p.125; Gil-Garcia et al, 2005, p.7; Li & 
Lin, 2006, p.1653; Luna-Reyes et al, 2007; p.818; Zheng et al, 2008, p.95), whilst the 
personal relationship between agency leaders was also noted as being a contributory 
factor to success in one instance (Yang et al, 2012, p.S57).  DELJIS found that 
securing a partnership with a state police body was a critical achievement as this 
became a gateway that encouraged other law enforcement bodies to co-operate (Gil-
Garcia et al, 2005, p.7). 
 
The roles and relationships between participants was also, unsurprisingly, an 
important factor in the success of information sharing schemes.  Establishing clear 
roles and responsibilities is important (Canestraro et al, 2009, p.125), as is having 
regular meetings between participants (Schooley & Horan, 2007, p.776).  The JNET 
project discovered that allowing agencies to determine their own levels of 
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participation encouraged continuing involvement (Gil-Garcia et al, 2005, p.7), 
although differing levels of participation could potentially be problematic in some 
instances.  Establishing problem-solving committees and having a dedicated project 
team was found to be beneficial in one project (Boba et al, 2009, pp.30-32), whilst 
another emphasised the importance of having a network of decision makers capable 
of changing the institutional environment where managers within participating 
organisations couldn’t resolve issues (Luna-Reyes et al, 2007, p.822). 
 
Care in the design of information sharing systems and interfaces can be integral to 
the success of information sharing schemes, and can help to overcome other barriers 
to successful collaboration, such as lack of trust and unwillingness to share (Chau, 
Atabakhsh, Zeng & Chen, 2001; Chen et al, 2002; Gottschalk, 2005, p.619; Zeng et 
al, 2003; Zhao et al, 2006, pp.625-631).  Allowing visualisation of outputs can assist 
users to handle complex data sets (Chen et al, 2004, p.337).  Involving staff during 
the design of the project, and providing adequate training to them, can also assist in 
the successful implementation of the projects (Gil-Garcia et al, 2005, p.7). 
 
The collaborative schemes examined above demonstrate that, despite the 
complexities involved in information sharing in both anti-crime and non-law 
enforcement contexts, it is possible to achieve, even on a large scale involving many 
participants.  This notwithstanding, each project had to overcome numerous barriers, 
but their success demonstrates that it can be done.  Several factors contributing to 
their success have been identified, including the importance both of effective 
leadership and maintaining relationships with clear lines of responsibility and 
communication, and ensuring that participating organisations understand each 
other’s needs and align their commitment to information sharing with their own 
organisational goals. 
 
Another important factor that these cases demonstrated is the importance of 
appropriate governance structures to support effective information sharing networks.  
To this end, Pardo, Gil-Garcia and Burke (2008, pp.6-9) identified six elements 
influencing governance structures to enable cross-boundary and inter-agency 
information sharing.  These are summarised in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4: Determinants of governance structures in cross-boundary information sharing 
initiatives 
 
 
Information Sharing and Fraud 
The rise of the internet and information technologies in leading governments, 
businesses and consumers to manage their affairs online, and the consequent 
migration of criminals online where they can reach a wider victim pool, maintain their 
anonymity and ignore physical and territorial boundaries, entails that multi-agency 
collaboration is more likely to be needed to combat fraud than most other types of 
crime (Doig & Levi, 2009, p.205).  Equally, changing technologies and consumer 
habits have transformed how people perceive, access and consume entertainment 
media, with much of this being sourced and delivered online, meaning that similar 
approaches and collaboration is required to combat IP crime.  The centrality of 
information and intelligence sharing to efforts against fraud were reflected in the 
prominence given to the issue in the Fraud Review (Fraud Review Team, 2006b), 
which devoted an entire chapter to the issue and made seven related 
recommendations, all of which the government agreed to implement (Button, 
Johnston & Frimpong, 2008, p.242).  The NFSA, subsequently rebadged as the NFA, 
set up following the Fraud Review, committed itself to working to improve pan-agency 
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and cross-sector information sharing, and placed this at the heart of the national fraud 
strategy (NFSA, 2009, pp.37-39; NFA, 2011a, pp.6-7; NFA, 2011b, p.9) although, as 
observed in Chapter One, the agency has since been abolished.  In line with this 
broader strategy, the government continues to build information sharing 
infrastructure, such as the NFIB and the Economic Crime Coordination Board, and 
cross-agency data sharing is central to the plans of the NCA (City of London Police, 
2010; Home Office 2011, p.21; NFA, 2011a, p.9).  The cross-sector aspect of anti-
fraud information sharing is especially important as, unlike many types of crime, 
economic crime investigation is not restricted to public sector or law enforcement 
agencies.  A significant number of organisations conduct fraud enquiries in the UK 
(Button, 2011, pp.251-252); there are more non-police fraud investigators than there 
are within the police (Doig & Levi, 2009, p.200; Levi, 2010, p.345).  These anti-fraud 
practitioners are spread amongst public sector agencies, law firms, accountancy 
practices, financial services companies and other organisations, resulting in a 
complex and diverse spread of entities both seeking and holding information that will 
be of use to others to counteract economic crime threats. 
 
It is, therefore, clear that information sharing is both desirable and necessary to 
effectively respond to the threat that economic crime, and its perpetrators, pose to 
society.  However, that the matter is still the focus of many political and commercial 
initiatives indicate that it is not as widespread or effective as it could be.  The 
complications are many, especially given the tensions between data protection and 
data sharing (6, Raab & Bellamy, 2005, p.113; Bellamy et al, 2005a, p.394; Cabinet 
Office, 2008, pp.11-12; Sarathy & Muralidhar, 2006, p.218; Yang & Maxwell, 2011, 
p.165), problems exacerbated by public concerns and political sensitivity over data 
security (6 et al, 2005, p.112; Fraud Review Team, 2006b, p.94; Performance and 
Innovation Unit [PIU], 2002, p.55), and the complexities arising from the sheer 
number of stakeholders across all sectors.  Such tensions are not restricted to the 
economic crime field; governmental efforts to promote information sharing to combat 
terrorism have also been opposed in some quarters over privacy concerns (Smith, 
Seligman & Swarup, 2008, p.54).  However, these complications do not account fully 
for the limited scope of anti-fraud information sharing that exists in the UK. 
 
Barriers to Economic Crime Information Sharing 
Despite the drivers for organisations to share anti-fraud information, and the current 
legal channels that enable it, there remain many challenges and barriers that prevent 
it from being achieved widely and effectively.  Many of these are parallel to issues 
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that we have seen affecting information sharing in other sectors.  There are many 
different barriers which can be analysed in different ways, but for an initial view the 
classification system of technical, political and organisational barriers as used by 
Dawes (1996, p.378) shall be followed.  Other classifications have been proposed 
(see Figure 2.1) but this delineation remains both pertinent and succinct, and provides 
a useful framework for consideration of the challenges faced in information sharing. 
 
There are a range of technical barriers that have impeded initiatives to share 
economic crime information between, and sometimes within, organisations.  Some of 
the most historically challenging, widespread and most commonly discussed 
technical problems encountered relate to IT systems and software used to capture, 
store, organise, interpret, interrogate, retrieve and share information.  The wide 
variety of solutions used, and inherent incompatibilities between them, provide 
significant challenges to organisations seeking to collaborate (Bellamy et al, 2005a, 
p.397; Fraud Review Team, 2006b, p.107; Levi & Wall, 2004, p.215).  Such problems 
still exist although, in recent years, advances in technology have resulted in 
technological solutions that can overcome these challenges (Fraud Review Team, 
2006b, p.107).  Furthermore, utilisation of open data and technology standards, such 
as XML, has proven to be beneficial in the design and implementation of information 
sharing systems (Bajaj & Ram, 2007, pp.31-32; Luna-Reyes, Gil-Garcia & Cruz, 
2007, p.814).  In recognition of this, technical barriers may pose less of a challenge 
for information sharing than other types of barrier (Yang & Maxwell, 2011, p.169).  
However, while solutions do exist it would be premature to disregard such problems: 
utilising the available solutions would require significant investment by organisations 
seeking to engage in data sharing.  To this extent, part of the technical challenge has 
arguably been superseded by a financial barrier.  The financial stakes can be high: it 
has been noted that technology projects for the purposes of enabling information 
sharing can be both highly complex and, sometimes, apt to fail, making capability 
assessments essential prior to investment in such ventures (Cresswell, Pardo, 
Canestraro & Dawes, 2005, p.2; Cresswell, Pardo & Hassan, 2007, p.122).   Other 
technical problems do exist, however.  Issues such as the security of information 
shared remain (Cooper, 2005, p.352), as do those of data quality and reliability (NFA, 
2010b, p.7), as well as complexities around data ownership and consent in some 
circumstances (Thomas & Walport, 2008, pp.31-35).  Related to the issue of data 
quality is that of interpretation.  Miranda and Saunders (2003, p.87) point out that 
most research implicitly assumes that information sharing involves the dissemination 
of information that has the same meaning to everyone, yet this would be a dangerous 
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assumption.  Furthermore, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States [9/11 Commission] 
highlighted another weakness, criticising intelligence systems for being based upon 
the assumption that it is possible to know who will want or need the information (9/11 
Commission, 2004, p.417).  It does not require a great stretch of the imagination to 
consider that such weaknesses may extend to systems designed for the sharing of 
economic crime information. 
 
Technology, therefore, presents both barriers and solutions to information sharing.  
On the positive side, it creates new opportunities for collaboration, and can help to 
facilitate information sharing (Jarvenpaa & Staples, 2001, p.152).  Historically, 
technology has also presented many barriers, some of which endure and will require 
significant effort, and resources, to overcome.  Even where technology can help 
provide solutions, additional technical problems may remain.  Furthermore, where 
technological solutions are implemented, this will only be a part of the answer.  As 
Brazelton and Gorry (2003, p.24) observe, the technology does not create a 
community, and people (and organisations) will still require incentives to engage in 
information sharing activities. 
 
Political barriers generally concern issues of political leadership and support for 
information sharing issues – often in reaction to the fallout from intelligence sharing 
failures as identified above, tempered by the public appetite for information protection 
and privacy – and to the infrastructure for information sharing and the legal framework 
underpinning it.  According to Kennedy (2007, pp.373-377), the Human Rights Act 
1998, the DPA, the common law duty of confidentiality and the restrictions upon 
statutory bodies to act within the confines of their vires all constitute obstacles to 
information sharing.  The Freedom of Information Act 2000 has also been identified 
as a barrier in that it discourages private sector organisations from sharing 
information with public sector agencies for fear that it may subsequently be disclosed 
under the Act (Fraud Review Team 2006b, p.124). 
 
The DPA is perhaps the most commonly discussed and controversial legislation in 
respect of information sharing.  Whilst it provides exemptions to allow information 
sharing as detailed earlier, it is commonly misunderstood (Fraud Review Team 
2006b, p.100).  Both public (PIU, 2002, p.105) and private sector organisations 
(Fraud Review Team, 2006a, p.124) perceive that it has been used as an excuse not 
to share information, perhaps especially by the public sector.  By way of example as 
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to how the DPA has been misapplied to the detriment of crime prevention, the Act 
was cited by Humberside Police to justify the destruction of documents relating to 
Soham murderer Ian Huntley (Bichard, 2004, p.127; Moss & Pease, 2004, p.7).  As 
we have seen though, the Act does not prevent the sharing of data, but places 
restrictions and conditions upon it (Brooks et al, 2003, p.9); much of the problem is 
how the Act has been interpreted by organisations wary of being penalised under it.  
Having stated this, there are issues that arise from provisions of the Act, such as the 
2nd Data Protection Principle which provides that data should only be used for the 
purposes for which it was collected (ICO, 2001, p.24) which has been vigorously 
upheld by successive Information Commissioners (Bellamy et al, 2005b, p.58).  In 
practice, the 2nd Principle does not necessarily preclude large scale data sharing, and 
neither do political sensitivities; the UK’s national data matching exercise, the 
National Fraud Initiative [NFI], has never faced political opposition (Bellamy et al, 
2005b, p.57). 
 
Overall, improvements to legislation and regulation alone will not provide a complete 
solution to enable better information sharing, as this will only tackle problems around 
the legal channels rather than the more subtle social regulation that occurs (6 et al, 
2006, p.432); a point amply demonstrated through the limited extent of sharing taking 
place under the legal channels that currently enable it. 
 
Organisational factors represent arguably the most challenging barriers impeding 
inter-organisational information sharing.  The problems are largely cultural in nature, 
and are not restricted to either the anti-fraud arena or the UK: the 9/11 Commission 
(2004, p.416) suggested that human resistance to sharing information presented the 
single most significant impediment.  Organisational culture is defined by Jarvenpaa 
and Staples (2001, p.156) as the shared values and attitudes held and espoused by 
members of an organisation, and these tend to be long-held and entrenched.  Cultural 
reluctance to sharing information with other organisations is seen in both public and 
private sectors (Boba, Weisburd & Meeker, 2009, p.34; Grabiner, 2000, p.26; Moss 
and Pease, 2004, p.7; Thomas and Walport, 2008, pp.46-48). 
 
Organisational self-interest overriding incentives to act in the greater good has been 
long identified as a challenge to collaboration (Dawes, 1996, p.380, Doig & Levi, 
2009, p.211) in both public and private sectors.  In the public sector, both HMRC and 
the DWP initially declined to join CIFAS – a financial services sector information 
sharing scheme, and a designated SAFO under the Serious Crime Act 2007 – on the 
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grounds that they could not recognise a benefit to themselves (NFA, 2010a, pp.13-
17).  Despite initiatives such as CIFAS, financial services organisations themselves 
have been identified as reluctant to share information with others (NFA, 2010b, pp.9-
10).  Competition between organisations can undermine efforts and incentives to 
collaborate (Aisopos et al, 2009, p.190).  The silo working mentality can also be a 
significant barrier to engagement in information sharing (Gil-Garcia, Chun & Janssen, 
2009, p.3; Gil-Garcia, Schneider, Pardo & Cresswell, 2005, p.1).  Cross-sector 
sharing can also be undermined simply by differences in the goals, priorities and 
responsibilities of public and private sector organisations (Levi & Wall, 2004, p.208), 
and their different roles have implications for public trust in these organisations’ 
abilities to safeguard their information (Bélanger & Carter, 2008, p.173).  Information 
asymmetry can also be a factor, where different organisations have access to, and 
control over, different amounts of information to others.  Information asymmetry can 
occur over both horizontal (where information is spread across numerous 
organisations and none hold the full set) and vertical  (where organisations can be 
considered information rich and information poor)  dimensions and can affect the 
effectiveness of information sharing, depending upon the level of involvement 
between stakeholders (Clarkson, Jacobsen & Batcheller, 2007, pp.828-830). 
 
Organisational issues, including cultural impediments, are diverse and may represent 
the most significant obstacle to improving inter-organisational information sharing, 
and these problems will continue to arise even if and when the technical and political 
obstacles have been largely addressed.  Overall, the challenges faced in improving 
the UK’s anti-fraud information sharing environment are formidable. 
 
Successful Anti-Fraud Information Sharing Schemes 
Despite all of the challenges to anti-fraud information and intelligence sharing, some 
schemes have been successful and these can provide useful examples of how such 
collaborations may work.  These vary in scope, starting with the simple agreement of 
common standards, as has been done for electronic passport photographs between 
the Identity and Passport Service [IPS] and the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency 
[DVLA] which allows the agencies to share individuals’ photos for processing 
(Coleman, 2008, p.22; Yiu, 2012, p.13).  More complex and sophisticated public 
sector models have also been developed, including the NFIB and Action Fraud 
(Magee, 2008, p.8). 
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A long-established and successful UK project is the NFI; a data matching scheme for 
identifying potential fraud.  It involves the collection and matching of data from over 
1,300 participating organisations, most of which are public sector.  Data from 
participants relating to employment, taxation, residence and benefits is collected 
centrally and cross-referenced across the entire data set; details of matches which 
may indicate potential fraud are returned to the providing organisation for further 
investigation (Audit Commission, 2014, pp.8-9).  The exercise is run biennially by the 
Cabinet Office (previously by the Audit Commission before its abolition) utilising 
powers under the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014.  While the NFI itself does 
not identify fraud outright, but rather returns matches that indicate potential risk back 
to participating bodies (Doig, 2006, pp.162-163), it has been used to identify fraud 
and overpayments to the collective value of £1.39 billion since inception in 1996 
(Cabinet Office, 2016, p.5).  Concerns have been raised about data protection and 
privacy issues, as the NFI involves the processing of many people's personal data 
with no prior, or subsequent, suspicion of fraud having been raised (Smith et el, 2011, 
pp.111-112), but the scheme continues unabated. 
 
Private sector schemes such as CIFAS have been highly successful (Fraud Review 
Team, 2006a, p.126; Smith, Button, Johnston & Frimpong, 2011, p.73), as has the 
IFB, the latter cited by the Cabinet Office (2011a, p.10) as a model that should be 
adopted by public sector agencies. 
 
Intelligence Theory 
Finally, in a study examining the professional use and dissemination of intelligence, 
it is worth briefly examining key theoretical aspects of intelligence handling.  To this 
end, this section looks briefly at two important models relevant to this area: the 
intelligence cycle and the NIM. 
 
The Intelligence Cycle 
The intelligence cycle (Figure 2.5) has been a long-standing model within intelligence 
theory.  It was originally developed in respect of military intelligence, but has had far 
wider application.  The model seeks to situate each of the key stages within the 
generation and delivery of intelligence within a cyclical process.  Despite the neatness 
of the model as a theoretical depiction, Johnson (2003, p.2) points out that, in reality, 
rather than being a neat sequence of stages, intelligence generation is more of a 
complex set of interactions between intelligence producers and those that task and 
consume it. 
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Figure 2.5: The intelligence cycle 
 
 
 
Despite being the predominant theoretical model for decades it has, in recent years, 
been subject to scrutiny and criticism as bearing little resemblance to actual 
intelligence practice (Phythian, 2013, p.1).  Critics, led by Hulnick (2006, pp.960-964), 
argue that the model fails at each stage, although much of this criticism refers to the 
military and political perspectives of intelligence, alongside additional concerns that 
that model is outdated in the world of digitised and cyber-intelligence (Warner, 2013, 
p.19).  Due to mounting criticism of the model, various alternatives have been 
proposed, from a multidirectional core functions model of Direction – Collection – 
Processing – Dissemination, within which feedback and discussion occur between 
each stage (Davies, Gustafson & Rigdon, 2013, p.67) to more complex hub-and-
spoke (Evans, 2009, pp.40-42) and intelligence web (Gill & Phythian, 2013, pp.30-
33) models. 
 
Despite the criticism, however, the intelligence cycle remains the main theoretical 
framework underlying intelligence work (Evans, 2009, p.26), and even Hulnick (2013, 
p.152) admits that it remains relevant in some situations and should not be discarded.  
Furthermore, it has been defended as the most appropriate model in the sphere of 
corporate intelligence in which the relationships between intelligence provider and 
consumer are different to those in political or military contexts (Strachan-Morris, 2013, 
pp.119-122).  This may well also be true in the economic crime arena where the 
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consumer of intelligence will likely be a specialist decision maker within an 
organisation’s anti-fraud division and closer to the producers of the intelligence. 
 
The National Intelligence Model 
The NIM is a framework developed by, and for, UK law enforcement promoting a 
focus on intelligence development, handling and dissemination.  NIM itself developed 
out of the concept of intelligence-led policing [ILP], which was an approach to policing 
emphasising activity based on intelligence and the direction of resources towards the 
most serious criminals (Brady, 2008, p.106).  This was part of a programme of policing 
reform following a series of scandals, and in the wake of influential reports from the 
Audit Commission and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary [HMIC] in the 
1990s calling for an intelligence-led approach (Maguire, 2000, p.317; Ratcliffe, 2002, 
p.54).  HMIC (1997, p.11) had called for a multi-agency approach targeting and 
disrupting criminals through sharing intelligence and information and co-ordinating 
action (HMIC, 1997, p.11).  However, this aim was complicated due to the number of 
agencies involved in UK law enforcement sector, including dozens of police forces, 
Customs, the Serious Fraud Office [SFO], British Transport Police and Ministry of 
Defence Police, amongst others (Sheptycki, 2004, p.312).  These invariably had 
different approaches and systems for intelligence handling, such as Customs' three-
tier system (of strategic, tactical and operational intelligence) and the two-tier 
(strategic and operational) approach of the National Crime Squad, each using 
different definitions of these (Sheptycki, 2004, p.326).  The NIM was identified as the 
solution to these and other problems, by providing uniform procedures and systems, 
a common vocabulary, and enabling sharing (Kirby & McPherson, 2004, pp.45-46).  
Standardisation of processes and outputs was one of the primary purposes of the 
NIM (John and Maguire, 2004a, p.28). 
 
At the time of NIM’s introduction by the National Criminal Intelligence Service [NCIS] 
in 2000, Maguire (2000, p.316) suggests that most police forces would have claimed 
to be committed to sharing intelligence and to be following an ILP approach.  Heaton 
(2000, p.351) contends that, in reality, systematic application of intelligence was a 
relatively new phenomenon amongst law enforcement agencies.  NIM was a business 
model designed to change the approach to policing from a reactive service to a more 
proactive and collaborative one (Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO], 2005, 
p.12); an attempt to professionalise law enforcement by providing a common platform 
and basis for decision making (Kleiven, 2007, p.257).  All police forces in England 
and Wales were required to be NIM-compliant by April 2004 (Maguire & John, 2006, 
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p.69).  The NIM set out a structure and procedures for the collection, storage and 
analysis of intelligence, a prescribed meeting structure to support decision making 
(Cope, 2004, p.191) and a framework to allow collaboration between agencies to 
share information and identify issues (Kirby & McPherson, 2004, p.46).  NIM was 
designed to operate at three levels of policing: local, cross-jurisdictional, and serious 
and organised crime (nationally or internationally) (NCIS, 2000, p.8).  It established 
four main intelligence product outputs: strategic assessments; tactical assessments, 
problem profiles and target profiles (Kleiven, 2007, p.259), and placed regular tasking 
and coordination meetings at the heart of the model, in which decisions would be 
made for allocation of resources based on intelligence assessments and on the 
direction of further development of intelligence (John & Maguire, 2004b, p.3). 
 
While ILP and the NIM, and their proponents, promised a fundamental change to the 
policing model, in reality their impact was restricted by a number of challenges.  The 
most significant of these were police resistance to change (James, 2013, p.127) and 
perceptions that NIM promoted a unidirectional flow of information through focus on 
collection of intelligence but not of its wider dissemination (Kleiven, 2007, p.270).  The 
potential offered by the model for collaboration and partnership was hampered in the 
early years due to few tasking and coordination meetings, at which decisions were 
made, involving partner agencies (Maguire & John, 2006, p.81).  The model has since 
been substantially revised and restructured, to the extent that the original 135 
standards set out within it have been reduced to just four broad requirements: having 
governance and command structures; the collection and use of information and 
intelligence; the incorporation of knowledge management; and adherence to the 
tasking and coordination process (James, 2016, pp.78-79).  Despite its impact being 
more limited than originally hoped, James (2013, p.199) suggests that NIM will 
continue, and praised the NCA for committing to it, which its precursor agency, SOCA, 
did not. 
 
Conclusions 
Information sharing is a highly relevant, and essential, strategy for effective long term 
action against economic crime.  Given the scale and complexities of the problem, the 
limitless pool of victims, and the number of organisations across all sectors that are 
involved in the prevention and investigation of fraud, increasing information sharing 
is imperative if the problem is to be managed and mitigated.  It is clear, however, that 
there are many challenges and barriers to improving and increasing such 
collaboration.  Over recent years, a number of intelligence sharing failures and 
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tragedies – relating both to fraud and other types of crime – appears to have 
increased the appetite of politicians and the public for greater information sharing, 
although there is a remaining tension with privacy considerations. 
 
The literature pertaining to information sharing in the economic crime, law 
enforcement, organisational and governmental contexts indicates that the challenges 
faced from the anti-fraud perspective have many parallels with other environments.  
There are extensive challenges, and while these are often considered within different 
frameworks many overlap, and many can be overcome. 
 
While technological issues have historically provided significant challenges to 
information sharing, recent advances have ensured that most of these could be 
overcome, although the ability and appetite of organisations to adopt and finance the 
solutions remains a considerable issue.  However, it is becoming increasingly 
recognised that many of the technical and technological challenges that have hitherto 
impeded information sharing are considered to be of lesser importance and 
magnitude to some of the other issues that must be overcome.  While there is an 
increasing political appetite and impetus for information sharing, many political and 
legislative issues remain, not least of which is data protection law. 
 
The most challenging and enduring range of issues, however, may be the 
organisational and cultural impediments to information sharing.  These problems are 
varied and often deep-rooted, but are crucial to improving collaboration.  Even when 
there is a sound infrastructure and clear legal channels in place to enable information 
sharing, these will continue to be underused unless and until stakeholders work to 
overturn these cultural constraints upon information sharing.  In the meantime, those 
perpetrating economic crime will continue to benefit. 
 
Some successful anti-economic crime information sharing schemes have been 
established.  In the short term, they remain the exceptions to the rule, but offer proof 
of concept that the challenges can be overcome.  This study will seek to fill the gap 
in understanding how the many impediments to information sharing can be overcome 
by examining how successful collaborators have tackled them.  With appropriate will, 
resources and effort, the barriers impeding information sharing can be overcome 
(Zheng, Yang, Pardo & Jiang, 2009, p.9).  This study will examine how this can be 
done to better combat economic crime, and Chapter Three will outline the approach 
taken to achieving this. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Methodology 
 
Introduction 
As set out in previous chapters, the aim of this study is to examine both the nature of 
the challenges that impede effective information sharing and strategies that can 
overcome these.  This chapter outlines the methodology employed in order to achieve 
these objectives.  This commences with a short analysis of the underlying 
philosophical standpoint, which has inevitably informed the strategy.  After this, the 
approach taken to the literature review is outlined, followed by a summary of the 
decisions made in the selection of methods and a discussion of the ethical issues in 
the research design.  This is followed by an account of the design and implementation 
of the two phases of data collection and a discussion of the strategy employed to the 
management and analysis of data collected.  The chapter closes with a short 
reflective assessment of the methods employed. 
 
Philosophical Standpoint 
The approach to research design is closely related to the researcher's philosophical 
standpoint, with decisions influenced by ontological and epistemological perspective 
(Dunne, Pryor & Yates, 2005, p.14).  Therefore the philosophical perspective of the 
researcher will underpin the methodological choices made and may be considered 
the basis upon which social research is constructed (Denscombe, 2010, p.117; Grix, 
2010, p.57).  As noted by Creswell (2009, p.5), research practice is influenced by 
underlying philosophical ideas even when these notions remain in the background. 
 
From an ontological perspective, where ontology determines how we define and 
understand the nature of the world (O'Leary, 2007, p.180) and how we attribute 
meaning to the elements that comprise reality (Crotty, 1998, pp.10-12), this study was 
founded on a leaning towards the constructionist perspective.  Within the social 
science context, Bryman (2012, p.32) defines constructionism as the understanding 
of entities as social constructions, as opposed to objective entities in their own right 
(Denscombe, 2010, p.119). 
 
Epistemologically, there are competing orthodoxies for how we come to have 
knowledge of the world (O'Leary, 2007, pp.76-77) and the conditions for knowledge 
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(Hughes & Sharrock, 1997, p.5).  Some of the primary traditions within social research 
– the positivist and interpretivist conventions – have been argued to be wholly 
divergent and incompatible dichotomies.  However, on the basis of underlying 
sympathies with elements of each of these, and in agreement with Gorard (2003, 
pp.9-10) who rejects use of the term 'paradigm' within this context, this research is 
founded on a pragmatic platform.  As pragmatism is a philosophical standpoint 
grounded in the real world application of knowledge, it is a natural path for researching 
issues relating to the professional realm.  Rather than being a rejection of positivism 
or interpretivism, it is an acceptance of the utility of both and of quantitative and 
qualitative methods.  Pragmatism allowed the approach to research strategy to be 
guided solely by the research questions and the adoption of methods that would yield 
appropriate data to answer these, rather than placing methodological constraints 
upon the methods to be employed. 
 
Literature Review 
The first stage of the project, once the topic had been determined and the proposal 
approved, was to conduct a literature review.  This was performed to survey the 
literature germane to the research topic (Robson, 2011 p.51, Wakefield, 2011, p.79) 
and to provide a contextual backdrop and rationale for the work (Denscombe, 2010, 
pp.29-30).  A narrative review, which Bryman (2012, p.111) argues to be suitable for 
interpretive qualitative research, was undertaken rather than a systematic one as the 
research was to be inductive rather than deductive in nature.  The review was 
conducted to provide the foundations on which the research was to be constructed 
(Hart, 1998, pp.26-27) and set out the theoretical backdrop against which the findings 
of the research would be set and developed. 
 
There is limited academic literature directly concerned with anti-fraud and IP crime 
information and intelligence sharing.  A body of relevant grey literature, such as 
government reports, was available on the subject, however.  This notwithstanding, 
there was a corpus of literature on information sharing in other fields, including 
approaches to information sharing and collaboration between organisations operating 
in both the criminal justice and other sectors.  It was around these, along with a core 
of key authors – the “essential and always quoted works” (Trafford & Leshem, 2008, 
p.71) - that the search was built, expanding on key works previously identified and 
broadening this out to examine a body of literature relating to information sharing 
schemes in the criminal justice arena.  The search was then extended to other 
examples of collaboration, including literature around collaboration between 
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governments and other reactive and responsive services ranging from emergency 
services to disease control.  This was supplemented in the initial search by a review 
of literature relating to knowledge management and transfer, as these were topics 
referenced in some of the resulting material and provided relevant insights into issues 
related to the subject matter. 
 
Engaging with the literature is an iterative and ongoing process (Denscombe, 2010, 
pp.32-33; Wakefield, 2011, p.94).  Additional literature was examined throughout the 
course of the research relating to ancillary issues that arose after the preliminary 
review had been undertaken.  An example of this was literature pertaining to the NIM, 
which had not had not been anticipated as forming such a central topic until data 
collection was underway.  As such, the approach to the literature taken throughout 
the research was intended to be flexible and responsive to issues arising from the 
data collected. 
 
Research Strategy 
The research strategy and the methods employed were primarily driven by the nature 
of the research questions themselves, as noted in Chapter One.  Creswell (2009, 
p.18) cites numerous factors, including the background, experience and worldview of 
the researcher, the research problem, strategy, methods and the audience, as 
influencing research design.  Being philosophically unbound to either qualitative or 
quantitative research paradigms, a variety of methodological approaches were 
possible for the research.  As the research was undertaken primarily towards a 
doctoral thesis the immediate audience in terms of academic examiners was well 
understood, although it was still undertaken with a longer term aim of publishing more 
widely and with a view to using the findings towards more practical application in the 
anti-fraud field. 
 
The research questions themselves were framed as exploratory lines of enquiry, 
looking to examine the nature of the challenges to effective information sharing, and 
the strategies that are employed by some organisations to overcome these.  The 
questions called for descriptive data in order to distinguish the essential 
characteristics of approaches to collaboration, and to examine patterns and parallels 
between these (Semmens, 2011, p.56). The exploratory nature of the research is 
appropriate as it seeks to assist the development of understanding in an area to which 
there is no extensive body of extant theory, and to explore this field of enquiry 
(Denscombe, 2010, p.105).  Given the limited extent of previous research, the 
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complexity of the subject matter and the exploratory nature of the questions which 
would be difficult to answer with numerical data, it was considered appropriate to 
adopt a research strategy focused on qualitative data (Frankel & Devers, 2000, 
p.253).  The adoption of a flexible design strategy was appropriate to allow 
development of research instruments as the research progressed with less pre-
specification required (Robson, 2011, p.74; Semmens, 2011, p.58). 
 
While broadly convinced that a research design focussed on collecting qualitative 
data would be appropriate, consideration was given to the possibility of employing a 
mixed methods strategy to collect, analyse and interpret both quantitative and 
qualitative data in respect of some of the research questions (Creswell & Tashakkori, 
2007, p.303).  Proponents of mixed methods research point to several advantages, 
including triangulation of data to enhance validity of findings (Robson, 2011, p.158) 
or to better understand social reality by investigating it from different angles 
(Bachman & Schutt, 2007, pp.351-352).  For some, mixed methods research is not 
just the combination or synthesis of paradigms but rather presents a third way 
(Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007, p.129).  Some argue that this can help to 
overcome identified weaknesses arising from employing purely qualitative or 
quantitative designs (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, pp.19-20).  Not all agree, 
however.  Sale, Lohfeld and Brazil (2002, p.50) contend that, rather than mitigating 
the weaknesses of either paradigm, combining methods from different paradigmatic 
camps risks devaluing both, and that either is capable of producing results that should 
not require validation from other methods. Whilst due consideration was given to 
these arguments, the final decision was made by going back to the research 
questions, determining that these would not be answered better with the inclusion of 
quantitative data, nor would this likely help validate the findings.  Once a strategy of 
seeking qualitative data was elected, this did not preclude the consideration of 
employing multiple methods towards this end.  Whilst some writers restrict the 
definition of mixed methods research to obtaining both quantitative and qualitative 
data (Bryman, 2012, p.628; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2014, p.42; Johnson, 
Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007, p.129), others, such as Yin (2006, p.42), argue that a 
broader range of potential mixes can occur when the focus is removed from the 
divergent paradigms altogether, and that mixed methods research can encapsulate 
multiple methods that seek to collect and use similar types of data. 
 
Having reflected carefully upon the research questions, giving due consideration to 
the depth of descriptive data that would be needed to answer them, a two-phase data 
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collection strategy was devised.  This strategy was designed to afford the best 
opportunity to collect data from a wide range of sources as well as detailed 
information about organisational approaches and strategies to information and 
intelligence sharing.  This approach could fall within the definition of mixed methods 
research as described by Yin (2006, p.42.), or be defined as a multi-methods strategy 
as both methods were geared towards collection of qualitative data.  The first phase 
would comprise a case study review of an organisation actively involved in 
intelligence sharing with other entities for the purposes of fighting economic crime.  
The intention of pursuing a case study design was to gather a body of data about the 
strategies and approaches employed by the organisation examined to a greater level 
of detail than would be afforded by many other methods, such as a survey or single 
interview.  For the second phase of the data collection, the scope of the research 
would be broadened by collecting additional data from other organisations involved 
in, or closely concerned with, anti-fraud information sharing.  This was to be achieved 
by conducting a series of semi-structured research interviews with relevant parties. 
 
Alternative methods were considered, but were rejected as these did not seem as 
suitable to collect the type of data needed to best answer the research questions.  
Quantitative instruments, such as surveys or structured interviews, could have been 
employed targeting a wide range of organisations and professionals engaged in anti-
fraud work and collaboration.  However, this was not considered to be an adequate 
strategy as the research questions were exploratory in nature, whereas a quantitative 
survey methodology would have been better suited to deductive, rather than inductive 
research (Bryman, 2012, p.36, Bachman & Schutt, 2007, p.19; Creswell, 2009, p.18).  
Other qualitative methods were also considered, but rejected on the basis of being 
less suited to fully answering the research questions.  For example, a design based 
on documentary analysis would not have been appropriate given limited documentary 
evidence available to provide suitable data.  An ethnographic approach may have 
been suitable in the case study setting, but would not have been practical given that 
the research had to be conducted around the constraints of the researcher’s full time 
employment. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
Ethical issues were an important consideration throughout the study, and required 
careful planning at the design stage.  It is a fundamental principal of UK academic 
research that the research will be conducted ethically, with detailed consideration 
given to ensuring that participants will be treated with due respect (Grix, 2010, p.143; 
   
 
63 
 
Macfarlane, 2009, p.9).  Research should be planned and conducted taking account 
of, and with due deference to, the wider cultural context and the accepted values and 
mores of the society in which it is undertaken (Brinkman & Kvale, 2005, p.162; 
Denscombe, 2010, pp.59-60).  There are a number of ethical principles which were 
taken into consideration, but foremost amongst these were those of protecting 
participants from harm and ensuring that they were able to make informed decisions 
about whether or not they wished to take part. 
 
The principle of protection from harm extends not only to the threat of physical harm 
but also from other risks including psychological harm, discomfort (Bryman, 2012, 
pp.135-136) and reputational impact (Bachman & Schutt, 2007, p.288).  Denscombe 
(2010, pp.63-65) emphasises the need to protect the interests of research 
participants, which may encapsulate the above but also extends to issues such as 
stress, invasion of privacy, protection of identity and ensuring the confidentiality of 
data. 
 
The principle of informed consent is also a significant consideration in the conduct of 
modern research (Denscombe, 2010, p.67, Davies & Francis, 2011, pp.283-284).  
However, while this is central to the ethical codes of many professional bodies, 
including those of the British Society of Criminology (2015, p.6) and the British 
Sociological Association (2002, p.3), it is not necessarily a clear-cut concept (Bryman, 
2012, p.138; Dunne, Pryor & Yates, 2005, p.63; Grix, 2010, pp.145-147).  As such, it 
was important to take steps to ensure that participants were fully cognisant of what 
they are being asked to consent to and the implications thereof (Davies, 2011, p.167). 
 
Careful consideration was given to the ethical issues and questions posed by the 
study design.  Furthermore, in line with the requirements stipulated by the University 
of Portsmouth’s Ethics Policy (2015, p.7), formal ethical approval was sought for the 
research, including conducting a risk assessment and making a detailed submission 
to the Research Ethics Committee of ethical considerations and planned safeguards.  
This submission was made and revised in late 2013, and consent received in early 
2014.  The risk assessment is reproduced as Appendix 1, and the ethical approval 
notification letter as Appendix 2. 
 
From assessment of the risks it became clear that these were more straightforward 
for the second phase of the research than for the case study.  This appraisal by no 
means disregarded the ethical issues involved in research interviews; Kvale and 
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Brinkmann (2009, p.62) state that “ethical issues go through the entire process of an 
interview investigation and potential ethical concerns should be taken into 
consideration from the very start of an investigation to the final report”.  However, as 
the topic of the research was not contentious and the interviews did not seek personal 
information from participants, did not expose them to risk of harm and involved no 
power issues, the overall risks were determined to be manageable.  These related 
primarily to ensuring that participants were able to provide informed consent, and that 
their identities and data were protected and securely processed in line with the DPA.  
In order to mitigate these risks, potential participants were provided with a detailed 
Information Sheet outlining the nature and purpose of the research and setting out 
how their data would be used, stored and destroyed once the project had been 
completed.  Participants’ identities would be protected by agreeing not to report their, 
or their employing organisations’, names in any output from the research.  It was 
made clear that participation was voluntary, and that they had the right to withdraw 
up to the point where data had been analysed and integrated with other findings.  
Participants were advised that the interviews would be recorded, and were asked to 
provide written consent confirming that they agreed to take part, and were also asked 
for recorded verbal consent at the start of each recorded interview.  Copies of the 
Invitation Letter, the Information Sheet, and the Consent Form provided to 
participants are reproduced in Appendices 3-5. 
 
The same issues were relevant to the case study interviews.  However, due to the 
nature of this phase additional risks were also assessed.  Firstly, it would be 
necessary for the organisation that was the subject of the study to be identified within 
the thesis and any subsequent publications arising from it.  There would also be the 
probability that the research would involve exposure to sensitive operational 
information relating to the organisation.  Both of these would expose the organisation 
to a certain amount of risk.  These risks were set out in a detailed information sheet 
addressed to the head of the organisation, and discussed openly with him in 
preliminary negotiations, and a Consent Form obtained acknowledging that the 
organisation agreed to take part having been notified of these risks.  The information 
sheet also provided assurance about sensitive data not being disclosed in the output.  
During access negotiations, it was also agreed that use of any materials in the output 
that may potentially be sensitive be discussed and agreed first. 
 
Additionally, it was recognised that the issue of power relationships (Denscombe, 
2010, pp.71-72) might be relevant in that, once agreement had been obtained from 
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an organisation to take part in the research, members of staff may feel obliged to 
participate.  This was addressed in the information sheets issued to both the case 
study organisation and to the individual staff members selected as potential 
participants, which established that individual consent would be sought in each 
instance, and that no obligation was conferred to staff members by the organisational 
consent.  Each targeted staff member was given full details of the nature of the 
research and their role within it and was asked to voluntarily participate, giving them 
the same rights of refusal or withdrawal as given to individual interviewees in the other 
phase of the data collection.  Furthermore, the Information Sheets made clear that 
while participants’ names would not be disclosed in any outputs in order to protect 
their identities, there was an underlying risk that their identities may be inferred by 
people who knew that they were employed at the organisation. 
 
In this way, the key risks were identified and addressed, mitigated as much as 
reasonably possible, and participants of both elements of the study were made aware 
of the risks of participation and the precautions taken to protect them.  Copies of the 
Invitation Letters, Information Sheets and Consent forms used in the case study 
element of the research are reproduced in Appendices 6-15. 
 
Data Collection Phase One: Case Study 
Case study research was chosen for the first of the two phases of data collection.  
Case studies are reviews into single, or multiple, units of enquiry (Bryman, 2012, p.66; 
Creswell, 2009, p.13), and are a strategy that allows the researcher to gain detailed 
understanding of the case (Denscombe, 2007, p.36; Hagan, 1982, p.122; Noor, 2008, 
pp.1602-1603).  Noor (2008, p.1602) observes that the case study does not aim to 
study the entirety of the organisation, but focuses on a particular issue or feature, and 
can be used towards the development of theory (Bryman, 2012, p.71; Darke, Shanks 
& Broadbent, 1998, p.275).  Furthermore, Appleton (2002, p.87) suggests that case 
studies are particularly valuable when there is limited knowledge about a particular 
subject.  As such, it is a strategy that lends itself well to the aims of the research. 
 
As a research strategy, case studies have been subject to a number of criticisms.  
Flyvberg (2006, p.221) identifies five commonly cited criticisms as being: 
 
 that practical, context-dependent knowledge is less valuable than theoretical 
knowledge 
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 that case studies may be subject to verification bias, and may serve to confirm 
the predetermined views of the researcher 
 that case studies are better for the generation of hypotheses rather than 
theory 
 that is it difficult to develop theory on the basis of analysis of specific cases 
 that findings from a single case cannot be generalised. 
 
For Flyvberg, each of these is misplaced.  He argues that case studies are well suited 
to development of context-dependent knowledge, and that detailed understanding of 
real-world phenomena is required to elevate understanding from rudimentary rule-
based insight to expert knowledge (Flyvberg, 2006, pp.221-222).  The issue of 
researcher bias is rejected on several grounds: that such criticism is often made from 
the positivist standpoint that qualitative enquiry is unscientific; that verification bias is 
not specific to case study research; and on the evidence of many case studies where 
findings have discredited initial hypotheses or caused them to be amended (Flyvberg, 
2006, pp.234-237).  Darke et al (1998, p.286), considering bias during data collection 
and analysis, assert that risks may be reduced through strategies such as 
triangulation of data from multiple sources. The remaining criticisms cited concern 
whether case study findings may be generalised, and used to generate theory.  Again 
Flyvberg (2006, pp. 224-225) points to the positivist source of this criticism, as 
scientists cannot generalise from a single case, a point with which Yin (2009, p.15) – 
one of the principal proponents of case study research – concurs.  Yin (2009, p.38), 
however, contends that case study findings may be better suited to theoretical rather 
than statistical generalisation.  Flyvberg (2006, pp.225-226) argues that findings may 
be generalisable dependent on careful case selection.  Appleton (2002, p.90) takes 
a different view again arguing that, for constructivist research, generalisation as a 
concept is better amended to that of transferability, to how well findings from one case 
may be transferred to another.  This, in turn, may help to explain the phenomenon of 
mimetic isomorphism, in which some organisations in uncertain environments will 
mimic the characteristics of others that are perceived to be successful (Williams et al, 
2009, pp.17-18).  This latter argument is compelling, suggesting that the findings from 
this research could be transferable and that organisations that are not currently 
engaged in, or effective at, sharing information should be able to adopt and adapt the 
strategies employed by others.  This may accord with the viewpoint expressed by 
Stake (1978, p.6) who argued that case studies are perhaps most useful for 
increasing understanding and extending the experience of others. 
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The question that underlies any case study research is 'what is a case?'  While space 
restrictions do not allow an extended examination of this, it is worth noting that there 
are multiple viewpoints and, in some instances, defining a case may not be a 
straightforward matter.  A case can be many things.  It can be any one of many units 
of analysis, such as an organisation, an individual, a group, an event or a 
phenomenon (Darke et al, 1998, p.280; Robson, 2011, p.135; Yin, 2012, p.6).  A case 
could be a particular decision, an activity or strategy, or a process (Yin, 2009, p.29).  
Appleton (2002, pp.85-86) argues that, given the extensive range of objects and 
phenomena cited within the literature as potential cases, virtually anything may be 
determined to be the case within the right context and if adequately defined.  For 
Bryman (2012, p.69), the case must be a discrete item of interest on which the 
researcher can focus on the unique characteristics.  Thomas (2011, pp.14-15) 
extends the focus, suggesting that the case must be an example of something: a 
simple description of a particular object or event in itself would not constitute a case 
unless it was an example of a particular characteristic, such as a successful project, 
or a noteworthy failure.  Therefore he emphasises the contextual relevance of the unit 
of analysis.  The case also need not be the entirety of an object; if a project is based 
within a particular organisation, for example, the case study may focus on one 
particular aspect or division rather than the entity as a whole (Robson, 2011, p.138). 
 
The case study phase of the research was conceived from the outset to be a single 
case design.  This was based on practical considerations due to the constraints of 
part-time research, especially given that the case study was only one part of the data 
collection.  While one of the commonly cited risks pertaining to a single case design 
include the issue of whether the findings can be generalised (Flyvberg, 2006, p.224), 
by having an additional phase of data collection from other sources helped mitigate 
the risk by allowing triangulation of the data.  While an alternative would have been 
to conduct a multiple case design, and not conduct an additional phase of stand-alone 
research interviews, this would not have been appropriate for this project.  There were 
two primary reasons for this.  The first was that by restricting the sources of data to 
two main cases, rather than one main case and a wider range of additional sources 
would limit the breadth of the study, and could potentially render the findings less 
generalisable.  Secondly, there was only a small pool of suitable potential cases to 
target for such a study, and there was no certainty of getting one, let alone two, to 
agree to be the subject of such research within a reasonable time frame. 
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Selection of an appropriate case for the study was, therefore, a critical decision.  
Purposive selection of the case was essential; random sampling would be an 
inappropriate strategy for a case study design as it could result in the selection of a 
case that may yield little suitable data.  A shortlist was drawn up of organisations 
actively focussed on the sharing of information for anti-fraud purposes.  These 
organisations were shortlisted because they were all examples of key cases 
(Thomas, 2011, p.77), or exemplary cases (Yin, 2012, p.35).  Additionally, such 
examples could be considered to be revelatory cases (Yin 2009, pp.48-49) as no 
case study research had been performed into the anti-crime intelligence sharing 
functions of non-law enforcement organisations in the UK.  First and second choices 
were selected, both of which operated within the insurance field, and these were 
contacted in turn with a view to obtaining their agreement to participate in the study. 
 
Several attempts were made to contact these organisations, with no response being 
received from the first choice.  Shortly after the second had been contacted, good 
fortune struck.  A chance opportunity arose at a conference in October 2013 to speak 
with the Director General of FACT, an organisation devoted to tackling intellectual 
property crime, following a presentation given by him on FACT's intelligence-led and 
collaborative approach.  His presentation suggested that FACT would be an ideal 
candidate for the case study, and a meeting was engineered with the Director General 
whilst he was at the conference.  In this, the nature of the research and a request to 
use FACT as the subject of the case study were discussed, and he expressed 
willingness to correspond further. 
 
In order to secure FACT's participation, further negotiations were held over several 
weeks, in which the nature and purpose of the research and the case study focus 
were discussed.  The Director General provided background information about the 
organisation, including copies of its strategic assessment document and 
organisational structure to enable planning of priorities in terms of members of staff 
to interview. 
 
A meeting was held with the Director General in February 2014 to make 
arrangements for the data collection.  Preliminary agreements were reached as to 
when the research would take place, which staff would be invited for interview, and 
for the Director General to distribute information sheets and consent forms to those 
staff in order that they could make informed decisions as to whether or not they 
wished to participate.  He also provided written and signed consent on behalf of FACT 
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for the research to take place, confirming that he was content for the organisation to 
be identified by name as the subject of the case study.  Within a few weeks of this 
meeting, we had agreed the timeframe for the data collection to be conducted at 
FACT’s office in March and April 2014. 
 
Yin outlines six main sources of data for case study research: documents, interviews, 
archive records, direct observation, participant observation and artefacts (Yin, 2009, 
p.101), although both he and Thomas (2011, p.162) agree that additional sources 
may be of use.  The primary method employed was the semi-structured interview.  As 
there were just two weeks on site full time in which to undertake the fieldwork, 
conducting interviews provided the opportunity to gather the greatest amount of data 
from across different parts of the organisation within this timeframe.  In addition to 
interview data, some documents were collected to obtain additional information, as 
well as some observation of meetings and day-to-day work insofar as time allowed.  
Due to time constraints, there was little opportunity in practice to spend time in 
observations, although sessions were conducted with members of both the 
Intelligence and the Internet Investigations teams to observe their work.  Due to the 
limited time available for this activity, this was primarily of benefit from a contextual 
perspective, allowing observation of matters that were discussed during interview 
sessions and providing insight into how FACT worked rather than data towards the 
research questions.  One of FACT’s Tasking and Coordination meetings was 
observed, in which all operational staff and managers were involved and in which the 
status of all active investigations was discussed and objectives and priorities set 
relating to case work and intelligence.  Documentation was collected relating to 
FACT’s strategy, policies and procedures to allow better understanding of the 
framework within which it operated, as well as samples of operational documents 
relevant to the topic of the research, such as copies of information sharing 
agreements, samples of intelligence products and board papers.  These were all 
valuable sources of additional data.  However, by seeking and analysing different 
forms of data, the study conformed to Heidensohn’s (2008, p.209) observation that 
most case studies employ multiple methods of data collection, which can enhance 
triangulation and validation within the study. 
 
In all, during two weeks onsite fieldwork, twenty-four tape-recorded semi-structured 
interviews were conducted.  This comprised just over 50% of FACT by capacity 
headcount.  Some short, informal and non-recorded chats were also conducted with 
additional support staff.  The interviews varied in length, with most falling between 
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forty minutes and an hour.  Figure 3.1 below provides details of the formal case study 
interviews.  One of the interviews, with a recently recruited member of staff, lasted 
just ten minutes, but covered issues such as her perception of the role, and the 
training that she had received, while the longest two interviews – with the Director 
General and with the Intelligence Manager – each approached two hours in length.  
Interviews were conducted with all senior officers, most of the Intelligence team, 
members of the other key teams and functions as well as a selection of support staff.  
This data was supplemented with a body of documentary material collected for further 
examination and field notes from observations of meetings and of time spent with the 
Intelligence and Internet Investigations teams. 
 
Figure 3.1: Case study interviewees 
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Data Collection Phase Two: Research Interviews 
The second phase of data collection involved a series of stand-alone interviews 
conducted with professionals actively engaged with, or having specialist knowledge 
of, information sharing relating to the prevention or investigation of economic crime. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were selected as the data collection method for this phase 
as these provide a framework to guide conversations but afford flexibility within 
interviews to respond to topics arising during conversation rather than sticking rigidly 
to a fixed question set (Denscombe, 2007, p.176, Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p.130; 
Robson, 2011, p.280).  Interviews seek to obtain contextual accounts from the 
interviewee’s perspective and experience (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006, p.319; 
Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p.3) and can provide a rich source of data that is useful for 
research into complex phenomena (Denscombe, 2007, p.174; Hagan, 1982, p.82). 
 
However, there are problems with the semi-structured interview as a research 
instrument.  They can be time consuming and expensive to conduct, transcribe and 
analyse (Denscombe, 2007, p.174; Hagan; 1982, p.83).  Robson (2011, p.281) 
observes that criticism has been levelled in respect of their not producing 
standardised responses, thus raising questions about reliability and validity of the 
data.  The data collected from interviews can cause problems in the analysis phase 
due to the volume of data that can be amassed (Bryman, 2012, p.565).  Furthermore, 
the method has been criticised as being too susceptible to researcher subjectivity or 
bias (Hagan, 1982, p.83; Kvale, 1994, pp.154-159).  These can be valid concerns 
and the issue of the volume of data will be discussed later in the chapter.  Some 
issues, such as concerns over validity and lack of standardisation may be 
philosophically-based (Kvale, 1994, p.170).  Measures can be taken to reduce bias, 
including through reflection on, and declaration of, the researcher’s position (Kvale, 
1994, p.155; Malterud, 2001, p.484) and through adopting a neutral stance in 
questions posed during interviews (Robson, 2011, p.282).  Steps were taken in these 
respects in that neutrality was sought through careful construction, review and 
revision of the research instrument.  The researcher’s position is that of an anti-fraud 
practitioner who is supportive of increased information sharing and motivated by 
professional experience of some of the problems involved to conducting this study to 
better understand how it can be appropriately and legally achieved.  An additional risk 
is that of elite bias, where the researcher seeks information only from those with a 
particular status, and does not obtain the full picture (Myers & Newman, 2007, p.5).  
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Whilst this risk is present in stand-alone interviews, it has been mitigated in two 
respects in terms of this research.  Firstly, the sample was not selected in terms of 
hierarchical status.  Secondly, the case study element has helped to ensure that data 
has been gathered from participants operating at all levels: senior, junior, operational 
and managerial. 
 
Effective interviewing is subject to the skills of the researcher as an interviewer, with 
the quality of the data collected dependent on this ability (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, 
p.82); these are skills that require practice and, ideally, training (Robson, 2011, 
p.301).  The researcher had previous experience of conducting semi-structured 
research interviews from a preliminary study earlier in the doctoral programme as well 
as extensive experience of conducting fact-finding interviews in a professional 
context. 
 
A purposive sampling strategy was employed, recognising that careful sample 
selection would be critical to obtaining suitable data (Bryman, 2012, p.416; Coyne, 
1997, p.623).  As the research strategy was focused on interviewing subject matter 
experts, purposive sampling was a natural strategy to adopt in order to access 
information-rich sources of data (Devers & Frankel, 2000, p.264) on the basis of 
participants' expertise as a ‘key informant sample’ (Marshall, 1996, p.523).  
Alternative sampling strategies were rejected as being less suitable.  Probability 
sampling would have been unlikely to have returned a sample with appropriate 
knowledge and expertise.  Convenience sampling lacks credibility, and would also be 
unlikely to generate appropriate data (Marshall, 1996, p.523).  While purposive 
sampling can be prone to bias (National Audit Office, n.d., p.11), the risk was 
minimised for this study as the sample demands selection of organisations known to 
be successfully engaged in information sharing, and the quality of the findings would 
be impeded if effort were not spent to select the best possible examples.  
Furthermore, the incorporation of snowball sampling also reduced the scope for bias. 
 
As the strategy demanded a very specific sample of practitioners and subject matter 
experts, two main approaches were taken to selecting the sample.  The first was to 
draw on the researcher’s professional knowledge as to those organisations that were 
actively involved in, or known for, sharing intelligence for anti-fraud purposes.  The 
second was to adopt a measure of snowball sampling, with participants from both 
phases suggesting additional people and organisations to engage with for the 
research.  An initial target list was drawn up, comprising public and private sector 
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entities engaged in anti-fraud information sharing, and other relevant parties with 
insight at the strategic or policy level, such as regulators and legislators.  This list was 
supplemented by snowball sampling recommendations made by some participants 
as data collection progressed. 
 
An interview schedule was prepared to provide a framework for the meetings, 
although allowing flexibility in how closely this was adhered to.  One main schedule 
was prepared before this phase of data collection commenced, although it was 
subsequently adjusted for a few interviews where necessary (for example, when the 
interviewee’s organisation had a policy, rather than operational, interest in intelligence 
sharing).  Copies of the schedules are reproduced in Appendix 17.  The first interview 
was used as a pilot, by agreement with the participant, and was used not only to 
collect data but also to refine the research instrument in line with generally 
recommended practice (Bryman, 2012, pp.263-264; Kezar, 2000, p.393; van 
Teijlingen & Hundley, 2001, p.1).  While it is useful to bear in mind the concern that 
pilot participants generally report no issues with the approach or questions, thereby 
limiting their effectiveness in helping to refine the research instrument (Sampson, 
2004, p.395), the first interviewee had, coincidentally, engaged in research on a 
similar topic for his own Master’s degree several years earlier, and understood the 
value of such feedback.  Some minor revisions were made to the research instrument 
following completion of the pilot interview, in terms of removing and adding questions, 
revising the structure and emphasis, and implementing small changes to the wording. 
 
Once the intended sample had been drawn up, potential participants were contacted 
through a variety of means.  Some were contacted directly, using contact details 
researched online.  Some success was had by this method, but some requests were 
rejected and a number of approaches received no response.  In one instance, a high 
priority target was successfully contacted through a blind approach on LinkedIn.  The 
most successful approach, however, other than snowball sampling where other 
participants generally agreed to make an introduction to the recommended party, was 
through exploitation of the researcher’s professional network.  Professional contacts 
in law enforcement and various industries were utilised to seek the right people to 
contact for the target organisations.  In many instances these contacts also made 
direct introductions, considerably easing the process of access negotiation.  Once 
contact had been established, usually by email followed by a telephone conversation, 
the participant would be sent the Information Sheet and Consent Form as described 
in the Ethics section above. 
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As with the case study interviews, the second phase interviews were audio recorded 
to aid retention.  Suitable preparations were made regarding familiarity with the 
recording device, ensuring there was sufficient memory space and having a backup 
recorder as well as material for taking notes.  A flexible approach was taken to allow 
for unexpected situations; two interviews involved multiple interviewees, with the 
original participant inviting another person to take part, while another interviewee did 
not wish to be recorded so contemporaneous notes were taken instead.  Interviews 
were conducted at locations suitable for the interviewee, and steps taken to prevent 
background noise and interference on the recordings. 
 
For this phase of data collection, twenty-two research interviews were conducted, 
involving twenty-four interviewees from nineteen different organisations across 
multiple sectors.  Figure 3.2 provides details of these interviewees. 
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Figure 3.2: Non-case study interviewees 
 
 
   
 
76 
 
 
Transcription and Analysis 
Almost as soon as the data collection was underway, the task of transcribing the 
interview data was started.  Due to the number of interviews undertaken, it was 
recognised that this would be a lengthy and time consuming process.  However, this 
was done by the researcher for two reasons.  Firstly, it would have been expensive 
to use a transcription service given the number of interviews involved.  Secondly, and 
more importantly, the process of transcription can assist in getting to know the data 
(Robson, 2011, p.478.  For Noaks and Wincup (2004, p.129) transcription is a 
valuable part of the analysis phase of research.  In order to make it more manageable, 
the decision was taken to fully transcribe all of the second phase interviews, but just 
the most apposite of the case study interviews: those involving the Intelligence team 
and senior officers; those which provided the data most relevant to intelligence 
handling and sharing.  This comprised nine of the twenty-four case study interviews.  
The remaining fifteen were coded directly from the audio recordings, focusing on the 
most pertinent topics arising within them.  This process involved playing back each 
of the recordings multiple times whilst coding. 
 
In order to assist with data management throughout coding and analysis, Computer 
Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) was used.  While Robson’s 
(2011, p.472) caution that consideration must be given to the time saving afforded by 
these packages against the time invested to learn how to use them was noted, the 
volume of data that had been collected for analysis and the functionality of such 
software made it a rational decision.  This was taken in full knowledge that CAQDAS 
is a data management tool and not a replacement to the intellectual effort and 
decisions required to code and analyse data (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013, p.2).  The 
advantages of CAQDAS is not just managing large quantities of qualitative data 
(Noaks & Wincup, 2004, p.132), but also that it enables researchers to employ more 
codes and code data more quickly (Marshall, 2002, p.58).  Nvivo software was used 
primarily for the practical considerations that both the software license and training 
courses in the package were available from the university.   Nvivo was useful for the 
research design as it allowed more effective data management, for both text and 
audio files to be uploaded for coding, as well as to run reports and queries which 
assisted in data analysis. 
 
A three stage process was followed to code and analyse the data.  While the study 
was not designed to follow a grounded theory methodology, the process of coding 
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and analysis did draw from this tradition.  The first stage of open coding used the 
descriptive coding method, assigning subject-based identifiers as free nodes within 
Nvivo resulting in a categorised summary of the data for subsequent coding and 
analysis (Saldaña, 2013, pp.88-89).  During this process, topics from the interview 
data relevant to the research questions were identified and coded as well as, for the 
case study, useful contextual data with respect to the key features of FACT’s 
operating model.  Aiming for total theoretical saturation in which no further meaning 
could be extracted from the transcripts would have been a perpetual process if taken 
to its logical extreme (Marshall, 2002, p.61), so a manageable and pragmatic 
approach was taken.  A comprehensive line-by-line approach was taken to coding, 
rather than employing a constant comparative approach.  However, it was recognised 
as progress was being made that additional topics and codes were being identified in 
later interviews that had not been coded in the same way in earlier transcripts; it was 
considered prudent to re-examine the earlier transcripts where saturation had not 
occurred (Glaser, 1965, p.442; Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p.112).  Accordingly, notes 
were made of key topics and codes used in coding later transcripts that had not been 
used in the earliest transcripts and these early transcripts were recoded.  This re-
coding was performed in detail for the first eight transcripts, but during the last few of 
these it was found that fewer coding changes were being made.  Each of the 
transcripts was reviewed a further time to ensure that key topics had not been 
overlooked.  On completion of the first phase of coding additional work was 
undertaken to tidy the codes, combining a small number where duplicates based on 
different synonyms of the same code had been created. 
 
The second phase followed the tradition of axial coding, in which the data and codes 
were arranged and reassembled into thematic categories, to assist in identifying and 
developing the linked themes and meanings within the data.  Bazeley (2009, p.7) 
observes the danger of named themes simply being meta-categories or 
classifications of codes, and states that emergent themes often closely resemble 
those already discussed within the literature (Ibid., p.9).  At this stage, it was 
becoming clear that some themes did indeed follow issues discussed in the literature, 
which is to be expected, but also that other issues emerged that were not covered 
therein.  Furthermore, repetition of some same topics across different transcripts and 
across interviews conducted in both phases of the research also provided validity for 
the findings by suggesting that the respective codes were reliable (Bereska, 2003, 
p.70). 
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A final stage involved analysis of the coded data into meaningful thematic categories, 
loosely following the concept of theoretical coding to create overarching codes into 
which the topics logically fall, resulting in a few core categories that systematically 
link the data (Saldaña, 2013, pp.223-224).  To conduct this, all coded data were 
printed, analysed and mapped out on word processing and spreadsheet documents 
to determine the links and relationships between them and identify the central 
categories to which they ultimately related. 
 
For the documents and field notes collected during the case study phase, a relatively 
simple approach was taken to content analysis.  As these were collected primarily to 
provide macro-level context in relation to the case study – for understanding FACT 
as an organisation and additional supporting evidence of processes discussed during 
interviews – detailed line-by-line coding was not undertaken.  Each document was 
examined closely and memos made as to how they related to topics from the interview 
data.  By way of example, where copies of memoranda of understanding were 
obtained, these were analysed in terms of overall content and structure to add deeper 
meaning to the role described in the interview data that these tools played in 
facilitating information sharing. 
 
Summary 
The study employed a multi-method qualitative research design based on two 
discrete phases of data collection: a case study of a single organisation that relied 
strongly on effective information and intelligence sharing as a core process to combat 
intellectual property crime; and a series of stand-alone qualitative interviews 
conducted with representatives of other organisations that rely on information sharing 
as a means of combating economic crime, or other subject matter experts.  This 
provided a substantial body of data which was coded and analysed in three stages, 
following a strategy incorporating elements of grounded theory. 
 
The design can be evaluated as having provided an effective strategy for the 
collection of an extensive and rich body of data suitable for addressing the research 
questions.  The greatest weakness of the strategy was that it was perhaps over-
ambitious for the purposes and constraints of a doctoral research project, resulting in 
an extensive body of data being gathered which led to challenges in respect of 
transcribing, coding and analysis.  Employment of either of the two phases alone may 
have resulted in the collection of a more readily manageable body of data that would 
arguably have been sufficient to answer the research questions.  However, 
   
 
79 
 
completing both phases has undoubtedly provided a richer body of data to analyse, 
has helped validate the findings through triangulation of data and, most importantly, 
has enriched the findings and depth of the study. 
 
The strategy has also been effective in terms of adding to knowledge in the subject 
area as it is the first time, to the researcher’s knowledge, that a UK-based non-law 
enforcement organisation dedicated to combating crime, and the first in the 
intellectual property arena, has been the subject of a case study examining the way 
in which it shares information and intelligence with others. 
 
The next chapters set out the key findings from the research, commencing with a 
review of findings relating to the barriers and challenges to economic crime 
information sharing and the legislative framework and problems that collaborating 
organisations must navigate. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Findings: The Legal Framework and Inhibitors to 
Collaboration 
 
Introduction 
In this, the first of four chapters setting out the research findings, the focus is on 
outcomes relating to the contemporary challenges and barriers to information sharing.  
This has been structured in three parts.  The first sets out participants’ views on how 
UK organisations are performing in terms of information and intelligence sharing.  The 
second part summarises key issues relating to the legislative framework around 
sharing discussed during the interviews, with special focus on data protection law.  
Finally, the other key challenges that were reported by participants as impeding 
effective collaboration are identified. 
 
Performance of UK Organisations in Information Sharing 
As a prelude to the second phase interviews, the interviewees were asked for their 
general views on how well, or poorly, organisations in the UK performed at information 
sharing, and if they could cite any examples of particularly good or bad practice.  
Although this was asked in order to solicit broad responses only, and the responses 
were not probed in detail, it provided some interesting results.  Views varied widely, 
with some interviewees content that organisations were performing reasonably well 
overall while others relayed a more pessimistic assessment.  Some went into more 
detail than others, and some restricted and clarified their responses with respect to 
particular sectors or industries.  This data provides useful contextual information 
about how those involved in combating economic crime and sharing intelligence 
across a variety of sectors and industries perceive the current state of collaboration 
in the UK. 
 
Some respondents were downbeat in their judgement of how organisations as a 
whole were collaborating: 
 
RI/07: “I think it should be a lot more fluid than it actually is, and I do find it a 
struggle reaching out to different organisations and trying to progress cases 
where there is a need to perhaps link in with other organisations.” 
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RI/05: “Abysmally.  Abysmally.  I attended a conference, I spoke at a 
conference about a month ago at Hill Dickinson in London where it was it was 
entitled ‘Profile of a Fraudster’. And what Hill Dickinson were keen to do was 
to try and break down some of the barriers.  […]  And there were three people 
from the insurance industry sat on the panel […].  And the interesting thing 
that came out from that was when challenged by the chairman as to what they 
thought the initiative was the insurers said ‘to be honest, we don’t even co-
operate with each other because if I reject a claimant or a policy holder and 
he goes to one of my competitors, I get a double win.  I avoid the fraud risk 
but what I also do is I cause my competitor who’s less well-resourced or less 
intelligent than I am to take that risk and potentially therefore reduce their 
effectiveness or profitability in the space and therefore give me a competitive 
advantage’.” 
 
Some of the less optimistic views were particularly focussed with respect to sharing 
within the public sector, or between public and private sectors: 
 
RI/03: “I think it varies tremendously, I think there is a tremendous amount of 
inconsistency in terms of how it’s done.  I think there is a massive disparity 
between public and private sector.” 
 
RI/21: “A large number of the partners we work with are very comfortable 
sharing information with us.  Others, you’ll probably recall yourself, the 
Revenue – HMRC – are somewhat unusual in that their initial stance is ‘you 
give us everything, we give you nothing’.” 
 
RI/11: “And if you think information sharing between private and public sector 
is bad, then look at public to public, or police to police.  Or police to law 
enforcement.  It’s horrendous.” 
 
However, not all responses were negative.  Other parties took either a more positive 
view, or at least saw that there were signs that things were improving, perceiving a 
greater willingness to collaborate.  This applied not only to private sector 
organisations, but also within the public sector. 
 
RI/19A: “Looking at our industry [insurance] we’ve been notoriously bad for 
sharing intelligence and information.  We’re getting better.  Different sectors 
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are better than others, so motor is way far [sic] advanced in sharing 
intelligence than, say, casualty and property.  […] But we’re now seeing the 
frauds change, move into other areas such as casualty in terms of organised 
nature, and you immediately see how far behind those areas are in sharing 
intelligence because they’re not used to doing it.  So, you know, it used to be 
awful, it’s made improvements, still much more room for improvement would 
be my view.” 
 
RI/04: “There are aspects of the public sector which, due to prior legislation, 
certain bodies within the public sector have been somewhat reticent to share 
information.  However, I think there is I think a change in perceptions about 
fraud data sharing, fraud intelligence sharing.   I think the last year, couple of 
years or so, have been a lot more participation in groups like the ACPO as-
was working groups under the Economic Crime Portfolio.  I think within those 
sorts of groups there’s been much more willingness to share.  We run working 
groups here which now people from the public sector are attending and 
sharing their fraud MOs verbally as well.  We are establishing more 
connections within the public sector for the purposes of sharing things like 
MOs, intelligence, that sort of thing.  So I think the situation is improving.” 
 
Two interviewees expressed very positive views about the current state of 
collaboration within the UK, although it was also evident that, for one of these, the 
optimistic opinion was relative to the challenges of sharing information in other 
jurisdictions. 
 
RI/22: “So within the UK I think we do incredibly well, as it happens.  I think 
the National Intelligence Model provides a good backbone for the exchanging 
of intelligence between agencies.” 
 
RI/14: “I think I’m quite qualified to say this, having worked in the UK all of my 
adult life and now looking after, for the last 18 months 2 years, looking after 
Europe, data privacy in Europe, I thought data privacy was prohibitive in the 
UK.  Believe me, it’s an absolute holiday in the UK.  Europe is an absolute 
nightmare, and France in particular are so bureaucratic it’s absolutely crazy, 
so I think – to qualify that – I think the data sharing is not an issue in the UK, 
providing you use data protection or whatever other legislation is available to 
you.” 
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It is clear from the responses that there are a wide variety of opinions on the current 
environment for inter-organisational collaboration and sharing amongst practitioners.  
While the overriding theme was that the situation was not particularly healthy, 
participants from both public and private sector organisations indicated that there was 
a greater willingness and openness to collaboration being seen and that there is a 
positive direction of travel despite the problems that remain. 
 
The UK’s Legislative Framework for Information Sharing 
A major topic of discussion within the interviews was that of the legislative framework 
within the UK with respect to information sharing including, most extensively, the law 
on data protection.  That this was a significant focal point was no surprise.  The Law 
Commission’s review of information sharing (2014, p.3) concluded that there was a 
lack of legislative clarity, conflicting guidance and consequential problems in the 
practice of information sharing.  Participants’ views on the legislative framework 
covered a range of topics, covering the law as both an enabler of, and a challenge to, 
effective collaboration between organisations and sectors for combating crime. 
 
Data Protection Act 
The DPA is perhaps the most significant piece of legislation with respect to 
information sharing.  Whilst it remains a contentious instrument that present 
numerous challenges in respect of collaboration, many of the interviewees expressed 
views that the legislation in itself was not a barrier to sharing.  Thirteen participants 
from the second phase interviews, plus the most senior FACT officers, recognised 
that, properly applied, the Act could facilitate the legal exchange of anti-crime 
information.  Three more participants discussed using the legislation in practice.  
Whilst it should be taken into account that participants were proactive proponents for 
sharing information, this does suggest broad consensus amongst practitioners that 
the provisions of the Act should enable collaboration. 
 
CS/24: “I carry around a copy of the Codes of Practice of the Data Protection 
Act, and I keep showing...  This key issue is that people do not understand 
that just because you’re a government agency, a law enforcement agency, a 
private agency, it doesn’t matter.  The Data Protection Act talks about, the 
word they use is ‘organisation’.  That’s the word they use.  So any 
organisation, no matter who you are, government, local authority, police, 
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private, you can share information.  You must have the checks and balances 
in place, but you can share that information.” 
 
RI/03: “I actually think [DPA section] 29(3) works pretty effectively, to be 
perfectly honest with you.  I think if you understand the legislation, if you 
engage with the regulators, if you operate a sound business model with good 
governance and you have proper controls around it, then I think 29(3) as it 
stands already provides a good framework.” 
 
RI/06: “And as long as the information is shared in a compliant manner with 
those proper checks and balances and a mechanism to do it, then absolutely.  
The DPA is not there to prevent you exchanging data, it’s there to get you to 
exchange data in a compliant manner.” 
 
However, for all of the practitioners’ recognition that the DPA may help facilitate data 
sharing if it is used correctly, it was also widely cited as being an impediment to 
collaboration in practice.  The Fraud Review (Fraud Review Team, 2006b, p.100) 
noted that the Act was commonly misunderstood, and evidence from a large number 
of participants suggested that this was still the case. 
 
CS/24: “From a legal perspective it’s, the misunderstanding or the 
misinterpretation of the Data Protection Act is the biggest problem.  It is, for 
intelligence sharing.” 
 
RI/12: “Some of the agencies don’t necessarily understand data protection, 
and will say ‘well I can’t share that’. Well actually, yes you can because s.29(3) 
says you can for the purpose of investigating and detecting crime.  So they 
don’t have an understanding but we can persuade that.” 
 
Simple lack of understanding or misinterpretation is not the only challenge, however.  
One of the interviewees commented on a government department adding additional 
criteria not contained within the Act itself: 
 
RI/01: “If you put forward a 29(3) notice stating exactly what you want the 
information for, the DWP some years ago went down the route of saying ‘I 
can’t help you it’s not a serious crime’.  Well, where does it say ‘serious’ in the 
Data Protection Act?  It doesn’t, so where did that come from?” 
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There were sometimes conflicting views from private sector participants on how well 
the Act was understood by law enforcement agencies: 
 
RI/19A: “I think it is a really good opportunity to share intelligence.  You know, 
police get it completely, we’ve no problems with sharing with them because 
everyone understands it from an insurer perspective.” 
 
RI/14: “I think probably law enforcement don’t understand.  Having been for 
30 years in law enforcement I don’t think law enforcement understand data 
protection.  I think frequently you will get someone bowling up with a s.28 [sic] 
DPA request.  Well, what they don’t understand it’s not mandatory.  I’m the 
data owner, and I can refuse.” 
 
Frustrations relating to the DPA were expressed by most participants in the second 
phase of the research, and by some in the case study, and several criticised the ICO 
for failing to provide clarity on the issue. 
 
RI/18: “The Data Protection Act and the understanding of that is a big problem.  
And the reluctance of the Information Commissioner’s Office to come out and 
make a clear statement again is problematic.” 
 
Another frequently cited complaint was that the DPA was used by many people and 
organisations as an excuse to hide behind, rather than to share data, regardless of 
the real reason for their unwillingness or inability to collaborate. 
 
RI/07: “My experience shows me that a lot of companies use the Data 
Protection Act to hide behind rather than using it as an opportunity to share 
information and intelligence.  So I find it quite a frustrating notion, I guess.” 
 
RI/21: “You may well, and we do, find individuals who choose to interpret 
legislation or who choose to interpret management guidance as a reason not 
to do something.  You know, we frequently hear that the ‘oh we can’t tell you 
that because the Data Protection Act doesn’t allow us.’  And of course we go 
back then and say ‘if you look at the reasons to share this information, you’ll 
find the prevention and detection of crime is a specific exemption.’  But you’ve 
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already backed someone into a corner that they were comfortable in their 
position and sometimes you will not move them from that position.” 
 
This issue was also recognised and discussed by an interviewee who operated within 
the regulatory environment: 
 
RI/08: “Plenty of people hide behind the skirts of data protection law as well 
because they just don’t want to do something, and it’s easier to say ‘oh the 
Data Protection Act doesn’t allow me to do it’, rather than say ‘I don’t want to 
do it’, because that sometimes causes offence.” 
 
The other commonly discussed issue with respect to the DPA was that organisations 
are afraid of making mistakes with respect to sharing personal data and of the 
potential consequences of doing so. 
 
RI/06: “There’s a reluctance, in my opinion from a lack of understanding of the 
Data Protection Act to actually exchange information.  Everybody is terrified 
of getting on the wrong end of the Information Commissioner, of exchanging 
information and being criticised for it, if not prosecuted for it.” 
 
CS/17: “I think people are worried about it.  People are frightened of it. 
Because it’s a stick to beat people with.” 
 
RI/13: “The second issue is that culturally, is there a cultural imbalance when 
it comes to information sharing?  So if you look at, you can cast your eye over 
the Information Commissioner’s Office and look at people who’ve been fined 
and organisations that have been fined £10,000s, sometimes £100,000s, for 
loss of information.  So what I’m saying is quite rightly there’s an oversight on 
how information is handled.  But can you tell me many examples where people 
have been fined £100,000s or threatened with imprisonment because they’ve 
failed to share information?” 
 
RI/13 was not the only person to comment on this perceived imbalance: 
 
RI/01: “…if you share data erroneously, the individual is held to account by 
the Information Commissioner’s Office, and if that goes wrong, or people lose 
data or a laptop gets misplaced, it’s all over the papers, and people or 
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organisations get significant fines and that’s all over the papers when 
something goes wrong.  But it’s never in the papers when something goes 
right.  And an awful lot of data does get exchanged properly.” 
 
The DPA, therefore, is a significant issue in the UK's information sharing environment 
and was a major topic of conversation within many interviews, especially in the 
second phase of the research.  While most practitioners took the view that it provides 
adequately for the sharing of information under the right circumstances and with 
adequate controls in place, the real problem was with misinterpretation and 
misapplication of it.  For this reason, some considered that reform would be justified. 
 
The Wider Legislative Framework 
While the DPA is a significant piece of legislation relating to information sharing in the 
UK, especially with respect to private sector organisations, it is just one part of a wider 
framework of legislation.  The interviews covered different aspects of the legislative 
framework in varying degrees of detail according to interviewees’ perspectives.  It is 
clear from the data that the overall legislative environment is perceived to be complex, 
convoluted and opaque; a situation which emphasises the challenge for those 
seeking to engage in inter-organisational data sharing.  This section will summarise 
interviewees’ views with respect to one specific piece of legislation – the creation of 
SAFOs under s.68 of the SCA – and then review the data relating to two further topics: 
legislation and legal gateways governing government departments and agencies; and 
the effectiveness of the legislative framework as a whole. 
 
SAFOs 
The establishment of SAFOs under the provisions of the SCA was discussed in 
Chapter One.  Several interviewees represented organisations that had obtained 
SAFO status meaning that, for the purposes of the legislation, they were designated 
as organisations with whom public sector bodies could collaborate for anti-fraud 
purposes and which had appropriate systems and controls in place.  This provision 
was discussed with these participants to obtain their views on how helpful this status 
was.  The responses were generally positive, to an extent; most suggested that it was 
useful to have the status, but that it hadn’t necessarily opened a channel to extensive 
collaboration with the public sector.  Three participants (RI/03, RI/04, RI/06) 
suggested that SAFO status had helped them to add public bodies as member 
organisations, and that the designation provided reassurance for those organisations.  
However, two interviewees (RI/06, RI/17B) commented that when they sought to 
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engage with public sector organisations, these still weren’t aware of the legislation or 
what SAFO status represented, and that there was still reluctance to engage when 
they were aware of the provision.  RI/03 also stated that his organisation would find 
it difficult to quantify the value of SAFO status in terms of data that was actually 
shared due to the provision.  RI/02, who is a policy lead on data sharing for a 
government department, stated that while the legislation had the potential to make a 
difference, it did not work effectively in practice.  This data supports the findings of 
reviews conducted into the efficacy of the channel (NFA, 2010a, pp.16-17; ICO, 2015, 
p.15). 
 
Departmental Legislation and Information Sharing Gateways 
Broad gateways such as SAFOs, designed to enable cross-sector sharing, aside, the 
prospect of collaboration between sectors was recognised to be a complex issue.  
Several interviewees discussed the difficulty of engagement and collaboration 
between public and private sector organisations due to restrictions on some 
government agencies and departments set out within their primary governing 
legislation, or vires.  RI/01, RI/03 and RI/12 discussed specific statutory restrictions 
within which organisations such as HMRC and the DWP had to abide, with RI/01 
pointing out that, because of these, they could not fall back on the anti-crime 
disclosure exemptions set out in the DPA.  RI/02 observed that, consequentially, we 
have reached a situation in which some bodies are bound by defined statutory limits 
and for which positive powers to share information must be created, while others are 
bound by common law and can collaborate unless there are specific restrictions 
against doing so.  This situation is complicated further given the numbers of legislative 
instruments that may apply and that it is often not clear which take precedence when 
these overlap or conflict (Law Commission, 2014, p.13). 
 
Another problem discussed by participants was that of the number and specificity of 
gateways established by legislation.  Given the Law Commission’s (2014, p.26) 
finding that there were too many specific statutory gateways enshrined in legislation 
providing data sharing powers for defined circumstances, it is no surprise that this 
was a matter that concerned participants, who were disparaging about the complexity 
of the resulting information sharing landscape. 
 
Several participants, including RI/01, RI/02, RI/13, RI/20 and RI/22, discussed the 
multiple legislative gateways and the over-complexity that arose from these.  The 
specificity of these gateways was also cited as a problem.  RI/02 suggested that not 
   
 
89 
 
only did this add a significant amount of time to the already lengthy process of creating 
data sharing agreements through negotiation between parties as to which gateway 
was appropriate to use, but that many gateways were so specific it prevented 
flexibility in how the data could be used for combating fraud: 
 
RI/02: “So you’ll end up with situation like DWP and local authorities when it 
comes to housing benefit data where they’re sharing this housing benefit data 
and it’s for the local authorities to only pursue housing benefit fraud.  That 
data is incredibly rich data and very useful for local authorities should they 
wish to pursue tenancy fraud.  However, the agreement with the DWP and 
with the gateway that was put in place did not mention tenancy fraud because 
they didn’t think about it at the time.” 
 
Several interviewees, most explicitly RI/02, RI/13 and RI/20, called for a process of 
simplification and codification of these provisions.  RI/01 contrasted the legislative 
trend with respect to the creation of myriad gateways to that of the simplification of 
anti-fraud legislation, noting that the Fraud Act had created a small number of general 
fraud offences, whereas the government was creating a large number of very specific 
gateways to deal with different types and circumstances of fraud. 
 
Adequacy of Legislative Provision 
Given the complexity of the legislative provisions in the UK, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that participants’ views on whether or not current legislation was fit for purpose were 
varied, with a fairly even split between those that took the overall position that there 
was adequate provision within current legislation to enable effective information 
sharing between organisations (including RI/03, RI/04, RI/06, RI/11, RI/14, RI/20), 
and those that pressed the need for legislative change (including CS/17, RI/01, RI/02, 
RI/12, RI/13, RI/15, RI/18).  Amongst those who considered that current legislation 
provided sufficient channels for legal exchange, many still suggested that 
simplification, elucidation and guidance would be beneficial.  Many of the calls for 
change concerned the same issues, mostly calling for the creation of clear, general 
gateways and the reduction in complexity and specificity of these to reduce the 
legislative tension between adequacy of provision and the reduction of uncertainty. 
 
CS/17: “I think the demystification of what the rules are is so important.  
Because if you don’t understand what you can and can’t disseminate, you’re 
never going to be able to effectively share intelligence with anyone, are you?” 
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Additional Barriers and Challenges to Information Sharing 
While legislative matters were a significant topic of the data collection interviews, 
these were not the only impediments to information and intelligence sharing 
discussed.  Due to the wide variety of organisations whose representatives took part 
in the study, a range of challenges were discussed, many of which were organisation- 
or sector-specific.  However, a number of issues cited as challenges to effective 
collaboration were discussed the interviewees, and those most commonly referenced 
are summarised in Figure 4.1 below. 
 
Figure 4.1: Barriers and challenges discussed during research interviews 
 
 
The most commonly discussed issues across the sample concerned cultural 
challenges to sharing, such as information flowing in only one direction between 
information sharing partners and the underlying unwillingness of some people and 
organisations to collaborate, and more technical problems relating to the transfer of 
data.  While these were the main topics directly discussed in terms of barriers to 
information sharing by the participants, other issues, such as the necessity of trust 
and adherence to shared standards were also discussed during the interviews, 
allowing the inference to be drawn that the converse of some of these positive factors 
would also impede collaboration. 
 
Summary 
In this chapter, the views of participants on the current state of information and 
intelligence sharing in the UK, including on the legislative environment, have been set 
out.  The findings have been mixed, with some practitioners more positive than others 
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on how well organisations in the UK perform in respect of sharing, although there 
does appear to be more willingness to engage experienced in recent years.  The 
legislative framework within which sharing must take place, however, is seen as over-
complex and difficult to navigate; this is invariably seen as problematic both by those 
who consider that current legislation provides adequately to facilitate sharing and 
those who suggest that legislative reform is necessary.  In addition to the legislative 
issues, a range of additional challenges and barriers have been identified as 
continuing to inhibit information sharing between organisations. 
 
The following three chapters will set out the findings of the research in respect of the 
structures, processes and strategies of organisations to collaborate effectively 
despite the challenges faced.  The next chapter will provide an overview of FACT, 
which was the subject of the case study phase of data collection, examining its 
structure, functions and approach to partnership working. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Findings: Matter of FACT – Case Study Overview 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine FACT as an organisation based on the findings of the case 
study phase of research.  FACT will be described with respect to its role, structure 
and functions, how it operates and the fundamental approach taken to intelligence 
processing and sharing with its partner organisations. 
 
Case Study: The Federation Against Copyright Theft 
The case study data collection was conducted by spending two weeks at FACT's 
office in Twickenham.  The data collection involved conducting interviews with senior 
officers and staff members across each of its core and support functions, collection 
and review of documents relating to strategies, policies and operations, and 
conducting observations.  The outline of FACT set out below is drawn from review 
and analysis of data collected during this fieldwork. 
 
Overview – History, Mission and Operational Focus 
FACT was formed in England in 1982 and incorporated at Companies House in 
October of that year.  The original name upon incorporation was Webcast Ltd, 
although the name was changed to the Federation Against Copyright Theft in 
November 1982, and a revised incorporation certificate issued by the Registrar of 
Companies in January 1983.  It was registered as a non-profit making company 
limited by guarantee, without share capital.  In the documents issued to Companies 
House notifying it of the change of name, the organisation also reported details of its 
starting membership on whose behalf it was to work.  This comprised nine 
organisations, including six major companies in the film entertainment industry and 
three trade associations: the Motion Picture Export Association of America (now the 
Motion Picture Association [MPA]), the Society of Film Distributors and the British 
Videogram Association (FACT, 1982, p.2). 
 
The Director General (CS/18) described FACT as a trade organisation, which remains 
non-profit making, representing the interests of its members in terms of protection of 
copyright material and pursuing enforcement action against those that unlawfully 
infringe their content.  FACT originally came into being due to the widespread copying 
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of the film E.T. onto video cassettes (CS/18), and thus was created to tackle the issue 
of film piracy. 
 
FACT’s primary operational activities involve work in three key areas of copyright 
infringement: 
 
 prevention and detection of illegal recording at source (e.g. in cinemas) 
 combating online piracy and the unlawful and unauthorised distribution of 
copyright material online, including digital streaming and file sharing 
 detection and disruption of piracy in hard media, such as pirated DVDs and 
decoders, often involving organised criminal groups (FACT, “About FACT”, 
2015a). 
 
Figure 5.1 provides some examples of FACT's enforcement activities. 
 
Figure 5.1: Example FACT cases 
 
 
In respect of these activities, FACT operates a strategy covering various pursuits, 
including raising awareness, conducting investigations – often in conjunction with 
other organisations – and pursuing litigation and sanctions.  For the latter, it will work 
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closely with law enforcement partners to seek to advance cases to public prosecution, 
although in some circumstances it does pursue private prosecutions on behalf of its 
members.  It has a successful enforcement strategy, securing 553 criminal 
convictions in 2009 (FACT, 2013a, p.4), although it actively pursues other 
interventions as well, working to prevent, disrupt and dismantle criminal operations 
(FACT, n.d., p.4).  FACT seeks to get involved in political and media debate about 
intellectual property and the availability of entertainment media to counter the 
arguments of those who advocate that all such material should be freely available 
(CS/18).  It also has an interest in political lobbying, primarily by supporting other 
organisations that actively lobby in this area. 
 
FACT also operates a certification scheme to organisations operating within the visual 
entertainment industry.  Through this scheme, organisations operating at any stage 
of the supply chain, from filming studios to the point of distribution (e.g. cinemas, TV 
studios and retailers), as well as distribution and logistics companies, can apply for 
FACT certification.  Certification is given following an inspection of premises, security 
controls and policies (such as staff non-disclosure agreements) and represents a 
benchmark of reliability confirming that the accredited company has appropriate 
controls in place with respect to handling intellectual property.  Continuing certification 
is subject to annual inspections and fees, and this provides both a service to the 
industry as well as income to FACT.  It can also be a source of intelligence (CS/10) 
for FACT.  During interview, the Certification Manager (CS/10) suggested that 
approximately 140 companies held the certification, although by late 2016 the 
published register indicated that 109 companies were accredited through the scheme 
(FACT, “FACT Certified Directory”, 2016b). 
 
In 2016, after the fieldwork had been completed, FACT extended its services beyond 
the film and television industry to encompass wider content and brand protection 
offerings (FACT, “FACT launches services”, 2016c).  However, these activities fall 
outside of the scope of this thesis. 
 
Membership and Funding 
As FACT is a membership organisation, a primary source of income is from its 
members, which pay annual fees according to a multi-tier subscription structure 
based on their turnover.  At the time of data collection, FACT had seventeen members 
and was in discussions with other prospective parties (CS/18).  Membership numbers 
do fluctuate; at the end of 2014, FACT had twenty-four members (FACT, 2014, p.2), 
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while in October 2016 it had twenty-two (FACT, “Members”, 2016d).  While all 
members pay towards FACT’s operating costs, the majority of funding (55%) at the 
time of data collection was provided by the MPA (CS/18). 
 
According to its financial statements to 31 December 2014, FACT’s turnover was 
£3.04 million, of which £2.87 million was derived from membership subscriptions, with 
additional operating income of £0.8 million (FACT, 2014, pp.8-11).  Income is also 
derived from the certification scheme and additional funding is received from Sky and 
BT Sports (in excess of their membership fees) for the prosecution of publicans and 
others for illegally showing live sports.  Occasionally, additional income is received 
from other sources, such as a £10,000 payment from the Cinema Exhibitors 
Association to allow FACT to purchase new software to capture and manage 
intelligence from social networking and other online resources (CS/18). 
 
As FACT is a not-for-profit organisation, it aims to balance the books without deficit 
or surplus.  When there is a surplus, this is reinvested or transferred to the legal fund 
used to pursue prosecutions on behalf of members (CS/18). 
 
Governance and Management 
FACT has a board of directors comprised of member representatives.  Not all 
members are entitled to representation on the board; this is restricted to those that 
pay subscriptions in the top four membership tiers (FACT, 2016a, pp.9-10).  The 
board appoints a Director General and other directors who need not be appointed 
from the membership.  At the time of conducting the research, the Director General 
was an executive officer of FACT and not an employee of any of its members.  FACT’s 
constitution states that there is no requirement to appoint a company secretary 
(FACT, 2016a, p.11), unless so required by legislation, although in practice it does 
make an appointment to this role. 
 
Oversight is provided by way of board meetings, to which the Director General 
reports, and additional General Meetings are held which are open to the wider 
membership to include those not represented on the board.  Members are assigned 
different voting rights according to their membership tier (FACT, 2016a, pp.7-10).  
FACT is also constitutionally required to hold an Annual General Meeting. 
 
In terms of operational management, the Director General has a deputy, the Director 
of Investigations and Intelligence, beneath whom sit middle managers that lead the 
   
 
96 
 
individual business units.  The other key officer is the General Counsel, who is a 
FACT employee.  The HR function is the responsibility of the Business Development 
Manager, who maintains control over staff policies and procedures.  Recruitment is 
generally conducted through agencies, with two trusted agencies relied upon for most 
appointments (CS/10). 
 
Organisational Structure 
FACT has a relatively flat operational structure.  Figure 5.2 provides a high level 
overview of the structure down to the key operational and support functions, adapted 
from a more detailed organisation chart provided by FACT (2013b, p.2). 
 
Figure 5.2: FACT organisation structure (high level) 
 
 
The core operational units are the Field Investigations, Internet Investigations and 
Intelligence teams, supported by the Forensic Examinations (IT forensics) team and 
additional operational and back office functions.  At the time of data collection, FACT 
employed approximately 42 people, although a number of additional positions were 
vacant.  The headcount has since fallen due to internal restructuring and a reduction 
in funding from the MPA (FACT, 2014, p.3), so Figure 5.2 may no longer accurately 
represent the current structure. 
 
The Nature of the Threat 
The intellectual property theft that FACT seeks to combat is both complex and 
damaging.  Traditionally, film piracy involved the manufacture and sale of counterfeit 
DVDs and video cassettes.  DVD piracy was still an issue at the time of fieldwork, but 
the methods of distribution of these goods was shifting away from markets and car 
boot sales to online sale via direct sale websites and social media platforms (FACT, 
2012b, p.5). 
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Most film and TV content theft now takes place online (FACT, 2013c, pp.3-4), with 
criminal groups using file sharing and live streaming sites to host and distribute 
content online.  Illicit streaming of live sports is also predominantly online, although 
there are additional angles of hardware infringement allowing access to subscription 
content in the home without payment, and of pubs and other venues screening live 
sports without holding the relevant licences. 
 
There are three main types of motivation behind this type of IP crime.  For ‘release 
groups’, which recruit ‘cammers’ and ‘cappers’ to record video and audio respectively 
at cinemas for subsequent online release, the motivation is primarily for the kudos of 
being the first to make new releases available (CS/18).  90% of online film content 
originates from recordings made in cinemas (FACT, 2012a, p.1).  Criminals running 
file hosting, downloading or streaming sites are largely separate to release groups 
and are motivated by financial gain (FACT, 2013c, p.20), achieved by selling access 
to illicit content and selling online advertising space.  The sale of hard goods is still 
dominated by organised criminals, primarily Chinese gangs in England, and local 
crime groups in Scotland and Northern Ireland.  Profits are used to fund other criminal 
enterprises, including human and drug trafficking (CS/18). 
 
Losses to the UK film and television industry are conservatively estimated to be £0.5 
billion per year, and criminal profits approximately £200 million per year (CS/18). 
 
Organisational Ethos 
Because of the changing landscape in how people perceive, access and consume 
film, television and sports entertainment media, FACT had to undergo a fundamental 
change in its structure and approach during the tenure of the current Director General.  
When he arrived, FACT was still geared towards disrupting the distribution and sale 
of pirated video cassettes and DVDs.  In the intervening years, it was re-orientated 
towards internet-based IP crime through peer-to-peer file sharing and digital 
streaming, as well as crime relating to satellite decoders and illegal public 
performance.  As technologies advance quickly, FACT’s leadership recognises the 
need to adapt to changing threats. 
 
As such, it has adopted an intelligence-led ethos, works broadly in line with the NIM 
and has invested heavily in intelligence software (CS/18).  It works closely with 
numerous bodies in the law enforcement, government and intellectual property 
   
 
98 
 
arenas (CS/23, CS/24).  The intelligence function, and the accuracy and quality of its 
intelligence database, is cited as being at the heart of FACT’s structure: 
 
CS/18 “…every decision we make is based on what we know because of the 
intelligence that we’ve developed.  So the intelligence unit is the hub of the 
organisation.  Everything else is subservient to that.  […] All the other units: 
the internet investigations team, the field investigators, the forensic 
examiners, even the individual people – the cinema investigators; everything 
that they do has to go into the intelligence team. […] Using intelligence to build 
a case and make informed decisions on what resources you’re going to put 
into it and continue to examine your goals and objectives and see if they’re 
still achievable.  Absolutely imperative.  It works, and I can prove it works, and 
it’s the only way forward.” 
 
An important feature of FACT’s ethos towards intelligence and collaboration is the 
attitude taken to information asymmetry; a key problem in many information sharing 
relationships (Zheng et al, 2008, p.95).  FACT accepts that much intelligence sharing 
will flow in one direction, but this does not reduce its commitment to collaboration.  
Neither does it influence the perception of the value of information sharing to FACT, 
as attested by the Intelligence Manager and Director General: 
 
CS/24: “I think that always happens.  The reality is we’ve got more to gain by 
giving it than keeping it.  So my philosophy is if we can, share it.  Give it to 
them.  […] So the important thing is if we can share it, share it.” 
 
CS/18: “What we do know, and what we say when we’re doing it, is we realise 
that as a public organisation the chances are that you’re going to get a lot 
more information out of us than we’re going to get out of you.  But we accept 
that.” 
 
This approach may be simpler to rationalise for FACT than some other organisations 
as it has numerous active channels of incoming intelligence, and that many of its 
relationships are reciprocal (CS/24), but this is a notable feature of its approach to 
collaboration. 
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Alignment with the National Intelligence Model 
FACT has aligned many of its business processes with the NIM, this being considered 
essential as an intelligence-led organisation (CS/18).  Its Intelligence Team works 
according to the NIM business model and adherence to this, and to the quality of the 
intelligence products produced, is integral to achieving its mission and effective 
collaboration with partners: 
 
CS/22: “…it’s integral because all the police forces obviously abide by the 
NIM.  When they know that we do as well, and we produce the same kind of 
products that they do it’s obviously a lot easier for them to work with us.  And 
they’re seeing the same products that they would see from their own analysts 
and, more often than not, when they see our products they wish their analysts 
produced the same quality of products.” 
 
While FACT is not rigidly bound by the NIM (CS/18), it has aligned its business model, 
and several processes and outputs, to the NIM framework.  This includes investment 
in the intelligence systems and processes used, the policies and procedures in place 
with respect to handling sources (including covert human intelligence sources 
[CHIS]), its evaluation processes, its development of intelligence and intelligence 
products (ACPO Centrex, 2005, p.15; ACPO Centrex, 2007, p.8), and debriefing at 
the end of investigations. 
 
A Strategic Assessment is produced annually by the Intelligence team.  This provides 
a comprehensive assessment of the threat environment, based on intelligence and 
research relating to threats and trends arising from new investigations, and takes 
account of emerging changes in that environment such as changing technologies and 
criminal techniques.  This assessment is used to drive the control strategy, in line with 
the NIM (ACPO Centrex, 2007, p.12).  The control strategy informs the intelligence 
screening criteria that FACT applies during assessment of incoming intelligence 
(CS/22) as summarised in Figure 5.3.  The strategic assessment was considered by 
John and Maguire (2004a, p.25) to be potentially the most significant NIM intelligence 
product because of this influence on the organisation’s control strategy.  Additionally, 
FACT uses the Strategic Assessment as a tool to help inform partner agencies about 
the IP crime landscape in which FACT operates (CS/18). 
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Figure 5.3: Assessment of incoming intelligence at FACT 
 
 
The NIM mandates a tasking and coordination process to drive operational decision 
making and allocation of resources (Police ICT, n.d., pp.2-4).  While FACT does not 
run its meetings in precise alignment with the NIM model, it does conduct monthly 
Tasking and Coordination meetings at which all active cases are reviewed, and at 
which resourcing decisions are taken.  One of these meetings was observed, by 
permission, during the data collection. 
 
FACT’s adoption of the 5x5x5 model of intelligence report (Appendix 18) for the 
evaluation of incoming intelligence and for dissemination of intelligence externally, is 
also in line with the NIM.  John and Maguire (2007, p.206) observed that the core 
advantage of this model was to allow allocation of resources according to the quality 
of incoming intelligence.  A new model, the 3x5x2 system (Appendix 19) was 
introduced in 2016 to overcome problems with the 5x5x5 (James, 2016, pp.86-87), 
incorporating clearer standards on how intelligence may be disseminated (College of 
Policing, “Intelligence report”, 2015b).  This was introduced after completion of the 
case study fieldwork. 
 
Alignment with the NIM is central to FACT’s strategy for effective collaboration, and 
to its own intelligence handling procedures. 
 
Operational Structures and Functions 
The following sections provide an overview of the main operational functions within 
FACT, with the greatest emphasis placed on the role of the Intelligence team and on 
how FACT collaborates with partners. 
   
 
101 
 
 
Intelligence Team 
FACT’s Intelligence team maintains responsibility for assessing, processing and 
developing intelligence received, providing analytical support for investigations and 
creating intelligence products for internal use, for sharing with partner organisations 
and for supporting litigation.  The team, headed by the Intelligence Manager, is 
comprised of Intelligence Analysts, Intelligence Researchers and the Criminal Justice 
Supervisor, who also acts as Disclosure Officer. 
 
The intelligence function uses the iBase intelligence management system [IMS] 
database on which FACT’s intelligence records are stored.  Intelligence is received 
from a variety of sources, including from law enforcement agencies and other 
partners, from members, from Crimestoppers and direct referrals from the public, as 
well as internally developed intelligence from investigation work (CS/22, CS/24).  All 
intelligence received is input into the ArtiFACT case management system [CMS] (a 
modified version of the Cyclops CMS).  This is performed by the person receiving the 
intelligence, who may be on any core or support team, and is input into ArtiFACT to 
a standard that enables ready conversion to a 5x5x5 intelligence form (CS/04).  Once 
intelligence has been input into ArtiFACT, it is assessed by the Criminal Justice 
Supervisor who applies FACT’s screening criteria.  This informs the decision as to 
whether the intelligence leads to an investigation (or is linked to an existing 
investigation) or is just stored on the intelligence database for cross-referencing 
against future intelligence receipts (CS/04, CS/24).  The Criminal Justice Supervisor 
is also responsible for creating cases and assigning analysts and investigators on the 
CMS (CS/22).  All intelligence received is pulled into iBase for indexing within 24 
hours after being input onto ArtiFACT (CS/17). 
 
Intelligence received is sanitised by the Researchers as needed (CS/21) and linked 
to other relevant records.  Intelligence evaluation is undertaken according to NIM 
standards and in line with the 5x5x5 system.  The Researchers are tasked by the 
Analysts, or by investigators or senior managers, to develop intelligence by 
performing additional open source research upon it.  They use resources such as 
electoral roll, land registry and credit reference checks and additional resources such 
as the National Anti-Fraud Network, and produce intelligence summaries of these 
(CS/21).  Researchers also produce 5x5x5 intelligence reports for distribution to 
partner agencies, such as the police (CS/21, CS/24).  All intelligence reports prepared 
for dissemination to partners are reviewed by the Criminal Justice Supervisor to check 
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that the appropriate evaluation codes have been applied (CS/04).  Most intelligence 
disseminated to partners is issued on 5x5x5 intelligence forms as these are 
understood by the recipients, meaning that they are more likely to act on them: 
 
CS/17: “Our intelligence tends to be disseminated amongst, predominantly, 
law enforcement bodies or bodies that are associated with law enforcement 
by proxy, so IPO [Intellectual Property Office].  So they will understand a 5x5.  
So the great thing is we run by the National Intelligence Model, so we run by 
5x5 reporting.  The great thing that that allows us to do is everybody pretty 
much knows what a 5x5 is, to a certain extent.  And if they don’t, they’re pretty 
easy to work out anyway.  So we run to that National Intelligence Model 
standard, whereas a lot of corporate bodies that disseminate information 
don’t.” 
 
Intelligence Analysts are responsible for providing analytical support to investigators 
and for creating intelligence products for internal and external use (CS/17, CS/22). A 
range of intelligence products are produced, including problem and subject profiles, 
composite 5x5x5 intelligence reports, timeline charts and visual association charts 
produced on i2 Analysts Notebook software, which provide a clear visual depiction of 
the relationships between entities and objects within investigations (such as people, 
companies, addresses, websites, telephone numbers, email addresses and bank 
accounts).  The benefit of producing and disseminating intelligence in these formats 
– 5x5x5 intelligence reports and i2 charts – are not only that FACT’s partners 
understand these, as noted above, but that the visual depictions especially are 
appreciated and understood by the police, courts and juries. 
 
The Intelligence team places considerable value on the close relationships that it has 
with partner organisations, which are seen as vital to its business model.  Significant 
emphasis is placed on FACT’s reputation for producing high quality products, 
ensuring that partners can rely on the intelligence and evidence that FACT produces 
(CS/24). 
 
CS/24: “…our quality is very high, we set our standards very high.  I do set a 
gold standard in what we do.  But when we’re not an enforcement agency you 
have to have the gold standard.  They have to go ‘oh, I don’t have to do 
anything.  I can take action, I can disseminate that further, it’s all been done 
for me’.” 
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To strengthen these relationships the Intelligence team routinely meets and engages 
with key partners.  The Intelligence Manager attends Government Agency 
Intelligence Network [GAIN] meetings across the country, and regular meetings are 
held with the IP crime community group and the NFIB (CS/22).  It has a close working 
relationship with the IPO (CS/24) to the extent that it shares a weekly report on all 
intelligence received, produced for FACT’s internal use, with the IPO, subject to the 
relevant handling and dissemination codes (CS/21).  FACT provides this in an Excel 
spreadsheet format to ensure that the IPO can import the data into its own systems, 
despite using a different format for its own purposes.  The Intelligence Manager also 
provides training to some partner agencies, such as Crimestoppers, to ensure that 
their operatives understand the role and needs of FACT and therefore improve the 
quality of the intelligence that comes in (CS/22). 
 
Field Investigations Team 
The Field Investigations team is one of two investigative units falling under the 
Investigations Manager, and conducts investigations into cases of suspected 
intellectual property crime. 
 
The field investigators are regionally based and focus on their own regions, although 
will assist investigations in other regions where necessary.  The role involves a wide 
range of activities relating to the conduct of investigations into IP crime.  The 
investigators tend to be ex-police personnel, and thus usually come into the job well 
trained in investigative skills (CS/11, CS/18).  A large part of the role involves working 
closely with partner agencies, such as the police and Trading Standards officials.  
Their work involves putting together case materials, taking part in raids, assisting in 
interviews, advising on legislation relating to IP crime and providing statements 
(CS/01, CS/09).  They also build and develop relationships and contacts through 
attending forums and GAIN meetings (CS/01).  Investigators will be the usual point 
of contact for law enforcement partners throughout a case (CS/09), and work on case 
management after suspects have been arrested by police (CS/18). 
 
They also regularly undertake operations during investigations conducted by FACT, 
such as test purchases and some surveillance activities (CS/11, CS/23).  Careful 
control is maintained on these procedures, with authorisation processes mirroring the 
requirements of Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 [RIPA] legislation, 
despite RIPA not applying to private companies.  All surveillance activity is subject to 
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assessment and approval by the Director of Investigations and Intelligence by way of 
a Directed Surveillance Authority (CS/23). 
 
Historically, the focus for the field investigators was on crime relating to the 
manufacture and distribution of counterfeit hard goods, such as DVDs, although, 
along with the rest of the organisation, the onus is moving more towards online crime.  
One of the investigators, CS/09, suggested that only 10% of her time is now focussed 
on crime relating to hard goods.  However, this is variable depending on region as 
there is more hard goods-related crime in major cities and this is a greater problem 
in deprived areas, such as Glasgow and parts of Northern Ireland (CS/11).  
Investigators in these areas will spend more of their time tackling those issues. 
 
Internet Investigations Team 
The Internet Investigations team also reports to the Investigations Manager.  Its role 
is to conduct investigations, collect evidence and seek interventions against internet-
based criminals infringing the copyright content of FACT members.  This includes 
investigations into streaming sites, torrent sites, sites streaming live sports matches 
and cyber lockers, as well as sites selling counterfeit DVDs and other hard goods 
online (CS/14, CS/15, CS/20).  The team is comprised of a number of investigators, 
a supervisor and an internet researcher. 
 
Internet investigations are conducted to establish the underlying facts about websites 
of concern, and involve work to verify that sites make copyright content available 
without the necessary permissions and authority.  The investigators gather evidence 
about the nature of the site, who runs it, where it is hosted, the amount of traffic on 
the site and evidence of monetisation of the content (CS/14, CS/15).  The team also 
conducts scanning projects, using a semi-automated web crawler that crawls through 
torrent sites and identifies members’ content, the results of which are verified and 
evidenced by the team (CS/14).  These investigations are conducted with a view to 
seeking interventions, ranging from issuing takedown notices under the US Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act [DCMA], issuing Google takedown requests, knocking on 
site owners’ doors to confront them directly, through to criminal prosecution (CS/15). 
 
The team also conducts covert activity, with one of the team members having 
developed a number of aliases over the course of several years which have gained 
credence amongst the IP criminal community.  These are used to gather intelligence 
through interacting with this community.  This activity does require a limited level of 
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participation by providing copyrighted content online in order to maintain criminals’ 
trust in the identities used.  FACT does not use its own members’ content in this 
respect and FACT is never the original source of the content; it will only use content 
that is already being illegally distributed.  The team also occasionally participates in 
law enforcement raids to provide technical advice to partner agencies. 
 
Additional Functions 
Further to the work of the core teams as summarised above, FACT has a range of 
additional operational functions.  These include a small forensic examinations team, 
which conducts IT forensics work in support of cases.  This team will go out on police 
raids and advise on what hardware to seize, conducts examination of seized devices 
and produces evidential reports on the content of hard drives and other equipment 
(CS/05, CS/13).  FACT employs a Market Strategist who focuses on hard goods being 
sold at markets and car boot sales.  This role is highly collaborative, working closely 
with a multi-agency enforcement group, called the National Markets Group, which 
targets not only sellers but also the organisers and owners of markets where sale of 
counterfeit goods is a problem.  Attached to the Investigations Team is a Theatrical 
Sector Investigator who works closely with cinemas to provide training to cinema staff 
and focus on enforcement activities at this point in the infringement life cycle, when 
people illegally use video cameras and audio recorders within cinemas.  A reward 
scheme is in place to encourage cinema staff to be vigilant and report this type of 
activity.  Other active operational functions include an Internet Service Provider 
Liaison Officer, and the certification scheme.  Additionally, there are a number of 
support functions and roles, including administrative staff, legal counsel and a 
Director of Communications, who manages FACT’s media and public profile. 
 
Evaluation 
FACT’s model as an information and intelligence sharing organisation is well 
designed and implemented and, most importantly, has been demonstrated to be 
effective.  As such, it is a model from which other organisations could learn and adapt 
to their own circumstances.  Central to the FACT model is a commitment to being 
intelligence-led.  It has invested heavily in its intelligence unit, which feeds into all 
other operational teams.  This is staffed by well-trained and skilled intelligence 
specialists, and utilises industry standard tools.  A second key principle is that it is 
maintains high standards in terms of the intelligence products that it produces, 
recognising that this is key to ensuring that partner agencies will understand and trust 
these products and will be able to act upon them.  While there is no legal requirement 
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to do so, it aligns its operations to the predominant national standards – NIM and 
Management of Police Information [MOPI] – as this further enables its partners to 
understand the intelligence products that it produces and be able to trust and place 
reliance on how FACT handles intelligence.  It formalises its relationships through 
intelligence sharing agreements and has these in place with multiple agencies, 
including most UK police forces.  It is actively engaged in the relationships that it 
maintains and recognises and accepts that, in many instances, most of the time it will 
be feeding intelligence out to other organisations rather than receiving it back.  It also 
works to improve awareness and understanding amongst partners of the legal and 
technical aspects of IP crime by providing training and education; this improves both 
the quality of intelligence that it receives from them, and increases their capability to 
take up FACT cases for intervention and enforcement. 
 
In terms of how the success of FACT’s information and intelligence sharing 
relationships can be evaluated, this study did not seek quantitative data that can 
indicate the number or percentage of cases or interventions that relied on 
collaboration with FACT’s partners.  However, the success of the organisation and 
the importance of the collaborative nature of its approach are closely intertwined.  The 
majority of the 553 successful prosecutions in 2009 will have relied on some form of 
information or intelligence sharing at one or more stages in the investigation life cycle.  
This will be either from receipt of initial intelligence from partners at inception or during 
the investigation, to the provision of investigation and intelligence packages to law 
enforcement partners at the end of FACT’s investigation in order to seek their 
assistance in taking the matter forward for prosecution as well as, in some instances, 
supplying analyses and products such as i2 charts to present in court.  While FACT 
does pursue some private prosecutions, these can be very expensive and are only 
pursued in exceptional circumstances. 
 
Of equal importance in evaluating the centrality of information and intelligence sharing 
in FACT’s success is the testimony of its staff and officers in this respect.  Many FACT 
interviewees discussed how it is an intelligence-led organisation, with all 
investigations and interventions based on the intelligence received and developed.  
CS/11 advised that the relationships are there, and work, because FACT needs other 
organisations, such as its law enforcement partners, to do things that it cannot do 
itself, such as financial investigation.  Conversely, some of FACT’s partners need 
FACT to undertake tasks that they can’t, whilst other partnerships are based on joint 
interests in intellectual property crime.  All of the officers, and the intelligence analysts, 
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within FACT stressed the reliance on effective relationships to the fulfilment of its 
mission: 
 
CS/11: “And, of course, if we can’t share anything at all as a trade organisation 
it’s a disaster for us.  It’s a potential disaster.  That’s why our partnership 
working is so vital to us…” 
 
CS/17: “So the relationships are absolutely key, and FACT wouldn’t be half 
as successful if they didn’t have those.” 
 
CS/24: “But a large proportion of our work involves preparing high quality 
intelligence products to take to share that information potentially with other 
organisations so that – hopefully – it fits within their priorities and they will take 
on a subsequent criminal investigation.” 
 
There are some aspects of the model that may not be as widely translatable to other 
organisations.  Firstly, FACT's general focus on hiring ex-police staff may not be 
appropriate for all organisations, and would place restrictions on the pool of potential 
candidates that they might otherwise recruit from.  While former law enforcement 
officers speak the language of law enforcement, and may have a good understanding 
of the NIM, many are likely to lack commercial experience and may not appreciate 
the outlook and realities of the business world, which may hinder anti-crime and 
intelligence sharing efforts in the private sector environment.  They may not speak 
the language of their peers in the business community with whom their organisations 
may need to establish information sharing relationships.  Secondly, FACT as an 
organisation is entirely geared to investigation work.  Other than the largest 
organisations, most companies will not have the resources to fund a dedicated 
intelligence unit within their anti-fraud units.  This could restrict the extent to which the 
model can be replicated elsewhere. 
 
Summary 
As a non-profit organisation, FACT exists to serve its membership’s interests with 
respect to pursuing investigations and sanctions relating to criminal infringement of 
their intellectual property.  It is an intelligence-led organisation, with its operational 
structure built around its intelligence unit.  It works closely with partners in the law 
enforcement arena and other agencies, with the effectiveness of these partnerships 
seen as essential to its success.  FACT implements a number of strategies and tactics 
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to ensure that its relationships are successful and productive.  These include aligning 
its intelligence handling and dissemination processes with the NIM standard, 
adhering to the legal standards that apply to law enforcement bodies in respect of its 
investigative activities regardless of whether or not it is legally required to do so, and 
by placing emphasis on the quality of the products that it produces and disseminates. 
 
In the next chapter, these and other strategies employed by FACT and other 
organisations that participated in the research will be examined in order to identify 
how organisations that are effective in sharing information and intelligence achieve 
this. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Findings: Strategies to Enable Information Sharing 
 
Introduction 
Organisations share information for a variety of reasons.  Some seek to collaborate 
with others after experiencing a fraud incident, which provided the required catalyst 
to take action (RI/17).  Some will do so in recognition that working together is a more 
effective way of dealing with crime issues, seeing the big picture (CS/11, RI/15).  
Others may encounter an entirely new type of fraud problem and will recognise that 
it cannot be effectively tackled without collaboration (RI/17).  Regardless of the initial 
stimulus, the challenges to collaboration are significant and complex.  This chapter 
sets out some of the key findings in respect of strategies and solutions to enable and 
facilitate information and intelligence sharing as reported by participants, and will 
examine key facets of these approaches which help to make effective collaboration 
possible.  This follows four themes.  The first examines the issue of standards and 
the quality of intelligence.  Secondly, evidence on the role of information sharing 
agreements and the structure of these shall be summarised.  Findings will then be 
reported in respect of the maintenance of relationships, including the issue of 
asymmetrical information flow.  Finally, findings relating to mass dissemination of 
information will be reviewed. 
 
Standards and Quality 
In Chapter Five, the importance to FACT of conducting its work in alignment with 
national standards and legislation was established.   This strategy was also adopted 
by a number of other participating organisations.  While not all aspects of the NIM are 
necessarily transferable, or desirable, for many private sector scenarios, the 5x5x5 
intelligence grading system did have plenty of adherents. 
 
RI/07: “We always follow the National Intelligence Model in respect of the 
5x5x5 evaluation process.  So if we ever share information and intelligence 
it’s always graded and rated in that way.  And that’s generally the best practice 
in the industry.  So you would get, usually, some version of an intelligence 
form, which would be the 5x5x5 assessment.” 
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Others, including both private and public sector participants, also used the 5x5x5 
grading system (RI/03, RI/06, RI/07, RI/12, RI/14, RI/15, RI/17B, RI/19A, RI/20, RI/21, 
RI/22).  RI/14 suggested that his organisation would not use it in all circumstances, 
but would when dealing with law enforcement because they will understand it, 
whereas not everyone would: 
 
RI/14: “We don’t do 5x5x5 with other banks because 1) the other banks 
probably don’t understand it, though some of them do. […] If we generate, we 
do it all the time, logs to the police, we will follow the 5x5x5 because obviously 
you’ve got some control over, obviously, who sees that and the identity of the 
source and the quality of the information.  So yeah, the 5x5x5 is very useful.” 
 
While several participants, including several FACT interviewees, stressed the 
credibility of the 5x5x5 system when dealing with police, for their part some law 
enforcement participants were willing to look beyond this in order to encourage 
referrals. 
 
RI/11: “We’ve made it too difficult for people to engage with us, because in 
reality why have we not just got if you want to tell me something send me an 
email with all the details on it and I’ll convert it into a 5x5x5 with that as the 
source information.” 
 
RI/09 agreed, as did RI/12 – the coordinator of a cross-sector intelligence sharing 
scheme that includes law enforcement – who suggested that his scheme would 
conduct the evaluation itself on incoming intelligence.  RI/09 observed that when 
private sector bodies employed ex-police staff in relevant roles this would often result 
in them adopting the 5x5x5 process. 
 
RI/14 suggested that it would be beneficial if the process became an industry 
standard: 
 
RI/14: “And it goes back to, Carl, the 5x5x5 which underpins it.  And I suppose 
if the banks were to use that and adopt it, or some sort of process of data 
evaluation and what credence do you apply to it, then I think that would feel a 
lot more comfortable.  Because I don’t want to know that you were the source, 
all I want to know that you’re an A or a B.  If you’re an E or something then we 
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know you can’t be judged.  So it’s giving you the comfort that when that 
intelligence comes to you well, it’s been graded appropriately.” 
 
While many of the participants were convinced of the benefits of organisations 
adopting the NIM or MOPI standards (CS/18, RI20), there is no underlying national 
standard that applies across sectors.  This itself was a significant issue for some 
participants.  RI/10 and RI/13 were especially critical about the UK’s lack of 
intelligence or procurement strategy, resulting in no shared standards for intelligence 
handling or processing, and an ongoing situation where public sector organisations 
often cannot open shared files due to system incompatibility.  RI/10 and RI/11 also 
expressed concerns about the governments’ failure to plan in this way.  Despite this, 
a couple of participants did describe slow moves towards adopting industry 
standards.  In the insurance sector, RI/19A suggested that her organisation was 
planning to adopt the same intelligence database used by RI/03 as this was the 
industry standard.  In the public sector, RI/20 and RI/21 explained that their 
organisation had adopted the Trading Standards’ database so that Trading Standards 
officers would have access to their organisations’ intelligence, with appropriate 
safeguards, and that they were moving to allow joint access: 
 
RI/21: “…we’re at the stages now of moving towards a situation where 
properly accredited people working for Trading Standards can directly access 
our data.  Equally properly authorised people in ours can access directly 
Trading Standards’ data.” 
 
Due to the emphasis placed on aligning with legislative or law enforcement standards, 
several participants referred to processes being in place to review the quality of both 
incoming and outgoing information (CS/04, CS/17, CS/21, RI/01, RI/06, RI/09, RI/18).  
Adherence to accepted standards, and having a reputation for producing high quality 
and reliable products and intelligence, are essential components of effective 
collaborative relationships (CS/24). 
 
Information Sharing Agreements 
One commonly used tool by which to agree standards, and to help structure and 
formalise a collaborative relationship, is an information sharing agreement, or 
memorandum of understanding [MOU].  These documents can take many forms, and 
the precise structure and content vary according to each individual information 
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sharing relationship.  However, their primary purpose is to set out and formalise the 
agreed basis on which partners will share data, information or intelligence. 
 
MOUs were a common topic of discussion during interviews across both phases of 
data collection.  They formed a central part of the information sharing strategy of 
several participating organisations.  At least twelve FACT interviewees discussed the 
role and utility of MOUs in facilitating intelligence sharing.  FACT uses MOUs 
extensively with its partners; CS/23 stated that FACT has MOUs in place with most 
police forces, with all of the GAIN networks and with other agencies.  The MOU is 
seen as central to FACT's ability to collaborate with others and to demonstrate to 
partners that it works to appropriate standards:  
 
CS/18: “It's building confidence into those documents, and that takes a 
number of forms.  The biggest one is probably data protection.  They've got 
to understand, our partner agencies don't have to work with us really, they 
don't have to give us information, so they need to understand that when they 
do agree to share information with use that we deal with it in a professional 
and legitimate manner [...] the MOU is the thing that gives us the opportunity 
to work together...” 
 
Other participants also referred to regular use of MOUs in framing and managing their 
intelligence sharing relationships, with RI/01, RI/03, RI/08, RI/09, RI/11, RI/12, RI/13, 
RI/17, RI/18, RI/19A, RI/20 and RI/21 discussing how their organisations had 
agreements in place.  As would be expected, the extent to which these were used 
varied, with some interviewees stating that their organisations had agreements in 
place for every intelligence sharing relationship that they had, while others were for 
use with specific partners or sectors.  For RI/11, who worked in a law enforcement 
body, they are not needed for sharing intelligence with other law enforcement 
agencies, but were with industry: 
 
RI/11: “We’ve got and we use SLAs [Service Level Agreements] in terms of 
all this.  I mean, when it comes to the general intel within law enforcement 
then no, because we don’t need that because the MOPI and NIM and 
everything like that.  When it comes to the outside agencies then yes, we have 
MOUs and SLAs.” 
 
   
 
113 
 
Some participants suggested that a similar affinity-based approach may be used 
within certain industries and sectors.  RI/19A, an insurer, suggested that her 
organisation has MOUs in place directly with some police forces, with other bodies 
through a collective MOU maintained by an insurance industry fraud intelligence 
sharing scheme, but when sharing information with other insurers they would rely 
solely on the DPA s.29(3) exemption.  RI/20, the Head of Intelligence in a public 
sector organisation, suggested that his organisation didn’t need MOUs when dealing 
with other public sector bodies, but does have a standard agreement for use with 
industry partners.  However, while the experience of many participants suggested 
that they favoured the use of MOUs, it was noted that these merely helped to structure 
the workings of a relationship and still relied on legal channels to share being in place; 
they do not enable intelligence sharing in their own right. 
 
CS/22: “…the statutory gateway’s there; an MOU only goes a little bit further.  
Well, actually, not really further at all but saying what can and can’t be done.  
It’s just that, really, an understanding to help understand the legislation and 
the relationship […] So the statutory gateway says that it can be done; the 
MOUs specify how it will be done.” 
 
MOUs do have drawbacks, however.  Several participants pointed out that they can 
be time consuming to put together, with time frames cited between three and six 
months (CS/11), six to twelve months (RI/11) and, at the most extreme end, two to 
six years (RI/02).  The volume of paperwork required if an organisation were to have 
agreements in place with every organisation with which it had an information sharing 
relationship was also mentioned as a factor (RI/06).  Furthermore, the level of 
complexity in the agreements increased with the number of parties involved, and all 
aspects need to be agreed by all parties.  One participant (RI/18), who had been 
working for a law enforcement agency on an overarching framework of cross-sector 
agreements with multiple partners, described a situation where multiple levels of 
MOU had to be completed.  Three protocols were agreed through various stages of 
piloting and prototyping of arrangements, with a fourth agreement to be put in place 
after completion of the initial trials.  These issues can be problematic, but RI/13 
argued at length that this need not necessarily be the case.  He put forth a strong 
case that it should be possible to achieve, in the public sector at least, just a handful 
of agreements based on general principles that should cover most agencies in most 
situations, and that this should be done at higher levels rather than each individual 
agency having separate agreements in place: 
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RI/13: “If you take the Prison Service and Law Enforcement: there’s 4 
information sharing agreements between those agencies, on corruption and 
general information and probation-led information.  Why do you need 4?  So 
on paper it works, or does it?  And not only does it have 4 national ones, but 
there are regional information sharing agreements between Prison Service 
and..., and there are local...  Why?  Why are we doing that?  Why don’t we 
have one overarching information sharing agreement that is drafted in a way 
which allows for the flow of information? 
[…]  
There are 203,000 police staff, police offers and PCSOs [Police Community 
Support Officers] in policing.  At the very least you can have an information 
sharing agreement between them and NOMS [National Offender 
Management Service].  We don’t need 43 forces doing that.  We don’t need 
dozens of local, everywhere where there’s a prison, there’s an information 
sharing agreement with that local BCU [Basic Command Unit].  We don’t need 
that.” 
 
Not all organisations, or information sharing models, rely wholly on MOUs.  Several 
participants, representing industry-based anti-fraud information sharing schemes, 
avoided the need to have individual agreements in place with each member by 
incorporating the fundamental elements of these within the membership contract and 
terms of reference (RI/03, RI/04, RI/06, RI/15, RI/17B).  This approach represents not 
a rejection of the MOU, but an alternative to it, and resolves the problem of having 
multiple unique arrangements in place.  This helps schemes following this model to 
avoid being undermined by complexity, but the rigidity means that agreements cannot 
be tailored to suit all organisations; those that do not agree to the standard terms 
would not join as members.  Even these schemes sometimes make use of MOUs 
with other sectors, however, for the benefit of all members (RI/19A).  Others will also 
make use of, where held, their SAFO status to enable cross-sector sharing by 
encouraging public sector organisations to join and collaborate with the scheme on 
the strength of the assurances provided by that designation (RI/06). 
 
However, some organisations proceed without the use of MOUs altogether.  RI/07 
and RI/14, representing investment and retail banks respectively, suggested that they 
do not have formalised agreements in place, but rely on informal, ad-hoc 
arrangements utilising the DPA s.29(3) exemption on disclosure.  This is, perhaps, 
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especially notable given that the financial services sector was the sector most 
commonly cited by participants as being effective at sharing anti-fraud information. 
 
Structure of MOUs 
During the case study research, FACT provided a copy of its standard MOU template 
for examination, as well as copies of three signed agreements: one of which was 
based on the FACT template, and two with police forces using those organisations’ 
agreements (FACT, 2008; City of London Police, 2012; Metropolitan Police, 2012). 
 
While the structure, length and organisation of the documents differed quite 
considerably, some common features of all three are set out in Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1: Common features of information sharing agreements 
 
 
There were also a number of features within the documents that were not necessarily 
common to all three, but were still potentially helpful elements, as detailed in Figure 
6.2. 
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Figure 6.2: Useful additional features within information sharing agreements 
 
 
Audit and Compliance 
A feature that some organisations and information sharing schemes incorporate into 
their collaborative arrangements is the right to audit partners on their adherence to 
the terms of their agreements.  As would perhaps be expected, this feature was 
especially prominent amongst the membership schemes that exist to enable anti-
fraud information sharing, such as those represented by RI/04, RI/06 and RI/17B, the 
latter of which confirmed that her organisation performs biennial audits on each 
member.  The right to perform audits is built into the membership agreements of these 
schemes.  If members are found not be adhering to their contractual obligations, 
sanctions – such as the cessation of membership – may be imposed.  This can help 
schemes to ensure not only that members are adhering to required standards, but 
also that they are providers as well as recipients of information to help overcome the 
issue of asymmetrical flow of data.  RI/15 represents another industry-based scheme, 
but with a very small staff, and there is no formal audit process in place.  However, 
RI/15 did describe how he will take up directly with members their failure to share 
relevant information or to fulfil the obligations to which they had signed up. 
 
RI/20, representing a government agency, also referred to auditing processes with 
partners.  Its MOUs require partners to acknowledge MOPI standards and the NIM, 
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and to be subject to the oversight of relevant regulatory bodies, such as the 
Surveillance Commissioner and the Criminal Case Law Review Commission, to 
which RI/20’s organisation is accountable.  Some participants referred to being 
audited by regulators as a standard process, with RI/06 stating that his organisation 
had been notified of an imminent audit by the ICO and that they had no apprehension 
about this due to the standards and processes that were in place and due to previous 
experiences of such audits.  Others, including RI/01, RI/04, RI/17A, RI/17B, RI/18 and 
RI/19A, discussed the merits of ongoing dialogue with the regulators, while RI/08, 
who worked for a regulatory body, discussed active engagement with organisations 
to promote compliance and provide advice. 
 
DPA s.29(3) Requests 
Central to many of the participants’ strategies for sharing information with other 
organisations, whether as part of a data sharing scheme or a bipartite relationship, 
was the DPA s.29(3) exemption.  This allows sharing of personal data for the 
prevention and detection of crime or the apprehension or prosecution of offenders 
where the failure to share this data would be likely to prejudice these purposes (ICO, 
2001, pp.42-43).  While this is an exemption from the restrictions on sharing, rather 
than a gateway to facilitate exchange, this is an important tool for those seeking to 
share economic crime intelligence.  All three of the MOUs provided by FACT made 
explicit reference to the provision, while the Request for Information form appended 
to FACT’s template specified this as being the legal basis upon which data was to be 
requested.  Other participants discussed the provision extensively as being important 
to their organisations’ intelligence sharing relationships, regardless of whether or not 
they used MOUs.  Several FACT interviewees discussed the channel, including CS/1, 
CS/16, CS/18, CS/23 and CS/24, as did non-FACT participants RI/01, RI/03, RI/06, 
RI/07, RI/09, RI/12, RI/14, RI/15, RI/17A, RI/18, RI/19A, RI/19B and RI/20.  For all of 
the problems that the DPA can cause – outlined in Chapter Four – there was 
widespread appreciation for the way that the exemption is structured when used 
properly: 
 
RI02: “I think the Data Protection Act is appropriate for the thing that it’s there 
for.  The problem is how it gets used in order to ensure that personal 
identifiable data is shared appropriately and I think the way that it’s done in 
the Data Protection Act is great.” 
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RI03: “I actually think 29(3) works pretty effectively, to be perfectly honest with 
you.  I think if you understand the legislation, if you engage with the regulators, 
if you operate a sound business model with good governance and you have 
proper controls around it, then I think 29(3) as it stands already provides a 
good framework.” 
 
Whilst it remains a misunderstood, and often misinterpreted channel, if used 
appropriately the DPA can be an effective facilitator of intelligence sharing for anti-
fraud purposes, as attested by the participants in the study. 
 
Building and Maintaining Relationships and Networks 
The establishment and maintenance of relationships is, unsurprisingly, essential to 
successful collaboration.  Many elements of the interviews focused, both directly and 
indirectly, on how participants and the organisations they represented went about 
ensuring healthy and productive information sharing relationships with partners.  A 
number of key topics, strategies and factors emerged, of which some of the primary 
subjects are discussed below. 
 
Information Asymmetry and Reciprocity 
The flow of information in only one direction between organisations has been well 
recognised and documented as an issue, as people are typically more interested in 
receiving information than providing it (Bharosa et al, 2010, p.63).  This emerged as 
a significant problem by participants within this research too, as reported in Chapter 
Four.  There were a number of responses and strategies discussed with respect to 
this issue, and reciprocity was identified as a key principle for maintaining effective 
collaboration (RI/03, RI/04, RI/05, RI/06, RI/11, RI/14, RI/17B).  Some interviewees 
representing industry-specific intelligence sharing schemes (RI/03, RI/04, RI/06, 
RI/17B) stated that it was such an important element that it was built into the 
contractual obligations of members to actively provide, as well as request and 
receive, relevant data, and this was subject to audit as discussed above.  While some 
participants also discussed hopes that their organisations’ SAFO status might help in 
this respect when sharing with the public sector, both RI/15 and RI/17B suggested 
that they had experienced continued resistance from some bodies, such as HMRC, 
after they became SAFOs and that many public sector organisations still did not know 
what the status signified.  RI/04 suggested that her organisation had enjoyed some 
success by accepting public sector organisations as members of its scheme.  
Furthermore, she described how her organisation periodically arranged round table 
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discussions as part of the work of a sub-group, and had found that bodies such as 
HMRC and law enforcement were engaging more through these fora.  RI/21, 
representing a public sector body, reported that his organisation had managed to 
break down some of the barriers with respect to HMRC and the Border Agency due 
to the strength of relationships forged with some of the HMRC policy officers that also 
worked with that agency.  However, he still found the results inconsistent, in that some 
HMRC officers would share intelligence with him on provision of a DPA s.29(3) 
request form, whereas others would not. 
 
For FACT, two primary strategies to this issue emerged from the data.  The first was 
the importance of agreeing common goals and each party’s responsibilities on a 
case-by-case basis, an approach also agreed by RI/05.  The second was to accept 
that most information would be likely to flow in one direction: 
 
CS/18: “…for years now the government have been saying ‘public-private 
partnerships are the way forward’ – but they’ve never told you how you’re 
meant to do that. So we say ‘this is how we think we can do this, because we 
can’t work together unless we share information’.  And we decide on common 
goals, and we decide on a particular case who’s going to do what.  So that all 
works very, very well.  What we do know, and what we say when we’re doing 
it, is we realise that as a public organisation the chances are that you’re going 
to get a lot more information out of us than we’re going to get out of you.  But 
we accept that.” 
 
This philosophy was shared by RI/20, who was willing to share regardless of what he 
received back on the basis that the information shared would be likely to spur action 
taken by other organisations and it was thus in his interest to do so: 
 
RI/20: “Doesn’t make it difficult for me, I share unilaterally.  If they don’t care 
to share back, that’s more their problem than mine.” 
 
However, it remains a contentious issue, with inconsistencies in the approaches of 
people within the same organisations.  RI/21, who works in the same organisation as 
RI/20, suggested that non-reciprocation can only go so far before it becomes a 
problem, and CS/22, amongst others within FACT, expressed frustration at not 
receiving much back. 
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Reputation 
Other vital attributes in both establishing and maintaining productive information 
sharing relationships are those of trust and of having a reputation as an organisation 
that produces high quality work and which can be relied upon to handle intelligence 
and sensitive data appropriately.  Trust and reputation were widely cited, especially 
amongst FACT participants, as being critical to the success of partnerships.  Eleven 
FACT interviewees, including its three most senior officers, considered FACT’s 
reputation for quality and competence to be key to collaboration. 
 
CS/24: “I think that the fact that you get a reputation for providing high quality 
products. Without a doubt that is key.  We frequently do get flagged up by 
people, you know ‘I wish everybody did intelligence like FACT’.  It is that 
reputation side of things.” 
 
 RI/14: “And what underpins everything is trust.” 
 
RI/19A: “Because it’s about trust.  It’s knowing that when you share that 
intelligence that you know the parties that you’re sharing that intelligence with 
are going to deal with it compliantly, they’re going to store it safely and they’re 
not going to bring you issue for releasing it in the first place.” 
 
Trust and reputation were identified as fundamental elements by numerous 
participants, and cited as essential by eleven interviewees in the second phase of the 
research, while lack of trust was also identified as a barrier to collaboration by another 
(RI/10). 
 
Personal Contacts and Networks 
It became clear from many participants that the basis of trust can rely significantly on 
the personal relationships, networks and, often, the history and background of people 
actively involved in the sharing of information.  This took two main forms. 
 
One was reliance on the normal relationships built up between practitioners, often 
originally built through networking events such as conferences, industry events and 
industry peer networks (RI/01, RI/05, RI/07, RI/10, RI/11, RI/19A, RI/21).  RI/15, who 
was newly in post as the Chief Executive Officer of an intelligence sharing scheme, 
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discussed having inherited ‘established trust’ within the network and of the need to 
maintain that. 
 
The second form was a reliance on the networks of practitioners from their previous 
careers in law enforcement or the military, where the underlying basis of trust is built 
on shared backgrounds, common interpretation of standards and mutual 
understanding.  This was discussed especially by five participants (CS/18, CS/22, 
RI/01, RI/07, RI/14) as being an important aspect of establishing networks and trust.  
For FACT, CS/22 suggested that a significant number of staff were ex-law 
enforcement officers and that this helped them to establish relationships with ex-
police officers working in other organisations.  RI/14, who described it as “the old boys 
club of law enforcement”, suggested it was a system that works. 
 
Regardless of the underlying basis of the personal relationships that are established, 
they can be important factors in facilitating exchange of information as that is where 
the trust in the standards and competence of collaborating partners is shown: 
 
RI/19A: “I have much more confidence in sharing intel with people I know, I 
know almost on a personal level, because I know I can trust them, I know they 
have the same work ethics as us.  Similar processes, controls.” 
 
Informal Channels of Communication 
Taking the subject of personal relationships and networks one step further, it also 
became apparent in a number of the interviews that reliance was placed by some 
organisations on relatively informal channels of communication between the 
personnel involved.  This was often in the form of initial, undocumented, 
conversations which may, or may not, be followed up with a formal recorded request.  
Several interviewees discussed this type of informal or off-record discussion (CS/24, 
RI/05, RI/07, RI/13, RI/14, RI/19A). 
 
CS/24: “…there are occasions where people want to talk to you on the record 
and off the record.  And from an intelligence perspective you have to have 
that.  There’s nothing wrong with that, everybody understands that there are 
these occasions when that is required.” 
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RI/05: “…we’ll speak to IFED [Insurance Fraud Enforcement Department] and 
we’ll generally get off-the-record steer about whether or not they’re going to 
do something or not going to do something.” 
 
Some such exchanges were described by participants as a preliminary discussion, to 
establish the nature of a request and identify if there is relevant intelligence to share, 
followed by submission of a formalised request by one of the parties (RI/07, RI/19A).  
Other participants discussed some situations in which off-record approaches were 
seen as necessary in order to bypass or evade rules or regulations (RI/07, RI/13, 
RI/14). 
 
RI/07: “So as well as thinking about the external framework, we’ve got our 
own internal controls and monitoring so that’s something that some people 
might thing ‘God, it’s not worth my while to try and send that out because I’m 
just going to get flagged up for doing this and doing that and I’m going to get 
in trouble for it and actually, I’ll just pick up the phone and tell them.’” 
 
RI/14: “If I know the police officer, I’m mindful of the fact that if I respond to 
s.28 [sic] I’m the data owner and I can do that.  However it may not be in the 
interest of our customers.  So very often I will say to the police officer I’ll give 
you this for intelligence purposes, however if you want to produce it lawfully 
you have to get a court order.” 
 
Such tactics are akin to those described by Handy (1993, p.308) as informal channels 
or cliques used in a manner to bypass rules in order to achieve required outcomes. 
 
Other uses of informal channels were to give other organisations or contacts an early 
warning about trends or issues.  RI/07 described how her organisation might call 
contacts to share general information about potential criminal activity, but would make 
it clear that it was unconfirmed intelligence provided for general awareness purposes. 
 
Onward Referral and Indirect Sharing of Intelligence 
Data ownership was an important consideration discussed by many participants in 
both phases of data collection.  Linked to issues of trust and competence in 
intelligence handling, as well as important in respect of data protection legislation, 
ownership affects organisations' ability to disseminate information to, and receive it 
from, others.  The underlying principle is that if an organisation doesn't own the data, 
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it cannot share it without relevant permissions from the owner.  This precept was 
accepted and recognised, either implicitly or explicitly, by all participants in the 
research, and there were two main approaches discussed in how to deal with this 
issue. 
 
The most common response to this type of scenario would be that of onward referral, 
or signposting.  One organisation which has, or is aware of, intelligence required by 
a partner would not share it directly with that partner, but would refer them to the data 
owner in order that they could request it directly (CS/04, CS/11, CS/18, CS/23, CS/24, 
RI/05, RI/06, RI/12, RI/15, RI/17B, RI/22).  It would then be up to the data owner to 
determine whether they wished to collaborate with the requester.  Some information 
sharing schemes are organised in a hub-and-spoke structure in order to facilitate 
sharing in this way, with the scheme acting as the conduit through which requests 
and responses are channelled (RI/12, RI/15). Several participants (RI/06, RI/15, 
RI/17B) suggested that their organisations might facilitate the discussion if needed.  
Another option was for the organisation holding another's intelligence to request 
permission from the data owner themselves to share it onwards (CS/18, CS/22, 
RI/12). 
 
Taking this a step further, the second tactic used by a couple of organisations, 
including FACT, was to leverage the strength of an existing intelligence sharing 
relationship to enlist the partner organisation to seek intelligence from a third 
organisation on its behalf. 
 
CS/24: "The other thing about [partner agency] is they have the facility to 
obtain  intelligence from other agencies that we, FACT, would not be able to 
speak to directly.  So the likes of PayPal, EBay, some of the other payment 
processors, etc.  And we have a referral process where we can make requests 
for information from them.  It's really so useful because they can give us that 
data." 
 
RI/22 suggested a slightly different arrangement available to her law enforcement 
agency, in which it could utilise the Europol forum to obtain material in respect of 
Russia when it would not be able to obtain that data directly from Russia itself.  While 
this particular facility would not be available to non-law enforcement organisations, 
the principle is similar to the arrangement discussed by CS/24 as noted above. 
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Single Points of Contact 
One of the tools used by many organisations to facilitate collaboration – and as the 
mechanism by which trust is established, standards upheld, communications 
channels directed and relationships maintained – is the Single Point of Contact 
[SPOC].  These are used extensively by FACT, and by several other participants, 
including RI/03, RI/05, RI/06, RI/07, RI/09, RI/15, RI/18 and RI/19.  RI/06 noted the 
incongruous nature of the term as there were often multiple SPOCs in place in a 
relationship.  He also reported that the data sharing scheme that he represented has 
documented guidance on the SPOC 'Role Profile' and 'Roles and Responsibilities' to 
which all members sign up, such is the importance of the position.  Where they are 
used, SPOCs are seen as the owners or gatekeepers of the relationship, and are 
often identified by name within MOUs. 
 
Pilot Projects and Joint Working 
Several participants (RI/01, RI/02, RI/03, RI/04, RI/17B, RI/18) discussed the use of 
trial projects, or pilot schemes, as a means to test the potential for a collaborative 
venture.  As well as providing evidence for further development and wider 
implementation (RI/02), if the pilot demonstrates positive results it can also help to 
develop mutual understanding between partners.  Similarly, joint working on projects, 
such as FACT co-authoring a jointly branded report on illegal streaming with the NFIB 
(CS/22), was also cited as good means to develop and strengthen working 
relationships.  Other participants also provided examples of collaborative projects, 
investigations and enforcement action (RI/03, RI/12).  Participating in, or organising, 
working groups between multiple collaborators was also reported to be a positive 
strategy to foster cooperation and develop mutual understanding and trust (CS/06, 
CS/19, RI/04, RI/05, RI/18, RI/19A).  RI/09 and RI/14 discussed how their 
organisations also made use of staff secondments to strengthen collaboration and 
cement understanding with partners. 
 
Senior Level Involvement 
Securing the involvement and support of senior level executives was generally 
recognised to be important in ensuring both the success of a collaborative scheme or 
project and in strengthening the information sharing relationship between 
organisations.  This was seen as important in terms of enhancing mutual 
understanding and, essentially, in helping to drive and, where necessary, change 
corporate culture in favour of information sharing (RI/03, RI/15, RI/17A, RI/19A).  
CS/24 and RI/14 both stressed the value of having decision makers on board and, 
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ideally, involved in key meetings to ensure that participants can make commitments 
on behalf of their organisations.  Failure to empower representatives leads to 
frustration and delays.  CS/18 discussed how gaining the support of senior officials, 
such as police Chief Constables, can help gain traction and ensure that action is 
taken.  The involvement of senior officials can provide reassurance to both parties of 
high level control in the processes and relationship (RI/05).  To this end, RI/03 
described how his organisation actively decided to change the composition of the 
board from fraud managers from member organisations to executives who could 
make strategic decisions and agree budgetary commitments. 
 
RI/02, representing a government department overseeing a number of anti-fraud 
intelligence sharing projects, stated that there was substantial senior level buy-in 
within and outside of government.  However, RI/06 suggested that this was not always 
the case, citing senior HMRC officials still failing to recognise the operational benefits 
of information sharing, despite ground level staff doing so. 
 
Mass Dissemination of Intelligence 
Many of the matters outlined above are concerned primarily with dissemination of 
information on a one-to-one basis.  However, there remains a need in many respects 
for anti-crime information to be broadcast at a wider level, on a one-to-many or many-
to-many basis.  In many instances this will not necessarily entail the sharing of 
personal or sensitive information, although in some it may.  This section provides a 
summary of some approaches discussed by participants in respect of these needs. 
 
The primary methods discussed during the interview with respect to mass 
dissemination are outlined in Figure 6.3. 
 
Figure 6.3: Channels and controls for mass dissemination 
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For generalised information and intelligence, publications (CS/18, RI/04, RI/07, 
RI/17B, RI/10), conferences and fora (CS/01, CS/05, CS/18, RI/04, RI/06, RI/07, 
RI/11, RI/14, RI/22) can be effective means of mass collaboration, and especially 
useful for sharing information such as trends, issues of general interest and 
applicability, case studies and techniques for detection, disruption and enforcement.  
Conferences and other fora also provide valuable networking opportunities, which 
may help delegates build and strengthen relationships with others facing similar 
challenges and risks (RI/07, RI/14, RI/19A).  The nature and content of publications 
may range from newsletters, reports and analyses of fraud issues to detailed 
Strategic Assessments as produced by FACT.  Online publications and fora such as 
fraud wikis were also lauded as creating opportunities for exchange through the 
creation of open repositories for anti-crime information (RI/10).  Email exchange was 
considered by some to be an effective tool for disseminating information on a mass 
basis, as well as for sharing data files on a one-to-one basis, and thus as a useful 
facilitator of intelligence sharing (RI/06, RI/11, RI/19A).  Email could, however, 
present challenges of its own, from restrictions on attachment sizes to messages 
being blocked by firewalls and security software at the end of either the originator or 
the recipient (RI/07, RI/11, RI/14, RI/18). 
 
For more sensitive information, or debate of issues specific to defined groups, such 
as industry peers (for which tension exists between sharing and competitive 
advantage), more defined fora, members meetings of intelligence sharing schemes 
and special interest groups may be more appropriate options.  Several participants, 
including CS/18, RI/06, RI/12, RI/15, RI/17B and RI/19A, discussed such events for 
purposes ranging from the discussion of general trends through to frank dialogue 
about sensitive issues behind closed doors.  In order to promote openness, 
conventions such as the Chatham House Rule can be observed to enable debate of 
details that would otherwise not be shared between separate, often competing, 
entities (RI/07, RI/14, RI/19A). 
 
Issuing alerts was another commonly discussed method of sharing both general non-
sensitive information (RI/04, RI/09, RI/11, RI/18) to more specific actionable 
intelligence (RI/06, RI/07, RI/09, RI/14, RI/17A), with controls and restrictions being 
placed on the latter.  For the intelligence sharing scheme represented by RI/06, e-
alerts were the primary means by which members would share intelligence, and these 
are posted onto the scheme's website where they can be searched by other 
members.  The scheme emails notifications to members when items of potential 
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relevance or interest have been made available to search.  Additional controls are 
applied, including grading alerts using the 5x5x5 system.  Furthermore, the alert being 
posted would be signed off by that organisation's registered SPOC, and would be 
reviewed by the scheme's compliance officers (of which RI/06 was one). 
 
An additional technique discussed by several interviewees as a means of enabling 
large scale dissemination of anti-fraud information was data sanitisation.  
Anonymisation and pseudonymisation of otherwise sensitive data may render it 
suitable for sharing with a wider audience than would otherwise be possible or legal 
(RI/07. RI/08, RI/10, RI/15).  In its Code of Practice on anonymisation, the ICO makes 
it clear that statutory data protection constraints do not apply to anonymised data 
where the data subject is not identifiable (ICO, 2012, p.7).  Such treatment was also 
reported to be beneficial in overcoming potential uncertainty over a recipient's ability 
to handle intelligence appropriately (RI/22), and in transmitting intelligence internally 
within organisations across territories with strict rules on transmitting sensitive data 
(RI/07). 
 
Summary 
In this chapter, findings relating to some key facilitators and enablers of intelligence 
sharing, and characteristics of collaborative relationships, have been set out.  The 
topic of establishing and adhering to acknowledged standards has been covered, with 
many participants considering this helpful in enabling intelligence sharing, but others 
not considering it essential.  Likewise, many organisations and intelligence sharing 
schemes define standards and processes within MOUs or contracts, whilst others are 
content to rely on formal requests made under DPA exemptions.  Factors such as 
trust and reputation for competence in handling intelligence were found to be integral 
to productive relationships.  Conversely, there is still reliance on private networks, 
including amongst alumni of law enforcement bodies, in some areas to enable 
sharing, which restricts opportunities for sharing outside of those restrictive networks.  
Finally, there are techniques available to allow dissemination of sensitive information 
amongst many participants through appropriate sanitisation or observance of 
conventions such as the Chatham House Rule. 
 
The next chapter will explore findings with respect to related issues such as 
competence in intelligence handling, the role of training and education, and the drive 
towards professionalisation in intelligence sharing. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Findings: Setting the Standard – Knowledge, Skills and 
Professionalisation 
 
Introduction 
Findings outlined in previous chapters have indicated that, in order to establish 
successful information sharing relationships, organisations and practitioners must not 
only have the willingness to collaborate constructively but also the understanding and 
skills to do so.  They must also be trusted by others in these respects.  This includes 
not only understanding the legislative and regulatory framework, but possessing the 
skills to handle, process and disseminate data appropriately and legally.  This chapter 
examines findings relating to the importance of competence in intelligence handling, 
approaches to training and education, and in respect of a tentative emerging 
professionalisation agenda within the anti-fraud and intelligence communities. 
 
Competence 
The issue of competence in people's and organisations’ ability to legally and 
appropriately handle sensitive information and intelligence was found to be of 
considerable concern to participants.  The matter is closely connected to reputation 
and trust, which underpin the relationships that are essential to effective information 
sharing.  It was a factor discussed by eleven interviewees within FACT alone as an 
important element in successful collaboration, as well as by four other participants as 
a significant issue.  Lack of competence in handling intelligence correctly not only 
impedes information sharing, but can have damaging implications both for individual 
investigations and for wider collaboration prospects: 
 
CS/11: “We have big issues with this because obviously we work within a 
bigger environment – intellectual property – so anything negative that’s done 
by anybody else rebounds very, very quickly and the doors close and people 
back off.  So a great example would be Google.  Where there isn’t a point of 
contact for the industry as a whole. Everyone’s vying, everyone’s just being 
selfish, everyone wishes to get their stuff done and someone will drop a 
clanger by sending a request to Google that asks them to do something that’s 
wrong, shouldn’t be asked for.  Probably illegal in the request.  And so Google 
will take that and they will go and stand on top of their building and wave it at 
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the IP industry and say ‘look at this, you’ve made a complete hash of this, and 
this is why we won’t be doing it anymore.’ […] Huge problem for us because 
there’s lots of individuals representing big organisations who really don’t know 
what they’re doing, pulling the wool over people’s eyes, protecting their own 
jobs.  All kinds of issues.  It’s a massive, massive problem for us.” 
 
Professional incompetence isn’t solely restricted to errors in the processing of data or 
in making inappropriate or illegal requests for, or disclosures of, sensitive data.  
Problems can also arise with respect to inconsistent or inappropriate application of 
standards, such as the 5x5x5 grading process (CS/04, CS/21, CS/24, RI/21).  The 
tendency to inundate others with requests was also cited as a significant issue by 
several participants. 
 
RI/19: “…that’s a big industry problem at the moment – firing s.29s off left, 
right and centre without an understanding of whether it’s going to be a fruitful 
exercise or not.” 
 
RI/07: “I know a couple of groups did drop out of [information sharing scheme] 
and that’s because you had a couple of companies within it who were just 
bombarding companies with intelligence requests and I think that was 
something that people get nervous about.” 
 
An alternative problem is that of excessive information being provided.  RI/13 made 
the point that if an organisation provided a partner with intelligence in the form of a 
158-page document that would likely both be excessive information and less effective 
in terms of actionable intelligence; in all likelihood it would not be read. 
 
Strategies for ensuring competence link back to other processes within the 
relationships, including focusing on quality rather than volume (CS/24), utilising 
SPOCs as gatekeepers (CS/24), and agreement of processes.  The latter may be 
achieved through MOUs and mutual understanding or through development of 
industry-wide standards on information requests such as the voluntary code for the 
insurance industry (Chartered Insurance Institute New Generation Group, 2015) cited 
by RI/19A and RI/19B.  Many organisations also place significant emphasis on 
training staff in order to ensure technical proficiency. 
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Training and Education 
An important means used by organisations to ensure that staff have sufficient skills 
and ability to handle and share information is by providing them with education and 
training.  These play a vital role in facilitating collaboration, and fulfil a number of 
functions for organisations that are seeking to share information to combat economic 
crime.  Not only can training and education be used to equip operational staff to 
process intelligence and sensitive data appropriately, but it can also be an essential 
tool in helping to overcome cultural barriers to information sharing (RI/01, RI/02, 
RI/14). 
 
The scale of the education requirement is extensive.  The need is not restricted just 
to fraud staff, or to employees within organisations involved, or seeking to be involved, 
in intelligence sharing.  It extends to organisations across all sectors, to data 
controllers in organisations large and small (RI/01), as well as to making the case for 
data sharing to the general public (RI/02, RI/13, RI/18).  As such, there is a role for 
many stakeholders, including organisations, regulators and the government, with 
respect to education and awareness around information sharing (RI/02). 
 
One of the most significant educational functions discussed by participants was 
providing awareness training to partner organisations to enhance their understanding 
of the purpose of the information sharing relationship, the issues involved and the 
type of data that they required, as well as, in some cases, the nature of the criminality 
and the relevant legislation that applies (CS/22, CS/24, RI/03, RI/09, RI/15, RI/18). 
 
RI/03: “I wouldn’t say we do training for police or regulators, I’d say we do 
awareness; so if we go in and speak to a new police force, we would have to 
make them aware of different types of fraud and how the model works.  But 
from a data sharing point of view our engagement with police and regulators 
is more around explaining our rationale for wanting to share the data rather 
than trying to educate them how to share data.” 
 
CS/24: “The reality is that our world has changed, our priorities have changed 
and we’re moving very much into an online – well we are, totally focussed on 
the online problem – but there’s still very much what we call a hard goods 
issue which is the sale and distribution of high quality DVDs.  So we do still 
find that a lot of people that pass us intelligence are passing us intelligence in 
relation to things that we are unlikely to do a lot of work on.” 
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By educating partners on their information requirements, organisations can help to 
ensure that partners understand their needs, share relevant intelligence and provide 
less irrelevant data, making the process more productive and efficient for both parties.  
FACT provides training not only to police forces on the nature of IP crime and how to 
respond to incidents (CS/22), but to non-law enforcement partners too.  It provides 
training every year to Crimestoppers in order to help its staff understand FACT’s 
information needs and obtain relevant information from people reporting IP crime to 
them.  FACT’s annual Strategic Assessment document, too, is an educational tool 
used to promote understanding amongst partners.  Education programmes are not 
only useful for external awareness.  RI/19A spoke of a large internal campaign 
conducted by her organisation to educate its insurance claims staff on what 
intelligence was and the benefits of it, and stated that referrals to the fraud team had 
increased significantly as a result. 
 
Another key angle of the training and education agenda was providing training on 
intelligence handling and the core standards and processes.  For RI/12, representing 
a cross-sector intelligence sharing scheme, it is important to do this to ensure that the 
organisations involved in the scheme understand what intelligence is and how they 
should be sharing it.  To this end, his organisation provides induction training for new 
scheme members.  Similarly, RI/06, who is on the board of an industry-based 
scheme, provides mandatory training for the SPOCs nominated by member firms.  
This involves a training day and completing a training package, covering both the NIM 
and the specific roles and responsibilities of the SPOC within the scheme.  Until they 
have completed the training, they cannot undertake the SPOC role, as it is the SPOCs 
that sign off any intelligence sharing alerts and act as the gatekeeper from the 
member firm’s perspective.  RI/06’s scheme was also investing in an e-learning 
package on the NIM, and had agreed to pay for scheme members to receive training 
from law enforcement on how to improve the quality of evidence packages supplied 
to the police.  Other participants’ organisations also provided training to members on 
subjects such as the NIM, the legal basis for sharing (including DPA s.29(3)) and how 
to handle and grade intelligence (RI/03, RI/12).  RI/15, who spoke on behalf of another 
industry-based scheme, organises regular information sessions and workshops for 
members with training provided for people in different roles, such as analysts, 
investigators and re-sellers, as well as crime awareness programmes for the public, 
including a publicity campaign for young people.  The training of internal staff is 
important too, with FACT devoting close attention to ensuring that new starters – and 
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all staff – receive NIM training, as well as training on the systems and processes for 
handling intelligence and on how to apply the 5x5x5 grading system (CS/04, CS/12). 
 
RI/13 – who works as an intelligence lead within a police force and who has worked 
on intelligence-sharing projects for ACPO – suggested there was a need for greater 
focus on intelligence training for police officers who were not in intelligence 
specialisations.  He pointed out that new recruits would typically receive two weeks 
of training on issues such as human rights, equality and diversity, which he 
recognised as topics worthy of training resources, but only forty-five minutes on 
intelligence.  This subsequently caused problems for (trained) intelligence teams who 
would spend valuable time trying to interpret intelligence reports written by officers 
who are not trained to write them properly, rather than devoting this time to developing 
that intelligence. 
 
Professionalising Intelligence 
The discussions on competence, training and education with respect to intelligence 
handling and sharing inevitably led, in some of the interviews, to the topic of 
professionalisation of intelligence-related roles.  Some interviewees within both 
phases of the research talked passionately about the need for professional controls, 
standards and recognition. 
 
CS/11: “I don’t think the world has really got on top of information sharing at 
all.  It’s not a hugely recognised skill, and it actually is vital and should be.  It 
should be a profession.  Definitely.  Definitely.” 
 
RI/13: “I would talk about a professionalised intelligence community who have 
training, and a programme of continuous development, continuous 
professional development.” 
 
While an extended discussion of what constitutes a profession, and the changing 
conceptualisation of professions and professionalism, is outside of the scope of this 
thesis, it is worth considering briefly some of the key characteristics of professions in 
order to consider whether intelligence as a specialism is moving toward 
professionalisation.  While it has been argued that it is no longer relevant to define 
professions by key characteristics (Evetts, 1999, pp.119-120), and that within the 
changing occupational environment it is difficult to define what it means to be a 
professional (Noordegraaf, 2007, p.781), some common attributes and qualities may 
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still be applied to the concept.  Some of these attach esteem to the concept of 
professions beyond the direct technical aspect of professional endeavour (Muzio, 
Brock & Suddaby, p.713).  Professions are founded upon a body of skill and 
theoretical or abstract knowledge, gained through specialised education and training, 
and professional work is characterised by the application of judgement (Freidson, 
1989, p.425).  This body of knowledge is protected, and it is the professional who has 
access to the monopoly exercised over that knowledge and techniques through their 
recognised status (De Lang, Jackling & Suwardy, 2015, p.43).  The knowledge base 
is supported, and controlled, by an institutional framework that controls access and 
codifies standards, certifying members as professionals and maintaining an ethical 
foundation (O’Regan, 2001, pp.217-219).  These are supplemented by activities 
including an active research agenda, a sophisticated literature and published serials 
or journals (O’Regan, 2001, p.219).  Other recognised or ascribed qualities given to, 
or claimed by, professions include technical proficiency (Evetts, 2011, p. 414; 
Wendel, 2000, p.563), authority and legitimacy (Evetts, 2011, p.414), and 
commanding the trust of those outside of the profession (Evetts, 2003, p.400). 
 
The data indicates that while there are some of the above elements of a profession 
evident, these are not yet embedded or organised, and the professionalisation 
agenda, whilst present, is at a nascent stage.  There is widespread recognition 
amongst participants that the work requires professionalism in terms of technical 
competence and that application of skill and judgement is necessary within the work 
and to enable intelligence sharing (CS/11, RI/11, RI/20). 
 
RI/20: “I think we underestimate the skill involved in intelligence sharing and 
intelligence handling. It’s not recognised, we think it’s data, and we think a 
couple of rules around that’ll be fine.  I think it’s much more complex, and it 
involves professional people making professional decisions.” 
 
As such, and with the recognition that there is a lack of competence displayed by 
some parties (CS/11, CS/21, RI/13), there is the acknowledged need for people 
performing intelligence work, and sharing intelligence with others, to have the 
requisite skills and knowledge to do the job (RI/12, RI/22).  As such, there is a call for 
both professional standards and recognition in some quarters, and indication of a 
shared professional identity amongst practitioners (Evetts, 2006a, p.518; Evetts, 
2006b, p.134, Evetts, 2013, p.780). 
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There is undoubtedly a knowledge base, although it is clear that, whilst some 
standards are in place – especially applicable to the law enforcement sector – these 
are not yet codified and do not apply to all intelligence, counter fraud or IP crime 
practitioners working with, or sharing, information and intelligence.  However, the 
standards to which law enforcement bodies operate were seen to be widely accepted 
by organisations in other sectors as best practice, and were adopted by FACT and 
by many other participants’ organisations as such.  These include the NIM as the 
business model (CS/22), MOPI as the general code of practice for information sharing 
(CS/18, RI/20, RI/21) and widespread use of the 5x5x5 grading system (CS/17, RI/03, 
RI/04, RI/06, RI/07, RI/14, RI/17B, RI/20, RI/22).  However, as this is not legally 
required, not all organisations use them.  Whilst FACT and several other participants 
stated that they adopt these standards in order to make it easier to share with law 
enforcement, some interviewees from law enforcement agencies stated that they did 
not necessarily expect or require this (RI/09, RI/11, RI/22).  RI/14, from the retail 
banking sector, stated that he used the 5x5x5 information report when dealing with 
law enforcement, but not when dealing with other banks as they might not necessarily 
understand it.  But there was a call for common standards, not just in intelligence 
handling and sharing, but also in data quality (RI/08) as trust in the quality and 
reliability of the data shared by partners is essential (RI/04, RI/06, RI/14, RI/18).  In 
the anti-fraud arena too, there is no framework of best practice in the private sector 
(Brooks, Button & Frimpong, 2009, p.494), and only piecemeal adoption of public 
sector standards and processes. 
 
There is no recognised professional institution for anti-fraud, IP crime or intelligence 
professionals that fulfils the functions of such an institute denoted in the literature on 
professionalism.  RI/01 gave an impassioned argument in favour of one for counter 
fraud practitioners, arguing that a chartered institution would have continuous 
government monitoring of its rules, and should have the power to set and enforce 
standards and remove the accreditations of those that contravened rules in respect 
of intelligence sharing, allowing fraud specialists to be held accountable for 
inadequate information sharing practice.   He was strongly in favour of properly 
trained and qualified investigators being given the power to share intelligence and to 
be held accountable for failures in process. 
 
For intelligence professionals, there are some early movements towards 
professionalisation.  Although there is no primary institutional body, the College of 
Policing has launched an Intelligence Professionalisation Programme [IPP] with the 
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intention of introducing accreditation and continuous professional development 
requirements (RI/13), although this will apply primarily to law enforcement 
practitioners.  Furthermore, the college has announced its intention to seek chartered 
status (College of Policing, 2015a).  Running in parallel to the IPP is an initiative from 
a NIM working group led by RI/13 encouraging universities to develop Master’s 
programmes in intelligence handling.  At the time of interview, RI/13 confirmed that 
three universities were due to launch such courses, which would be available to both 
law enforcement and civilian students, with talks underway with other universities.  
Additionally, the Counter Fraud Professional Accreditation Board, hosted by the 
University of Portsmouth, issues two accredited qualifications for intelligence 
professionals, at Technician and Specialist levels (University of Portsmouth, n.d.).  
This is a positive step with respect to the drive towards professionalisation, but the 
courses must reflect the requirement of providing not only qualifications to students 
in these subjects but also the competencies required in the workplace (Pavlin, Svetlik 
& Evetts, 2010, p.99).  There is a market for such qualifications; both RI/19A and 
RI/19B expressed support for more qualifications in intelligence and fraud. 
 
RI/19A: “For me, there has been a massive industry push on people having 
CII accreditation but within that accreditation there is very limited fraud, there’s 
very limited intelligence. […] So I think if the industry’s concerned, intel sharing 
would be better if everybody was actually educated.” 
 
Other accreditations may also be pursued by organisations and information sharing 
schemes to demonstrate professionalism and the standards to which they adhere.  At 
the time of interview, RI/03 stated that the intelligence sharing scheme that he 
represented was pursuing accreditation under the ISO27001 information security 
standard. 
 
Without professional institutions in place, other key aspects of professionalisation are 
not present or not organised and controlled in the way of traditional professions.  
There is a knowledge and research base, and there are journals devoted to the 
intelligence and fraud fields, but these are not institutionally driven.  Nor is there the 
formal control of access to the knowledge base centred around an institution, 
although alternative mechanisms for restriction to the knowledge and skills are there, 
such as restriction for some training courses to law enforcement staff, as well as 
controls imposed by vetting procedures ranging from Disclosure and Barring Service 
checks on criminal history to formal Security Clearance procedures (RI/12, RI/19). 
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Summary 
Ensuring that people dealing with, and sharing, economic crime-related information 
and intelligence have the requisite knowledge, skills and competence to handle and 
exchange this data appropriately and legally is a matter of considerable concern to 
the stakeholders involved and to participants of the study.  Without mutual confidence 
in the ability of practitioners on both sides of the information sharing relationship, 
collaboration will not happen, or will be limited in extent.  As such, the role of training 
and education is an invaluable and important function in the operations of many 
organisations that successfully engage in information sharing.  Equally, there was 
substantial evidence of many organisations adopting the default intelligence handling 
and sharing framework and standards used within law enforcement, despite there 
being no legal requirement for non-law enforcement agencies to do so.  In the 
absence of other national standards, however, the benefits of their doing so are clear.  
In recognition of these factors, and the skills involved in handling and sharing 
intelligence, there appears to be a growing identification amongst practitioners that 
they are exercising professional judgement and skills, and that both anti-fraud work 
and intelligence work should be recognised as being professional in nature.  While 
there are some indications of a professionalisation movement, this is clearly in its very 
early stages, and there was no evidence arising from the data of how such a 
professionalisation movement in both anti-fraud work and intelligence work may 
develop or harmonise across both functions, despite the overlap between the 
domains. 
 
The findings outlined in this chapter, along with the three previous chapters, will be 
discussed further in Chapter Eight which will consider the findings together and how 
they reflect on the practices and structures that lead to effective inter-organisational 
intelligence sharing. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
Discussion 
 
Introduction 
The previous four chapters set out the findings from the analysis of the data collected 
during the study, across four broad thematic areas.  This chapter brings these findings 
together for further discussion of some of the most significant matters arising from the 
enquiry.  It commences with a discussion of the primary challenges and barriers to 
information sharing identified during the study.  This is followed by a review of the 
legislative framework, the issue of standards for intelligence sharing and strategies 
for managing collaborative relationships identified within the data.  After this, some of 
the underlying models for information sharing relationships, as described by the 
participants are examined, followed by further discussion of the issue of 
professionalisation. 
 
Barriers to Information and Intelligence Sharing 
It is not possible to take a simplistic view as to whether or not most organisations 
within the UK are effective at sharing information or intelligence with others for the 
purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating or taking enforcement action against 
economic crime.  Neither can such judgements confidently be made with respect to 
particular sectors or most industries, although there was a general consensus that 
the financial services industry was better than most.  There is insufficient information 
published to ascertain how many organisations, and across which industries, are 
involved in this type of collaboration, or are trying to be.  It is well documented, 
however, that information and intelligence sharing is an important, and potentially 
transformative, tool in the fight against fraud and IP crime (Doig & Levi, 2009, p.205; 
Fraud Review Team, 2006b, p.94).  A more nuanced view must be taken with respect 
to how well organisations are at collaborating in this respect due to the complexity 
and sensitivity of the issues involved, and as a balance must be maintained between 
the sharing of personal data to combat crime and the need to protect privacy (Fraud 
Review Team, 2006b, p.93; ICO, 2007, p.4). 
 
To this end, however, remain a number of barriers and challenges to information 
sharing that arise from the need to achieve this balance and which are ancillary to it.  
Unsurprisingly, many organisations have historically struggled and continue to do so.  
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The perceptions of research participants were varied, although it was generally 
recognised that organisations found information sharing to be problematic and not as 
simple as it could, and perhaps should, be.  Furthermore, there was a great deal of 
inconsistency reported.  Cross-sector sharing between public and private sectors was 
generally perceived to be poor, despite numerous calls for improvements and 
government initiatives to stimulate this over many years, both before and after the 
Fraud Review of 2006.  Additionally, there was a perception of continuing problems 
in sharing between public sector bodies, despite this sector being host to many 
strategies to promote collaboration and – perhaps in some cases because of – having 
a multitude of legislative gateways intended to enable sharing.  The central and long-
standing perception has been the tendency for public sector organisations to expect 
private sector companies to supply them with information and intelligence but to share 
nothing back; this view was expressed by participants representing both private and 
public sector organisations.  This supports findings from reviews of the efficacy of the 
legislative channel allowing public sector organisations to share information with 
designated SAFOs, in which failures by public sector bodies to understand and use 
the channel were recognised (ICO, 2015a, p.15; NFA, 2010a, pp.14-17), a problem 
that still persists.  Consequently, there remains a reluctance in some private sector 
organisations, whether they are SAFOs or not, to share with the public sector due to 
the belief that they will receive nothing back. 
 
This notwithstanding, there were also some optimistic messages from the research.  
There was acknowledgement that the situation was improving and recognition – again 
from those representing both public and private sector organisations – that there was 
more government support for collaboration, with participants from FACT, law 
enforcement and the private sector citing the ‘dare to share’ mantra.  However, the 
evident problems that remain in cross-sector information sharing suggest that there 
is still much to be done to turn such rhetoric into effective and widespread 
collaboration. 
 
In terms of the primary barriers to information sharing discussed by participants as 
being current at the time of data collection, a number of key issues remain as long-
standing and ongoing challenges.  Each of the factors cited most commonly by the 
participants as being major impediments to intelligence sharing were issues that have 
been previously documented in the literature.  This is testament to the enduring nature 
of these problems and evidence of the failure of both policy and professional practice 
to resolve these despite repeated calls and commitments to improving and enabling 
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intelligence sharing at professional and governmental levels.  Furthermore, as many 
of the problems previously identified within the literature did not necessarily relate to 
the anti-fraud context, although many did relate to collaborations within the criminal 
justice arena, it indicates that these issues will likely be enduring in other areas as 
well, some of which may not have enjoyed the level of political will towards improving 
intelligence sharing that the anti-fraud field has seen.  This is of concern, but further 
exploration of it remains beyond the scope of this work.  As was illustrated in Figure 
4.1 in Chapter Four, the issues most commonly cited by participants as obstacles to 
information sharing were those of data quality, cultural reticence to share, the 
tendency for a one-way flow of information, incompatibility between systems, cross-
jurisdictional problems and the volume of data to be transmitted, processed and 
stored.  Each of these has been previously discussed in the literature (see Figure 
2.1), although with respect to the issue of volume of information, the concern raised 
by participants was focussed on the volume of electronic data due to the information 
rich world in which organisations currently operate rather than the volume of data 
stored in non-digital form as identified within the medical emergency information 
sharing scheme discussed by Schooley and Horan (2007, p.771). 
 
Some additional factors discussed with participants, however, were found to be more 
pronounced within the anti-fraud field than in the literature concerning information 
sharing in other contexts, even in other areas of criminal justice.  Legislative 
problems, especially those relating to the DPA, were a particularly dominant theme 
in the data whereas, whilst legal and political issues had been identified within the 
literature, no single such legislative matter appeared to stand out to such a profound 
extent in other intelligence sharing settings.  While the legislative framework will be 
discussed in the next section, the problems of hiding behind the DPA, lack of 
understanding of legislative provisions and fear of reprisals from the Information 
Commissioner were central themes in the interview data.  Other than the grey 
literature relating specifically to anti-fraud intelligence sharing, these were not 
significant challenges found in the wider information sharing literature.  Matters of 
competence in intelligence handling and sharing also form a central challenge in 
sharing data in the anti-fraud and IP crime contexts, and related issues of lack of trust 
in partners and deficiencies in training of practitioners have been identified in the 
literature (Figure 2.1).  However, this may again be more pronounced in the anti-fraud 
field due to the large number of non-law enforcement actors involved in preventing 
and investigating these types of crime in both public and private sectors (Albrecht & 
Albrecht, 2004, p.15; Button, 2011, pp.251-252; Button & Gee, 2013, p.52; Smith et 
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al, 2011, pp.70-72).  Accordingly, the levels of experience and competence of these 
will vary widely (Comer, 2003, p.225).  The significance of these issues helps to 
explain the emphasis placed on the training of practitioners – both within their own 
organisations and, often, supplied to other organisations by those involved in 
intelligence sharing – identified in the research data. 
 
Technological issues, relating primarily to matters such as system incompatibility, 
data quality (including inconsistencies in the format of data stored by different 
organisations) and the volume of electronic data are certainly still relevant.  However, 
whilst these are challenges that must be faced by those processing and sharing 
intelligence for anti-economic crime purposes, solutions and fixes are readily 
available, from the agreement of data schema between partners to investment in 
bigger servers and technologies that can resolve these problems.  So whilst these 
challenges are still extant, and they appear regularly in the literature, especially that 
of a decade or so ago (e.g. Bellamy et al, 2005, p.397; Levi & Wall, 2004, p.215), 
these can be resolved with sufficient investment and so may perhaps be considered 
to be primarily cost and resource issues in essence.  The evidence from RI/20 and 
RI/21, from a government agency that had changed its intelligence system to be 
compatible with that of a key partner, Trading Standards, shows that these challenges 
can be overcome with sufficient commitment. 
 
Cultural issues, such as the reluctance or refusal to share by people or organisations, 
remain enduring themes both in the literature and the research data.  However, 
changing organisational culture can be a difficult, and often long-term, process.  
Organisational culture may be considered to be the shared values and beliefs that 
are collectively taken for granted and seen as non-negotiable from the basis of their 
historical success (Schein, 1996, p. 236; Schein, 2009, p.26).  Corfield and Paton 
(2016, p.91) observe that, while culture may be resistant to change, organisations 
must be able to adapt themselves to face new realities in the current environment.  
Alvesson and Sveningsson (2008, p.40) suggest that there are three main positions 
on the management of organisational culture: 
 
 that with the application of resources and skills, senior management may 
adapt culture 
 that senior management may adapt culture, but it is difficult to achieve 
 that culture is not controllable and, by implication, change may not be actively 
directed. 
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The challenge of changing culture is, therefore, well recognised.  Schein (2009, p.21) 
defines three levels of culture: 
 
 artifacts: visible corporate structures and processes 
 espoused values: organisational strategies, goals and philosophies 
 underlying assumptions: tacitly accepted norms which are the source of 
values and action. 
 
It is this third layer that must be changed to truly overcome some of the key challenges 
faced in intelligence sharing, although this change may be directed and supported by 
change in the other two.  This layer is the most difficult in which to enact change due 
to those assumptions being formed and held subconsciously; employees may not be 
aware of deficiencies in the existing cultural norm (Limwichitr & Broady-Preston, 
2015, p.484).  However, is possible to achieve change in information sharing 
behaviour, as in other areas.  Heller (2002, p.51) argues that, while most change 
programmes seek to change culture first, followed by behaviour, the real object is to 
change people’s actions first, and cultural change will follow.  Anti-fraud 
collaborations may be considered as security networks, described by Whelan (2015, 
p.2) as relationships between multiple entities within the security field, and in which 
culture is one of the most significant properties.  Whelan goes on to observe that 
cultural change occurs as agencies work together (2015, p.18), whilst Powell (1990, 
p.324) states that the sharing of information between partners itself can lead to the 
building of common values. 
 
Whelan states that there remains a significant gap in understanding of how security 
networks achieve cultural change (2015, p.8).  The findings from this research 
indicate that, within the anti-fraud and IP crime fields at least, the commitment of time 
and resources to programmes of education and training, not only of internal staff but 
of staff and senior managers within partner agencies and prospective partners, is an 
important strategy employed to achieve this end.  Given the challenges faced in this 
area, such training tends to focus on primary issues such as the nature of the 
problem, the legal framework for sharing and key aspects of intelligence handling in 
line with standards such as the NIM and MOPI.  The active involvement and support 
of senior officers of the organisations involved is also an important factor in effecting 
cultural change pertaining to information sharing. 
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One final challenge relates to the issue of intelligence sharing failure.  This is normally 
framed in terms of the failure to share intelligence, but in the discussions with FACT, 
supported by data from other participants, it is clear that there are two main angles of 
intelligence sharing failure: the failure to share information, and the sharing of data 
that should not be disseminated (Figure 8.1).  Both present significant problems in 
respect of effective collaboration and the maintenance of trust, while the area 
between these two positions is the critical intelligence sharing space in which sharing 
is both appropriate and necessary. 
 
Figure 8.1: Intelligence sharing failure and the critical intelligence sharing space 
 
 
Legislative Framework 
The research has provided data on the legislative framework available to 
organisations in the private and public sectors in respect of information sharing, and 
of the channels that are utilised.  It has provided further insight into some of the 
complexities and challenges with respect to this legislative infrastructure relating to 
intelligence sharing for anti-fraud and IP crime purposes. 
 
The findings focussed on three main topics, these being: the DPA and the exemption 
within s.29(3) relating to the disclosure of personal information for the prevention and 
detection of crime or the apprehension and prosecution of offenders; the gateway 
under s.68 of the SCA allowing public sector bodies to share information with SAFOs; 
and the legal gateways available to government departments for sharing information 
relating to fraud and financial crime.  Overall, the message echoed that which has 
been previously expressed in the literature; the general legal framework exists to 
enable organisations to share information and intelligence, but the law in its current 
form is poorly understood and regularly misinterpreted and misapplied. 
 
   
 
143 
 
The SCA provisions in respect of SAFOs is not being adequately utilised by public 
sector bodies to share with those private sector bodies so designated.  The evidence 
suggests that many public sector bodies remain unaware of the provision, do not 
understand it, or are unwilling to use it.  As such, this channel does not adequately 
fulfil its purpose of enabling cross-sector sharing.  Even when it does work, there 
remain so few bodies recognised as SAFOs that the provision remains extremely 
restrictive in its scope and potential.  This suggests that there has been limited 
progress since this channel was first established, despite reviews of the efficacy of 
the provision by the NFA (2010) and the ICO (2015a) highlighting these problems.  
Some participants in the research represented SAFOs; they reported that, with a few 
exceptions and some limited progress, that the channel was not working as intended 
or hoped. 
 
Likewise, the situation with respect to legal gateways for government departments to 
share information for anti-fraud purposes gives little confidence that government 
policy is travelling in the right direction.  The landscape of these provisions is complex 
and confusing, with myriad specific gateways in place and little clarity over which take 
precedence (Law Commission, 2014, p.26).  These are generally very restrictive in 
terms of scope and applicability, and result in a fragmented and misunderstood 
framework.  This continuing situation was a concern raised by several participants, 
who commented on the over-complexity of the provisions and the lack of flexibility 
allowed when the government continues to create – often at the behest of individual 
departments such as the DWP – gateways designed to allow limited sharing in 
response to specific criminal activity in precisely defined circumstances.  Where 
criminals continuously adapt their techniques and targets, this direction of travel is 
not only misguided but counterproductive, and is moving in the opposite direction to 
the simplification of primary legislation with respect to the core offences of fraud and 
bribery.  There was serious dissatisfaction expressed by participants at the current 
approach, and call for simplification and reform towards the creation of clear, broad 
channels to improve information sharing between and by government bodies.  
However, as noted in Chapter One, the government appears to be continuing along 
the path of creating new specific gateways such as that created in the Digital 
Economy Act 2017. 
 
The exemption on disclosure of information in s.29(3) of the DPA was shown to be a 
major issue for those sharing information and intelligence for economic crime 
purposes.  Participants saw the scope of the provision as providing a clear and 
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sufficient opportunity to allow relevant sharing between partner agencies, and the 
ability to do so legally.  As such, this exemption forms the legal basis upon which 
most participating organisations, within both public and private sectors, based their 
information sharing relationships and arrangements.  This was also detailed in the 
MOUs, contracts and service level agreements used by many participants, and was 
central to the agreements and approach used by FACT.  Where participants didn’t 
have formalised agreements in place, s.29(3) requests were often still used to request 
information from other parties on an ad-hoc basis. 
 
However, despite this reliance and general consensus that it provided a workable 
legal foundation for exchange, the data also confirmed that the DPA continues to 
provide significant obstacles in respect of information sharing.  Substantial concerns 
were voiced by participants across both phases of the data collection.  These 
focussed on serious issues such as lack of clarity in the legislation, serial and 
widespread misunderstanding and misinterpretation of it, and using the DPA as a 
shield by which to avoid sharing information rather than utilising the exemption as a 
means to enable it.  Additional concerns related to fear of the consequences of 
breaching the Act and enforcement action from the ICO if it was used incorrectly.  
These problems seem not to be constrained to the private sector, but were reported 
to affect public sector bodies and law enforcement agencies as well, and seriously 
impede information sharing within and across sectors.  These problems have been 
well documented within the grey literature and recognised as challenges for a long 
time, having been noted as serious issues within the Fraud Review (2006b, p.100).  
Similar problems have been noted with respect to the DPA for other criminal justice 
failings beyond the fraud and IP crime arena, such as in the Bichard Report (2004) 
into the Soham murders.  It is disappointing that little progress appears to have been 
made in this area, despite widespread recognition of the problem and the publication 
of guidance and codes of practice intended to provide clarification.  This failure means 
that, despite confidence in the adequacy of the provisions, the application of the 
legislation remains dysfunctional and impedes information and intelligence sharing.  
Additional guidance has been issued by the ICO (2015b) since the data collection 
was completed; while the impact of this cannot be determined from the research data, 
it seems reasonable to conclude that this alone will be insufficient to tackle the deep 
seated dysfunctionality of the DPA in respect of information sharing. 
 
Education and awareness, and setting out the legislative framework within MOUs and 
similar documents, remain the key strategies employed by organisations to overcome 
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these problems, but the prospects for success of these approaches will be 
constrained without government intervention and simplification or clarification of the 
law.  Furthermore, while this provision remains the primary general basis for sharing, 
it is further constrained by being an optional, rather than mandatory or recommended, 
conduit, and qualifying requests under s.29(3) may be refused by the recipient.  This 
provides potential contradiction and conflict with the finding that there is greater 
general impetus to share, and government initiatives to encourage it, including the 
“dare to share” mantra. 
 
However, clarity on data protection law appears to be an unlikely prospect for some 
years to come.  On 24 May 2016, the EU General Data Protection Regulation [GDPR] 
came into force, with the objective of harmonising data protection rules across all EU 
member states (Linder, 2016, p.108).  Despite the UK’s referendum vote to leave the 
EU [Brexit] in June 2016, the GDPR will apply in the UK in May 2018 when the 
Regulation takes effect across EU member states as the UK will not have left the EU 
by this date (ICO, 2016, p.3); thus it will have force of law in the UK, replacing the 
DPA.  The impact of the GDPR on information sharing is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, as it had not been published at the time of data collection, although most 
participants, including FACT, confirmed during interviews that they were closely 
monitoring developments in this area.  However, the change in legislation will 
undoubtedly introduce uncertainty and change in respect of data sharing, and the full 
implications and determination of rights and powers under the GDPR will be subject 
to debate and legal tests for many years to come (Calder, 2016, p.1).  Given the lack 
of clarity evident with respect to the DPA, the changes with the GDPR will ensure 
uncertainty for the foreseeable future.  Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether 
the GDPR will remain in full force, or if it will itself be changed and replaced, following 
the UK’s eventual exit from the EU. 
 
Standards 
While there is a provisionally adequate, albeit flawed and dysfunctional, legislative 
framework in place that can enable information sharing, there is no such established 
set of national standards that govern the practice of information sharing or intelligence 
handling across all sectors.  There are standards in the law enforcement arena, 
including the NIM, MOPI and the 5x5x5 grading system (superseded by the 3x5x2 
model after the data collection had taken place).  These have collectively become the 
benchmark, and the default standards that many information sharing models have 
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adopted, despite being designed primarily for use in the law enforcement 
environment. 
 
FACT has based its operating model as an intelligence-led organisation around the 
central tenets of the NIM business model.  This can be seen in its adoption of key 
structures and processes prescribed by NIM: from maintenance of a Control Strategy 
setting out its strategic direction; the running of Tasking and Coordination meetings; 
the recording and dissemination of intelligence on information reports using the 5x5x5 
grading process; and its production of core intelligence products described in NIM, 
including its Strategic Assessment, Target Profiles and Problem Profiles (ACPO 
Centrex, 2005).  This is fundamental to FACT’s approach both to its operational model 
and its strategy for collaboration with partner agencies as it means that it produces 
intelligence products that its key partners – law enforcement agencies – recognise, 
understand and are confident to act upon. 
 
Many other participants in the research also advised how their organisations adopted 
parts of the NIM process and outputs, grade incoming or outgoing intelligence 
according to the 5x5x5 model and adhere to MOPI guidelines for similar reasons.  In 
the absence of a formal national standard across all sectors, the law enforcement 
framework has become the de facto standard to which many, although not all, 
organisations and intelligence sharing schemes align. 
 
However, just as FACT follows the spirit of the model, but does not rigidly apply every 
aspect of it (CS/18), neither do the other private sector organisations that adopt, or 
adapt, parts of the NIM business model.  They can, and do, pick and choose which 
elements to apply in accordance with their own procedures and needs.  This is 
inherently sensible, as the NIM was designed to apply to a law enforcement 
environment, supporting a diverse range of policing issues and operating at three 
levels: local; cross-border and organised crime (NCIS, 2000, p.8).  Much of the model 
may not be relevant or appropriate to non-law enforcement bodies and businesses.  
Herein also lies the danger.  Where organisations will pick and choose elements of a 
default adopted model in the absence of national standards, and may interpret and 
apply them according to their own needs and criteria, such practice risks devaluing 
the model as a whole.  Whereas FACT demonstrably goes to considerable lengths to 
maintain high standards and produce high quality intelligence products, not all 
organisations may be so rigid.  This risks undermining trust in the whole system and 
making professed adherence to the NIM, or other standards, meaningless outside of 
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the law enforcement arena.  Accordingly, this could undermine this key strategy of 
those organisations that do use the NIM appropriately to enable intelligence sharing 
and maintain trust with partners.  This is one of the many problems and risks that 
arises not only from the lack of national standards for intelligence handling and 
sharing, but the lack of a national intelligence strategy that takes all sectors into 
account and the absence of a central body to maintain oversight of this. 
 
Relationship Management 
The foundation of effective information sharing is having strong relationships with 
partners.  Analysis of the data collected suggested that there were four key, and 
interlinked, aspects of such a relationship: trust; competence, mutual understanding 
and reciprocity.  These elements are inter-related in terms of how they reflect 
organisational capability of handling and disseminating information and intelligence, 
and of how collaborating partners’ goals and needs for the relationship have been 
aligned (Figure 8.2).  These issues had been variously identified in the literature, with 
barriers of lack of trust identified by, amongst others, Canestraro et al (2009) and 
Schooley and Horan (2007), one-way flow of information by Zheng et al (2008) and 
lack of understanding by Bharosa et al (2010).  Competence in intelligence handling 
has been less directly covered, although competence issues have been both inferred 
and discussed in respect of discrete matters such as data privacy (Boba et al, 2009).  
The data confirms that all of these factors are essential, although reciprocity may be 
subject to mutual acceptance of more information flowing in one direction than the 
other if this serves the interests of both parties.  Given the range of organisations 
across all sectors to which counter fraud work pertains, competence is perhaps a 
more significant factor in anti-fraud intelligence sharing than other criminal justice 
arenas for reasons of scale alone. 
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Figure 8.2: Prime attributes of effective information-sharing relationships 
 
 
There are a number of key strategies employed by participating organisations that 
address these issues.  Training and education of internal staff and, perhaps crucially, 
training of partners’ staff (and members of intelligence sharing schemes) is central to 
their success.  Adherence to – and training to – the default standards (e.g. NIM) is an 
important part of this.  The involvement of senior officers is also valuable, especially 
in establishing relationships and developing understanding, as well as from the basis 
of having people involved who have the authority to make decisions on behalf of their 
organisations.  Likewise, many participants reported that the use of SPOCs, both as 
contact points and gatekeepers who are responsible for maintaining agreed 
standards, are important.  These findings reinforce the previous identification of these 
within the literature as enablers to sharing.  The role of MOUs and contracts, also 
acknowledged within the literature, was an important element within anti-fraud 
information sharing.  These were extensively used by FACT and other participants in 
formalising relationships.  MOUs set out the agreed processes and standards and 
help to cement trust and understanding between parties.  This can be reinforced by 
the agreement and conduct of audit and compliance processes (also an important 
element of the mechanisms described by many participants). 
 
Trust may also be influenced by underlying motivation.  While there are services for 
the sharing of intelligence that are profit-orientated, it is notable that FACT and all of 
the industry-based schemes that took part in the research were non-profit making 
entities, with boards comprised of representatives of member firms.  This may not be 
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an essential factor, but it may help to strengthen trust amongst those participating in 
the schemes as there is no secondary motive. 
 
The issue of reciprocity is an important one, as the one-way flow of information can 
critically undermine a relationship where both parties are expectant of receiving 
information in return for that which is given.  Public sector bodies received significant 
criticism from participants on this point.  However, the levels of information that must 
be shared in each direction will be different for each relationship.  Many of the 
industry-based information sharing schemes specifically audit members’ provision of 
information.  But this is not necessarily critical in every information sharing 
relationship.  FACT officers generally stated that they were content to act primarily as 
providers of information to their partners (especially law enforcement) as this fulfilled 
FACT's needs, which was to get these agencies to take action.  RI/21 was similarly 
inclined.  The crucial element of success then, is not necessarily that both parties will 
have equal flows of information incoming and outgoing, but agreeing expectations.  If 
both partners are content with a majority, or even all, information and intelligence to 
be flowing in one direction, and expect this to be the case in operation, the relationship 
can work well on that basis.  It is where expectations are not fulfilled in reality that 
problems will arise; this further underlines the importance of mutual understanding. 
 
Two concerning issues arise from the data in respect of relationship management.  
Firstly, many information sharing relationships rely on the private networks and 
personal contacts of the staff working in anti-crime functions.  Often these will be 
based on historical relationships between, or affinities held by, ex-law enforcement 
officers.  This is primarily due to the similar experiences and understanding that such 
a shared background brings, and an initial trust in the standards to which intelligence 
will be processed and graded.  As such, this can be a practical substitute in lieu of 
recognised national standards and accreditation in anti-fraud and intelligence 
handling work.  However, it does serve to exclude practitioners and organisations 
without access to this relevant experience, and may impede their abilities to build and 
engage in productive information sharing relationships.  Secondly, there continues to 
be reliance on informal and off-the-record sharing, some of which may technically be 
illegal or, at least, outside the spirit of the legislation.  This is often followed up by a 
formal s.29(3) request if it is confirmed that the intelligence is there and is relevant.  
Such activity will invariably fall on a spectrum, ranging from a preliminary informal 
steer through to non-documented provision of sensitive intelligence and personal 
data; at one end this may constitute illegal behaviour and abuse of process.  Again, 
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the lack of clear national standards and central oversight could be a factor in this 
activity. 
 
Models of Information Sharing 
During the interviews, several different models of data sharing were discussed by 
participants, either in respect of how the organisations that they represented 
structured their information sharing relationships or described from their previous 
experiences.  While these models were subject to varying amounts of complexity and 
detail in operation, the underlying structures of these have been represented in 
Figures 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5 below. 
 
Figure 8.3: One-to-one information sharing (three variants) 
 
 
Figure 8.3 summarises three commonly used variants, described by participants, of 
models for inter-organisational information sharing based on the use of the DPA 
s.29(3) exemption. 
 
Variant 1 illustrates an informal information sharing relationship, whereby an officer 
in an anti-crime department of Organisation 1 makes an ad-hoc request for 
information under s.29(3), relating to an incident under investigation, to a similar 
department within Organisation 2.  Providing that the request satisfies the 
requirements of s.29(3), Organisation 2 may decide whether or not it chooses to 
provide the information requested.  Organisation 1 has little basis for determining 
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whether or not Organisation 2 is likely to be inclined to cooperate.  This is the default 
model under which most organisations will operate, unless they have information 
sharing agreements in place with other parties. 
 
Under Variant 2, the information request is made by Organisation 1 to Organisation 
2 using the same underlying legal basis for the appeal.  However, in this model, the 
two organisations have an MOU in place that sets out the basis of their information 
sharing relationship, and under which each organisation has nominated SPOCs to 
act as gatekeepers for this purpose.  The SPOC for Organisation 1 issues the s.29(3) 
request to the SPOC for Organisation 2 who will make the decision as to whether to 
accede to the request if it is determined to meet the s.29(3) criteria.  While 
Organisation 2 is still not obliged to cooperate under this model, even if the sharing 
would be legal under the DPA, it is far more likely to be amenable to the request as 
there is a formal relationship in place, the protocols for collaboration and exchange 
of information and intelligence are agreed and documented, and there are established 
points of contact through which requests made under the MOU are made.  This is the 
optimal of the three variants, and most likely to result in successful sharing of 
information, and is the essence of the model used by FACT, as well as other 
participants in the study. 
 
Variant 3 describes an informal information sharing relationship between two 
organisations similar to that depicted in Variant 1.  However, the s.29(3) request is 
made by an officer in Organisation 1 who has a contact in Organisation 2 on the basis 
of their private network, such as a shared history in law enforcement.  The request 
operates in the same manner as that for Variant 1, but may be more favourably 
received and responded to by the recipient in Organisation 2 on the basis of their 
personal relationship.  While this can be beneficial in the immediate circumstances of 
the information request illustrated in Figure 8.3, and can lead to successful sharing 
and collaboration, this model bears the risk of failure should either of the parties in 
the private network leave their positions in their respective organisations, in which the 
basis of the collaborative relationship and mutual understanding would be lost, and 
the two organisations would be left with the model illustrated in Variant 1. 
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Figure 8.4: Hub-and-spoke model (externally searchable database) 
 
 
Figure 8.4 depicts the underlying model of information sharing used by several of the 
information sharing schemes that took part in the research, including those 
represented by RI/04 and RI/06.  In this, scheme members agree to a standard 
agreement that documents the rules and responsibilities of the relationship, in a 
similar manner to an MOU but having a single agreement that applies to all members 
rather than individual terms for each organisation.  Under the agreement, members 
of the scheme will upload appropriate anti-crime related information or intelligence 
that is organised and stored by the scheme in a central database.  When members 
are seeking information, they will access the scheme’s database via a secure portal, 
or other established means of access, and search for the information that they 
require.  If information meeting the search criteria has been uploaded by another 
scheme member, this will be accessible by the member searching for it providing that 
the request and exchange meets the rules set by the scheme (and potentially subject 
to further restrictions on access to the information set by the provider).  This is a 
model that can enable successful many-to-many information sharing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
153 
 
Figure 8.5: Hub-and-spoke model (onward referral via central coordinator) 
 
 
Figure 8.5 also illustrates a model used by information sharing schemes, and one that 
can be suitable to enable information and intelligence sharing between multiple 
parties.  It shares similar characteristics to the model described in Figure 8.4 in that 
scheme members agree to a standard set of rules and responsibilities that govern the 
scheme.  However, instead of information being uploaded and made available for 
access through a repository accessible to all members, the scheme relies instead on 
a central coordinator to facilitate intelligence sharing between members on a one-to-
one basis (or a one-to-many basis if multiple members hold relevant intelligence).  In 
this model, a scheme member will submit an intelligence request to the scheme 
coordinator.  The coordinator, in turn, will push this request out to other members to 
seek confirmation of whether they might hold relevant intelligence that would satisfy 
the request.  If another member does have this, and is willing to share it with the 
requestor, it will notify the coordinator, who in turn will notify the requestor and provide 
the contact details of the responding member.  The requestor will then submit a formal 
information request, under DPA s.29(3), to the responding member, detailing the 
request in full.  The responding member will then make a decision whether or not it is 
willing to provide the intelligence that it holds to the requestor in response to the 
formal request.  This model provides the basis on which the schemes represented by 
RI/12 and RI/15 operate. 
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Call for Professionalisation 
Given the range of challenges in sharing information and intelligence for anti-fraud 
and IP crime purposes, the number and diversity of organisations potentially involved 
and the factors involved in ensuring success, there is inevitably a call and need for 
greater professionalism in both intelligence handling and anti-economic crime work.  
This is driven by a mix of the complex legal environment, the sensitivities and skills 
required in the work, the lack of a national strategy, coordination or oversight and the 
daunting breadth and scale of the economic losses caused by fraud and IP crime.  
Practitioners recognise that they need training, accreditation, recognition and a body 
of standards to which to adhere, all of which were repeated themes in the research 
interviews in both phases of data collection. 
 
Professionalism, and what constitutes a professional, can be viewed through several 
different lenses.  It can be considered as a state-sanctioned recognition of the status 
and value of an occupation, and a privileged category that deliberately sets it a 
profession apart from other vocations (Edgley, Sharma & Anderson-Gough, 2016, 
pp.15-16).  In the military intelligence context, importance is also placed on the 
concept of a profession being able to self-regulate and operate with limited external 
interference (Kreuzer, 2016, p.581), a logic that applies within other contexts with 
varying degrees of accuracy.  As was discussed in Chapter Seven, there are many 
identifiable characteristics that have been used to define or describe the concept of a 
profession, including those of specialised education and training, professional 
institutions setting standards and applying control over access to a body of knowledge 
as well as the application of judgement and skill by the professional.  This latter is 
perhaps especially resonant given the importance that interviewees gave to the issue 
of competence in handling and sharing information and intelligence both appropriately 
and legally.  Professionalisation is the process to achieve such status and for the 
work of practitioners to demonstrate and uphold such standards.  This was called for 
and otherwise discussed by many participants, most prominently and extensively by 
RI/13. 
 
The data indicated that very early, tentative steps are being made in this direction 
within the intelligence field.  This includes initiatives to establish higher education 
qualifications in intelligence handling and more professional training being developed, 
including the IPP by the College of Policing which has also announced that it will seek 
chartered status.  In the absence of extant professional bodies, however, there was 
evidence from participants of organisations taking it into their own hands to improve 
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standards and skills through the provision of training to their own and other 
organisations’ employees and members in order to provide them with the underlying 
skills and knowledge to handle and share information legally and effectively. 
 
However, these are early steps, and will on their own have limited potential to extend 
to the wide range of practitioners across all sectors and industries involved in 
intelligence and anti-economic crime work.  Without a co-ordinated intelligence 
strategy incorporating all sectors, and central oversight of this, the risk is that any 
moves toward professionalisation that do occur will be focussed solely in one sector, 
such as law enforcement or the public sector, to the exclusion of others.  This could 
serve to improve intelligence handling and sharing within these areas, but could 
compound existing problems elsewhere and may further undermine cross-sector 
information sharing by reducing trust in the skills and standards employed by 
practitioners in excluded sectors.  This would therefore strengthen the hand of 
criminals involved in fraud and IP crime for years to come. 
 
The issue of professionalisation, the tentative steps towards it, and the recognised 
need for it was an underlying theme running throughout the study.  Many of the key 
issues that emerged from the interviews across both phases of data collection are 
closely linked to it, either explicitly or implicitly.  The importance of adhering to 
consistent standards in information and intelligence handling and sharing, the 
requisite emphasis on quality of data and outputs and the roles of trust and reputation 
in ensuring effective information sharing relationships were consistent themes, and 
inherent in the underlying conception of professions and professionalism.  Likewise, 
in the current absence of broad, cross-sector standards for information and 
intelligence handling and sharing, efforts to attain and adhere to these can be seen 
in the adoption of the standards and practices in law enforcement and industry-wide 
standards (such as those in the insurance sector) point to this need and drive.  
Similarly, the resources expended on the training of participating organisation’s own 
employees and those of partners, plus equivalent training provided by some of the 
information sharing schemes to their members, further demonstrates the recognition 
of the need to apply ‘professional’ judgement and skill, and the value of consistent 
and appropriate standards, processes and quality as well as legislative compliance 
in information sharing.  Progressing the professionalisation process across all sectors 
would be a significant step in encouraging and enabling information and intelligence 
sharing within and across sectors in the UK. 
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Summary 
Information and intelligence sharing in the anti-economic crime context remains 
subject to a complex array of challenges and barriers that reduce participation and 
prevent the benefits of collaboration from being more widely realised.  While these 
challenges are not unique to the economic crime setting, they are amplified by the 
sheer number and range of actors with interests in this area.  Furthermore they are 
exacerbated by a legal framework which, while for most parties does allow for 
appropriate information sharing, suffers from over-complexity, lack of clarity, 
widespread misinterpretation and uncertainty, the latter of which is likely to be 
compounded for years to come with the forthcoming introduction of the GDPR.  While 
these problems are substantial, the data has shown that the devotion of resources to 
training and education of internal employees and those of partners is a key strategy 
to successfully collaborating in this legal environment.  The adoption of, and 
alignment with, standards prevalent in law enforcement – in the absence of more 
widely applicable guidelines – is also a widespread strategy, although there are 
dangers inherent in the differences in how these may be interpreted by different 
parties, so this would benefit from coordination and oversight.  There are a variety of 
structures and models employed to facilitate effective collaboration, and these can be 
utilised to enable bilateral or multilateral information sharing relationships.  These 
frameworks can be bolstered further by a range of relationship management 
strategies to achieve the most effective outcomes for those involved. 
 
The next chapter brings these themes together, and examines them against the 
research questions to set out the final conclusions of the study, as well as examining 
the contribution to knowledge that this enquiry has made. 
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Chapter Nine 
 
Conclusions 
 
Introduction 
Following the presentation and discussion of the findings of the research in Chapters 
Four to Eight, this chapter sets out the key contribution made to knowledge of 
information and intelligence sharing in the economic crime context, and presents the 
overall conclusions of the study.  These are presented with reference to the research 
questions raised in Chapter One. 
 
Contribution to Knowledge 
This research has contributed to knowledge of economic crime-related information 
sharing in several ways.  It is the first time that a UK-based organisation in the IP 
crime arena has been examined by way of a case study into its operations with 
respect to intelligence handling and sharing, allowing greater understanding of the 
means by which it undertakes information sharing activities with partner agencies.  
The study has added to the body of knowledge on anti-crime information and 
intelligence sharing, and has substantively enhanced that with specific respect to 
organisations operating in the anti-fraud and IP crime fields.  It has also added in a 
modest way to our understanding of intelligence failure within anti-economic crime 
information sharing by identifying inappropriate intelligence sharing as a type of 
intelligence failure.  Finally, although it did not explicitly set out to do so, it has made 
a contribution to our understanding of how security networks achieve cultural change. 
 
Any research of this nature will invariably raise new questions and leave other areas 
open for new and further exploration.  There is considerable scope for further work to 
be undertaken in several topics relating to this subject area, including in the following 
directions: 
 
 whether the general adoption of a non-mandatory set of standards, designed 
specifically for use by a particular sector, in lieu of a general standard for 
intelligence handling and dissemination, will result in that standard losing its 
value as a benchmark of reliability through inconsistent interpretation and 
application, and the extent to which this occurs 
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 the impact of legislative change, including the introduction of the GDPR and 
any further developments arising from Brexit, on information and intelligence 
sharing 
 the process and development of the drive towards professionalisation in 
intelligence handling, the extent to which this occurs across all sectors, and 
the impact on any sectors or industries that are excluded from this process. 
 
Conclusions 
In order to conclude the study, it is worth briefly revisiting the questions set in Chapter 
One that framed the scope of the research. 
 
What are the Contemporary Barriers and Challenges to Information Sharing? 
As a general observation, the primary challenges to sharing information and 
intelligence to combat economic crime are broadly similar to those challenges in 
sharing data in other criminal justice fields.  The main challenges cited by participants 
are summarised in Figure 9.1, organised into technical, organisational (non-cultural 
and cultural) and political classifications.  The real challenge in respect of economic 
crime are that these issues affect a diverse range of organisations across all 
industries and sectors, rather than being the preserve of law enforcement agencies, 
and the practitioners that face and try to overcome them have equally diverse 
backgrounds and skills.  These problems are compounded further by the lack of 
national standards which makes it difficult to establish benchmarks for quality and 
reliability against which trusted relationships could be forged.  Furthermore, the legal 
framework is complex, misunderstood and, following the Brexit vote and the 
forthcoming introduction of the GDPR, subject to years of change and uncertainty 
ahead. 
 
Figure 9.1: Economic crime information sharing barriers 
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What Strategies can be Deployed to Overcome these Challenges? 
Organisations can overcome the challenges to information sharing.  The focus should 
be on establishing trust and mutual understanding of processes and outcomes, and 
ensuring that the practitioners involved have the requisite skills and knowledge to 
handle and share intelligence competently.  Key strategies employed, both by 
organisations in one-to-one data sharing relationships and by intelligence sharing 
schemes, emphasise aligning to best practice standards such as the NIM in the 
absence of mandatory requirements, formalising relationships and expectations 
through MOUs or contractual documents, and investing in training, education and 
awareness of both internal staff and those of the other party.  These strategies can 
be readily adopted by other organisations given sufficient commitment and resource, 
and there is no reason why any organisation could not get to a position whereby it 
can successfully exchange information and intelligence with others to combat 
economic crime.  Competence, quality, trust and reputation are key elements in 
building and maintaining collaborative relationships.  Mutual understanding – 
including agreeing expectations in respect of the issue of the direction of data flow 
and levels of reciprocation by each party, and aligning this to the needs of all 
participants – is also essential if the relationship is to be productive, mutually 
beneficial and effective in the longer term. 
 
How Can Professional Practice be Improved to Overcome the Challenges? 
In order to extend successful information and intelligence sharing on a widespread 
basis across all industries and sectors, and between sectors, professional practice 
needs to be improved at three levels. 
 
At the operational level, practitioners need to be competent at handling, storing and 
disseminating sensitive and personal information and intelligence.  If they are to 
adhere to the default standards, they need to be competent in applying the requisite 
skills and judgement in line with best practice in a manner that is proportionate, 
responsible and within the legal framework, and consistently with those standards. 
 
At the strategic level, organisations need to commit to intelligence sharing 
relationships if they aspire to having these.  This requires allocation of appropriate 
resources and demonstrating senior level support to ensure that practitioners can 
receive adequate training, and have the necessary processes and systems to 
process and disseminate intelligence appropriately.  This must be supported by a 
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culture – in either the organisation as a whole, or at least within the relevant 
departments – that supports information and intelligence sharing.  Those responsible 
for building and maintaining the relationships for all parties need to be clear about the 
expectations of each party, and deliver on these. 
 
At the government policy level, there is an urgent need for national standards to be 
set for intelligence handling and sharing, and for an intelligence strategy covering 
anti-crime intelligence that incorporates organisations operating outside of the public 
sector.  The present situation, whereby private sector organisations align their 
approach to law enforcement standards is understandable in the absence of a 
mandated cross-sector standard, but may ultimately result in trust in these standards 
breaking down where organisations adopt parts of the NIM in a piecemeal way and 
interpret and apply it inconsistently.  This risk was previously identified in policing, 
with MOPI introduced to promote uniformity of application (John and Maguire, 2007, 
p.207).  There is, therefore, similar need for such a mechanism in respect of wider 
adoption of the NIM framework.   
 
Support should also be given to the tentative professionalisation agenda that is 
emerging in both the intelligence and counter fraud fields; this will need government 
support and oversight to ensure that it applies across all sectors to the benefit of the 
economy as a whole.  Finally, in an environment in which significant change can be 
expected over the coming years to the legal framework in which information and 
intelligence sharing must take place, the government must work to ensure that 
sufficient clarity and guidance is given as early as possible to allow organisations to 
work to a common understanding of the emerging legal requirements.  The current 
legislation is excessively complex and commonly misunderstood.  The necessary 
changes over the coming years will create further uncertainty but should be used as 
an opportunity to work towards creating a clear legal framework within which 
organisations across all sectors can share information competently and appropriately 
in order to effectively combat fraud, financial and IP crime. 
 
Concluding Comments 
Because of the range of organisations and practitioners involved, and the convoluted 
and opaque nature of the current legal framework, information and intelligence 
sharing in the anti-fraud and IP crime fields is a complex matter.  The underlying aim 
is simple: to effect proportionate and appropriate sharing of information in a legal 
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manner between organisations to prevent, detect, investigate or pursue action 
against criminality.  In practice, however, it is a difficult end to achieve. 
 
This research has shown that some organisations do manage to do so effectively and 
appropriately, and that there are benefits to all parties that achieve this.  Many of the 
strategies that they employ can be readily adopted and replicated – with the 
application of sufficient commitment and resource – by others. 
 
However, elements of the strategies on which this success is built are based on fragile 
and uneven foundations.  These may both undermine the prospects for ongoing 
intelligence sharing and exclude other organisations from realising the benefit of this 
valuable tool for mitigating crime risks.  There remains significant reliance on informal 
networks and the relationships between practitioners who are ex-police officers, 
described by one participant as an ‘old boy’s network’; a potentially ironic situation 
given that many intelligence analysts within police forces are civilians (John and 
Maguire, 2007, p.203).  While this can work for those organisations with the relevant 
contacts in place, it does imply that other organisations may be at a disadvantage.  
The reason for this situation is readily apparent: the mutual trust in the application of 
intelligence handling standards understood by current and former law enforcement 
personnel.  The surest way to overcome this hurdle would be for the introduction of 
an integrated national strategy, the setting of national standards that apply across all 
sectors and that are translatable between them, and the introduction of training and 
accreditation processes that can be accessed by practitioners in all sectors.  This is 
a lofty aspiration, but the potential benefits that could be realised across the entire 
economy by enabling organisations to take advantage of intelligence sharing to 
combat fraud and IP crime would make the investment and commitment worthwhile. 
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Appendix Seventeen: Phase One Interview Schedules 
 
Various version of the semi-structured interview schedule were produced for the 
following job roles within FACT (listed in the order reproduced in this appendix): 
 
- Criminal Justice Officer 
- Director General 
- Director of Investigations and Intelligence 
- Field Investigator 
- Forensic Examiner 
- Human Resources 
- Intelligence Analyst 
- Intelligence Manager 
- Intelligence Researcher 
- Internet Investigator 
- Internet Researcher 
- Internet Supervisor 
- Investigations Manager 
- ISP Liaison Officer 
- IT Support 
- Legal Counsel 
- Market Strategist 
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Appendix Eighteen: Phase Two Interview Schedules 
 
Various version of the semi-structured interview schedule were produced (listed in 
the order reproduced in this appendix): 
 
- General interview schedule (used for most participants) 
- Regulator interview schedule 
- Government Strategy / Policy interview schedule 
- Government Information Sharing Research Project interview schedule 
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Appendix Nineteen: 5x5x5 Information/Intelligence Report Template 
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Source: Manchester Safeguarding Children Board: 
www.manchesterscb.org.uk/displaydoc.asp?id=466 
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Appendix Twenty: 3x5x2 Information/Intelligence Report Grading System 
 
 
 
Source: College of Policing: https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-
content/intelligence-management/intelligence-report/ 
 
 
 
 
